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What is the added value of strategic theory in the understanding of Swedish securityand defence policies? By introducing a series of concepts that identify policiesthat are pursued in both peace and war such as escalation, deterrence, andweapons acquisition, we argue that strategic concepts contribute to the analysisof Swedish security policy mainly by highlighting forms of policy that do not conceptuallyrest upon the dichotomy of war and peace. Differently from mainstreamscholarly analysis that treats deterrence as one, uniform concept, we differentiatebetween four different logics of deterrence. Using this conceptual tool, we analyseSwedish policies in the 1950s and 2010s and discover that although Sweden pursueddeterrence during both this periods, her policies depend on a different logic. Bycomparison, 1950s Sweden understood to pursue deterrence understood as a wall,while 2010s Sweden understands the term in terms of a shield.

The Vietnam War has generated a vast literature but one which has often forgotten that the United States fought in Vietnam as part of a coalition. This article examines Washington's efforts under President Lyndon B. Johnson to recruit third country combat assistance. He and his colleagues sought military help less for practical reasons than for political ones as a way of legitimizing the war both domestically and abroad. However, no NATO countries were willing to participate, and some of the five troop-contributing countries (Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand) were attracted probably more by American largesse than by idealism. In exploring the diplomacy of coalition-building, this article has a contemporary resonance in the light of the military campaigns initiated by the White House since 2003.

Piracy can lead to risks so high that they, according to the International Maritime Organization, are tolerable only if risk reduction is not practicable or is disproportionate to the benefits achieved. Therefore, there is a need for reducing ship security risks in relation to antagonistic threats such as piracy. The aim of this study is to identify challenges for ship operators when developing their ship security management. Furthermore, this study also investigates two central aspects in the analysis: understanding the threat and understanding how a security threat affects the crew and operation of the ship. It is clear from the analysis that the importance of subjective aspects beyond a ship operators’ direct control is high. This seems to be the fact for all aspects of the risk management process. The situation is also dynamic as the security risk, as well as the risk perception, can change dramatically even though there are no actual operational changes. As a result, the ship security management process is highly iterative and depends on situations on board as well as conditions out of the ship operator’s control. In order to make ship security manageable, the risk management has to put particular focus on methodological understanding, relevant system understanding and well-defined risk acceptance criteria as well as on including all levels of the organization in the risk reduction implementation and on a continuous monitoring.

This article analyses the alteration of the referent object for maritime security from protection of shipping and port facilities to protection of citizens and national economies. It presents a tentative answer on the extent and consequences of this alteration applied by states in a global perspective, and focuses on validating four explanatory factors on why the alteration has occurred. The time period of study is between 1991 and 2013. Its results illustrate a transition in states’ security policies from traditional expressions of maritime security to broader security perspectives, and also indicates radically altered maritime strategic perspectives among states.

This article argues that the method outlined in NATO’s Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) manual is entirely based on systems theory and describes how to apply the principles for managing system change through comprehensive operations projects. Such systems thinking is based on conceptually different principles than traditional military planning methods. Students must therefore be provided with new conceptual tools to understand and handle the complex planning process outlined in the COPD manual. Thereto, they require knowledge of its founding scientific theories to meet academic standards. The concluding message is that military teachers and students must widen their individual mental frames of reference through a transformational learning process to obtain the comprehensive understanding required to fully manage the COPD process. Moreover, they need to prepare for facilitating dialogues in the less mature comprehensive operations planning teams of real-life situations.

Maritime security is increasingly important for the coastal states of the Baltic Sea, which collaborate on sea surveillance in pursuit of maritime domain awareness. Finland and Sweden operate a bilateral system and assume lead roles in multilateral projects; Russia’s increasingly aggressive behavior has led them to substantially deepen their defense cooperation by creating a standing bilateral Naval Task Group. We examine this cooperation from a security policy perspective. For the project to succeed, it must operate in harmony with other cooperative strategies and it will also require substantial legislative changes. If Finland and Sweden succeed in adopting new policies, common structures, and organizational norms in their navies, a deep integration is conceivable.

Recently, Finland and Sweden decided to substantially deepen their defence cooperation and this project involves creating a bilateral standing Naval Task Group (SFNTG). The present article aims at examining the deepening naval cooperation between Finland and Sweden from a regional integration perspective, focusing on its motives, current challenges and future prospects. Driven by perceptions of common challenges and desires for cost-effectiveness, and strengthened by recent successes on sea surveillance and a combined Amphibious Task Unit, the bilateral project has considerable potential to achieve success. To fulfil its objectives, substantial legal changes in both countries are required to allow the use of force on each other’s territorial waters. To cater for the requirement of not conflicting with EU, NORDEFCO or NATO cooperations, the bilateral Task Group must operate according to NATO standards and by using English as the language in command and control. The costs of adjusting the naval units to NATO’s technical requirements are far from negligible and this issue still remains to be solved. If Finland and Sweden manage to incorporate new policies, common structures and common organisational norms among their navies, an even deeper integration, as in Belgium and the Netherlands, are conceivable.

The new US maritime strategy has received praise from many corners of the world. As a manual it is well suited to guide the efforts of its three sea services in navigating a challenging global security environment in the years ahead. The strategy emphasises maritime presence, both where conflict threatens the global system and US national interests, and where allies require reassurance, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. However, Stefan Lundqvist and J J Widen argue that the document fails, to some extent, to address Russia’s increasingly challenging conduct and its implications for Northeast Europe and the Baltic Sea region.

The aim of this article is to analyze the tactical behavior of Somali pirates, international naval forces, and the shipping community operating in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin. To what extent has tactical behavior changed over time and can this process be understood in more theoretical terms? Our theoretical framework centers around some concepts often used in naval doctrine, discussing tactical change in terms of command and control, force, mobility, protection, intelligence, and endurance. We also evaluate this change using two tactical concepts—tactical adaptation and tactical development. The empirical data is based on statistics from the International Criminal Court-International Maritime Bureau and the EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta, as well as interviews. We conclude that Somali piracy has unquestionably adapted their tactics to circumstances, while naval forces have increased their capacity to capture pirates and shipping to avoid pirates.

Sjömakt, teori och praktik är en studie i krigsvetenskap där författaren försöker förklara de bakomliggande faktorerna av begreppet sjömakt. Sjömakt, teori och praktik är uppdelad i tre böcker; den första boken behandlar sjömaktens och sjökrigets teoretiska bakgrund, den andra boken handlar om hur denna kan utnyttjas och den tredje boken belyser folkrättens möjligheter eller begränsningar av densamma.Bokens syfte är att ge en bred översikt över begreppet sjömakt, men även att försöka bringa ordning i begreppsfloran samt att ge exempel från historien. Till ett av de tyngre bidragen hör beskrivningen av de tidigare sjökrigsteoretikernas idéer, den ingående redogörelsen i 17 av sjökrigets metoder samt granskningen av den operativa nivåns villkor.Boken är en av de första som på svenska beskriver förutsättningarna i litorala havsområden, lågintensiva konflikter och fredsfrämjande marina operationer. Boken är också en av de första som sorterar in temporära zoner i ett mönster.Sjömakt, Teori och praktik är helt ny. Visserligen finns grunden i en tidigare bok, Den Blå Boken, men de flesta kapitel är nyskrivna, medan andra har utsatts för omfattande bearbetning.

Denna bok utgör den noggrannaste och mest djupgående beskrivningen hittills av USA:s syn på ­Sverige under det turbulenta 1960-talet. Få har grävt så djupt i amerikanska arkiv om Sveriges ­säkerhetspolitiska roll som författaren. I boken redovisas ett av de viktigaste fynd som gjorts i amerikanska arkiv. Ett tidigare okänt ­riktlinjedokument om USA:s planerade politik mot Sverige, undertecknat av Henry Kissinger från september 1975. Det är den ­första tydliga indikationen på USA:s syn på Sverige efter det så traumatiska ”frostens år” 1973. Dokumentet visar att USA:s syn på Sverige åter stabiliserades och att den positiva syn som funnits i början av 1960-talet åter dominerade. Författaren ger också den hittills mest detaljerade bilden av verksamheten vid den amerikanska ambassaden i Stockholm på 1960-talet, inklusive CIA:s arbete genom att innehållet i den amerikanske underrättelseagenten James Everetts opublicerade ­memoarer presenteras. Everett arbetade som illegal underrättelse­agent i Sverige för CIA:s räkning under åren 1960–67. Han berättar bl.a. om hanteringen av sovjetiska och kinesiska ­avhoppare, värvning och utnyttjande av agenter i Sverige, avlyssning mot sovjetiska och kinesiska mål.Vidare bedömer författaren amerikanskt agerande i samband med viktiga händelser:

1. Den finländska notkrisen 1961: Den djupaste studie som hittills gjorts ur ett amerikanskt perspektiv.. Författaren konstaterar att USA initialt bedömde den sovjetiska noten som en förlängning av Berlinkrisen men på en ny arena medan man efter några veckor alltmer såg den sovjetiska aktionen som ett sätt att stärka ­Kekkonens maktposition och därigenom skaffa sig allt större kontroll över Finland. I kapitlet om notkrisen presenteras både State Department, Pentagons och CIA:s analyser av krisen och Kekkonens agerande. Här beskrivs även den roll som spelades av den sovjetiske avhopparen Golitsyn samt den hemliga framstöt som gjordes av amerikanska diplomater gentemot Erlander i januari 1962.

2. Spionfallet Stig Wennerström 1963–64: I ett eget kapitel beskrivs ingående det samarbete som skedde mellan svenska och amerikanska myndigheter för att utreda flygöverstens spioneri mot Sverige och Väst. Här framkommer bl.a. att samarbetet mellan de svenska och amerikanska underrättelse- och säkerhetstjänsterna var betydligt mer ingående än vad som tidigare angivits. Även Olof Palmes viktiga roll i den känsliga politisk-diplomatiska hanteringen av fallet skärskådas. Slutligen beskrivs hur USA, i samband med Wennerströmaffären, försökte locka Sverige närmare Väst, bl.a. genom utökat militärt samarbete.

3. Den svenska Vietnamkritiken och leveransproblemen med ­luftvärnsroboten Redeye 1968: I kapitlet framkommer vilken stabiliserande funktion det militära samarbetet hade och hur detta tenderade att kompensera för den kris som fanns i de politiska och diplomatiska relationerna. Avslutningsvis konstateras att Sverige hade tre roller i det amerikanska säkerhetstänkandet: rollen som militärstrategisk väktare vid Natos norra flank, rollen som politiskt ombud i internationella och regionala sammanhang, samt rollen som kritiker av stormakternas agerande i världen. Denna tredelning är ett viktigt bidrag i forskningen om Sveriges roll under det kalla kriget. Väktarrollen tenderade att vara stabil under perioden. Ombudsrollen däremot blev allt svårare att fylla pga. de negativa konsekvenserna av det utökade utrymmet för kritikerrollen.

The prevailing explanation of the institutionalization of the principles of war is misleading. Although the introduction of the principles into Western doctrine coincided with total war and the need to train unprecedented numbers of soldiers and junior officers in tactics, the fact that the principles disappeared from doctrines immediately prior to and during the Second World War suggests that they were not institutionalized to meet an increased need to educate the military. Instead, we test two other explanations: one drawing on the principles’ military effectiveness and one drawing upon the principles’ explanatory power. We find that neither one of these hypotheses stand. Instead, we conclude by elaborating on how the institutionalization of the principles of war can be made understandable using non-rationalist frameworks, in particular the growth of a particular kind of identity of staff officers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. According to this framework, the two world wars interrupted—rather than promoted—the institutionalization of the principles, since the wars with their large death tolls and mass recruitment increased the difficulties of creating a separate and unique identity for the burgeoning corps of staff officers.

In this article, we address the often ignored issue of quality standards for doctrine. In doing so, we contribute to the existing literature on military doctrine, since much of previous research has focused on outlining the effects of doctrine or the causes of particular doctrinal content, rather than how we should measure its quality. The predominant way of understanding quality of doctrine is based on the rationalist understanding of doctrine as a force multiplier. However, rationalist aims do not necessarily tell us anything about the contents of doctrine. Hence, a doctrine can be seemingly of high quality, but ultimately impede or lead armed forces astray. Rather than focusing on the utilitarian side of doctrine, we suggest that doctrine should mainly be understood as articles of faith or a belief system. And thus the quality of doctrine becomes inextricably linked to military norms and military identity. Writing doctrine thus becomes part of ritual, rather than reason.