Currently, hybrid threats against the western society continues to rise as the global security worsens, yet their implications are continuously difficult to manage. Media has portrayed these threats as the bold sabotage of submarine cables, considerable disinformation campaigns and extensive and elaborate cyberattacks. The hybrid threat is multifaceted, often intertwined, is difficult to predict, respond to and can cross multiple domains. The main hybrid threat against Sweden is the threat of wide-spread cyber-attacks, which according to the Swedish Armed Forces can be as dangerous to all of Sweden’s vital societal functions and critical infrastructure as a conventional kinetic attack. Recently, the Swedish Security Service in their 2025 annual status report, criticizes the threshold of following through with conducting cyberattacks against Sweden as being too low. The significantly alarming Russo-Ukrainian war began with large-scale Russian cyberattacks. Without a sufficient, reliable cybersecurity level, Sweden can risk being next-in-line for the Russian aggression. The elemental purpose of this study is to increase the understanding of how Sweden’s cybersecurity strategy is contributing to increase the threshold to conduct cyberattacks against Sweden. The study takes a qualitative approach and conducts content analysis of various official national strategies and updated EU directives. The results indicates that the cybersecurity strategy is contributing to developing increased deterrence by punishment, denial and association. The results however also yet indicates that the strategy does not contribute to increasing deterrence by norms and taboos.