Military logistics is a crucial element for success in military operations and expeditionary efforts. Despite the importance of logistics, it is a subject that is understudied and needs to be researched more in academia. In light of this problem, the thesis aims to contribute to research on military logistics by examining logistics in the Falkland War to further build a better understanding of the subject. This also contributes to the understanding of expeditionary operative logistics. The study uses Moshe Kress’s Cognitive properties and Structural and Operational properties to analyze the British logistical chain during the Falkland campaign.
The results of the thesis show that the attribute of foresight is not achieved because the initial planning was insufficient, which affected the build-up of logistics. Furthermore, the property attainability was not achieved because the initial allocation of troops was inadequate. The properties of synchronization, continuity, tempo, simplicity and efficiency were partially achieved where they were initial problems. However, the logistics chain developed and improved during the operation and for the final operation against Stanley the properties were achieved. The major contributing factor to these initial limitations was the hasty advance. Sufficient build-up had not occurred, mostly because of the political pressure from London to make progress on land. The attributes of improvisation, flexibility and survivability permeate the entire British campaign to retake the Falklands. During the campaign, the logistical chain improved, proving that the British had learned from their mistakes, but also showing the importance of the property foresight in planning the initial phase of establishing logistical support for a land offensive