Amphibious operations are complex due to the unique operational environment spanning from sea to land. Operation Shingle in 1944 serves as an example of where this complex transition became evident. After a successful landing, the offensive stagnated as the phases of consolidation and exploitation failed, leading to significant losses for the Allied forces.
This study seeks to answer the question: How can the failure of consolidation and exploitation during Operation Shingle be explained through Biddle´s theory of The Modern System? Previous research on Operation Shingle has primarily focused on strategic perspectives, leaving a research gap concerning the tactical aspects of the operation. Therefore, this study applies Stephen Biddle´s theory, The Modern System. The study is a theory-consuming single case study based on qualitative content analysis, aiming to explain the Allied tactics during the operation through the lens of The Modern System. The study specifically focuses on the part of the theory that addresses offensive tactics.
In summary, the results show that the allied forces failed to fully achieve the tactical factors outlined in The Modern System, which can explain the failure during the consolidation and exploitation phases. This study contributes to a greater understanding of Operation Shingle and the challenges associated with consolidation and exploitation, which remains relevant for the continued development of amphibious warfare.