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-How can Sweden’s engagement in Afghanistan be understood within the framework of Galula’s theory of counterinsurgency?

The Swedish government's 2024 lessons-learned report on the Afghanistan mission concluded that Sweden failed to contribute to Afghanistan’s stabilization and to prevent the Taliban’s resurgence. Following this publication, questions arise as to why this failure occurred despite broad international support, newly developed doctrines, and joint strategies. This study aims to understand Sweden’s unsuccessful engagement in Afghanistan during the period 2004–2012, using David Galula’s theory of counterinsurgency as a theoretical framework. The study adopts a theory-consuming case study approach, based on qualitative data collection, focusing on generating a deeper understanding of the specific case. The analysis is based upon three independent literary sources, and the findings indicate that the study can partly contribute to an enhanced understanding of Sweden’s failure.

The results reveal significant difficulties in building trust between the local population and Afghan security forces, which in turn negatively affected the Swedish forces as no meaningful advancement in stabilization was achieved. Consequently, efforts to stabilize Afghanistan stagnated, enabling the Taliban to continue operating among the local population. Ultimately, this allowed the Taliban to regain power, and Sweden’s failure became inevitable.