This study contributes to an understanding of naval warfare by testing and applying a blue-water theory to the context of coastal warfare. More specifically is the purpose of this study, to examine the lesser studied French naval theorist Admiral Raoul Castex’s theory of strategic manoeuvre and to tests its ability to explain modern green-water operations. The theory is assessed through an analysis of two U.S. naval battles fought in coastal environments during World War II: the First and Second Naval Battles of Guadalcanal in 1942. These engagements are close in time and comparable across several key factors—such as participating forces, differences in strength, and support from land troops—but differ in their outcomes. Ten indicators of strategic manoeuvre are applied to each case to determine whether the theory can account for the divergence in results.
The findings do not conclusively indicate whether individual indicators or their combination were primarily responsible for the outcomes. However, the analysis suggests that variations in initiative, economy of force, movement, security, and freedom of action between the two engagements contributed to their differing results. Overall, the study demonstrates that Castex’s theory of strategic manoeuvre possesses explanatory power when applied to maritime operations in coastal environments.