Counterinsurgency emerged as an increasingly common form of armed conflict in the 21st century, often marked by asymmetry and complexity. Despite this shift many military doctrines remain rooted in conventional warfare scenarios thus highlighting the need for a deeper understanding of the various strategies within counterinsurgency operations. This thesis focuses on enemy centric counterinsurgency which is a strategic approach that prioritizes the elimination of insurgent forces over gaining the support of the local population. Through a case study of the Sri Lankan conflict that occurred between 1983 and 2009, this study examines the factors that contributed to the government’s military success against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). While the Sri Lankan case represents one of the few documented instances of successful enemy centric counterinsurgency it remains relatively understudied. Particularly through the lens of a theoretical framework such as Jaqueline Hazelton’s coercion theory which this study uses as its theoretical framework. The findings suggest that several key factors contributed to the government's favorable outcome, including targeted operations against insurgent leadership, restrictions on rebel mobility, intelligence gathering from local communities and the use of harsh measures with significant humanitarian consequences. However, the analysis also reveals limitations in the explanatory power of coercion theory, particularly its failure to fully account for variables such as material resources and international support.