This study uses a long-term perspective to analyze the processes of crisis-induced learning that took place in Israeli Defense Intelligence (IDI) after the intelligence failure on the 6th of October 1973, in order to explain why the organization despite these processes failed to prevent the intelligence failure on the 7th of October 2023. The Agranat Commission distilled several lessons after the first case, and the majority of these were implemented through reforms in the organizational structure, routines and culture. The aim of these reforms was to encourage conceptual pluralism and diversity of opinion as well as to facilitate the dissemination of views both vertically and horizontally within the organization. The previous organizational culture and structure had led to a climate of conformity that had been reinforced by certain senior individuals blocking minority views. These dynamics had led to the emergence of a flawed analytical paradigm that distorted the intelligence process and eventually led to the intelligence failure in 1973. The findings of this study show that the changes to the organizational structure and routines successfully survived in the organization up until the intelligence failure of 2023, but were not properly used by the organization’s members, due mainly to the fact that the long-term efforts to change the organizational culture were partly unsuccessful. This could be traced back to a flawed distillation and implementation of lessons after the first case, such as the fact that the Commission Report failed to give specific guidelines for how cultural change was to be executed and didn't properly address how to prevent unsuitable individuals from continuing to be elected to senior positions. Implementation was also flawed because of the high turnover of both analysts and directors as well as insufficient efforts regarding cultural reform at all organizational levels. This led to the emergence of another flawed analytical paradigm that eventually caused the intelligence failure of 2023.