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As the European security environment deteriorates, with a full-scale war raging in Ukraine and shifting priorities in U.S. foreign policy, the question of NATO’s burden-sharing is becoming increasingly urgent. Lessons might be drawn from another pivotal moment for the alliance, the 2011 intervention in Libya. For the first time, the United States took a step back, allowing its European allies to take the lead in a major military operation. Despite having the military advantage, NATO forces failed to compel Muammar al-Gaddafi to capitulate, and the conflict only settled after a prolonged campaign. This study aims to explain this failure, with the purpose of contributing to the overall research on NATO’s development toward becoming a post-American alliance.

The research was conducted with a theory consuming approach, using coercion theory to analyze the intervention. Particularly, factors related to coalition dynamics and their effect on the variables of a modern theory of coercion were taken into consideration during the analysis.

The findings suggest that shortcomings related to coalition dynamics and coercion theory, found in events both preceding and during the intervention, reduced the likelihood of a successful campaign, thus furthering our understanding of why NATO, the strongest military alliance in the world, failed to reach a negotiated settlement with Gaddafi.