Existing research debates whether or not the United Nations robust peacekeeping missions should be similar to counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Based on previous research, there seems to be similarities between counterinsurgency and robust peacekeeping operations. However, some researchers strongly urge that these peacekeeping missions should not be resembled with counterinsurgency, while others argue that previous UN robust missions, with increased mandate, are more similar to counterinsurgency operations. This thesis aims to examine the extent to which robust peacekeeping operations could be similar to counterinsurgency. The thesis also contributes to increasing understanding regarding this discussion. The thesis examines the UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in the period 2014-2016 using a descriptive approach. Using Kilcullen's theoretical framework for the analysis, the thesis concludes that there are certain similarities and differences between robust peace operations and the COIN theory. The results show that the period that is examined during the MINUSMA mission, can be compared to a less successful counterinsurgency operation. This was due to an unbalanced buildup between the security and economic pillars, according to the theory. The environment in which MINUSMA was carried out is very similar to the operational environment characterized by counterinsurgency. However, as a consequence of the population's negative perception of MINUSMA's presence, the UN had difficulties in acting according to Kilcullen's theoretical framework.