Research on authoritarian states frequently emphasizes the importance of regime control over the armed forces as a requisite for regime stability and effective governance. The increased tensions in authoritarian civil-military relations seems to not have gone real-life autocrats by, with empirical studies showing that authoritarian regimes invest extensively in various coup-proofing measures. Yet multiple questions regarding the nature of coup-proofing remains partially, or entirely, unresolved. This thesis aims at contributing to one of these partially explored questions, which is understanding why authoritarian states differ in their employed coup-proofing measures. One of the more promising explanations is the recent contribution by Escribà-Folch, Pilster and Böhmelt, who ties weakly institutionalized authoritarian states to the practice of counterbalancing. This thesis aims to further develop their theoretical explanation by adapting their theory for in-case testing, exploring the potential for further theoretical development through plausibility probing case studies of coup-proofing measures implemented in the Russian Federation.