In April 1941, Germany penetrated Greece’s mainland defence, forcing the Greeks to retreat to Crete. Despite the chaos, some units successfully withdrew. Soon, British and Greek forces began preparing defences against a potential invasion. Hitler had ordered the takeover of British fortifications on the Greek islands by airborne forces. The German battle plan involved airborne capture of two airfields and coastal cities. Despite similar preparations at each battlefield, the initial airborne assault resulted in different outcomes. At Maleme, the Germans successfully took over the airfield, but not at Heraklion.
This essay studies the two different airborne assaults at Heraklion and Maleme to determine why there were two separate outcomes even though they were very similar in regards to preparation and planning. The essays results conclude that the assault at Maleme better used surprise, simplicity and speed which contributed to the different outcomes. The results also show that a mistake from the defending side had a big impact on the outcome at the battle for Maleme airfield.