The theory of network centric warfare has since its introduction in the early 2000s experienced both a substantial hype and spectacular collapse. Various studies have focused on the theory’s ability to increase mission effectiveness, predominantly within sea and air operations, whilst the domain of land warfare remains largely uncharted. This single case study assesses the theory’s ability to deliver mission effectiveness in ground combat. The case chosen for the study was the U.S. army 3rd Infantry Division and their offensive during the invasion of Iraq 2003. It is concluded that, while a digitalized force, the interoperability within the division was low, effectively excluding definite claims of network centric warfare’s ability to produce mission effectiveness in the land warfare domain. Being one of a few studies on this complex domain, these results warrant for further research. In addition to its findings the study provides an additional tool for how the effects and workings of network centric warfare may be understood and studied in the future.