This study analyses how experiences from the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 were interpreted in the Swedish military journal Tidskrift i Sjöväsendet shortly after the conclusion of the conflict. By analysing a selection of articles published in proximity to the war, the study investigates which experiences were identified as important within a Swedish military discourse. The analysis is conducted using Carl von Clausewitz’s theories as an analytical framework, primarily drawing on his concepts of war as a continuation of politics, moral forces and discipline, as well as friction and uncertainty, as presented in On War. These theoretical perspectives are applied to interpret how the authors in the journal explained success and failure, assessed military effectiveness, and understood the relationship between political objectives and military operations. By focusing on the ways in which war experiences were processed and theorised rather than on the factual course of events, the study contributes to a deeper understanding of how a Swedish naval journal engaged with foreign wars as a source of military experience. The findings highlight recurring themes and patterns in the interpretations of the Russo-Japanese War.