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The Russian-Ukraine war in 2022 had a clear favourite during the initial phase of the invasion, due to Russia’s numerical and technological advantage. Despite this Russia did not manage to achieve any success during the wars first major battles. Earlier studies have attempted to answer why this was the case and the most common conclusions is due to logistical blunders and poor force deployment in the form of battalion tactical groups. However few studies have tried to explain why the Russians failed in Ukraine on a tactical level. Therefore, this paper will answer that question with the use of William S. Lind manoeuvre theory. This will be achieved by applying the theory on the Russian tactical decision-making during the battle of Kharkiv in 2022.

The manoeuvre theory states that by applying three principles and three mental filters during tactical decision-making, the enemy’s decision-loop can be broken which eventually will lead to victory. The three principles are decentralized command, accepting confusion and avoiding formulas. These three make up the foundation of an armed forces capable of utilizing manoeuvre warfare. The three mental filters are mission command, concentration of forces and the enemy´s surfaces and gaps. By applying these three mental filters during tactical decision making the manoeuvre theory states that the chances of a tactical success significantly increases. The results show that Russia only achieved two of these six principles and filters partially while they failed to achieve the other four at all. This shows that Russia failed on a tactical level due to a lack of manoeuvre warfare which led to them suffering big losses during the initial phase of the invasion of Ukraine. Further research regarding Russia’s tactical failure in Ukraine is recommended to focus on a Ukrainian victory and apply the manoeuvre theory on their  tactical decision-making, to attempt to explain why they have achieved success while the Russians have not