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Från en oberäknelig omvärld till att möta det ryska hotet: Försvarsmaktens avskräckning på Instagram
Swedish Defence University.
2026 (Swedish)Independent thesis Basic level (professional degree), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
Abstract [en]

In a rapidly changing security environment, Sweden has transitioned from military non-alignment to NATO membership, bringing increased focus to conventional deterrence. Meanwhile, armed forces are more active on social media. This raises interest in how these platforms can serve as potential tools for deterrent signalling, while making Sweden a relevant case for examining how such communication is expressed.

This study examines how the Swedish Armed Forces’ social media communication can be understood in terms of deterrence.  By comparing Instagram content from 2021 and 2025, the study uses a qualitative, comparative design. The analysis combines Montgomery’s five mechanisms of showcasing military capabilities with a narrative analysis to examine dominant patterns in visual and written content.

The findings indicate a shift from personal, recruitment- and information-oriented communication in 2021 to a more coherent and capability-focused narrative in 2025, in which Russia is constructed as an explicit and aggressive adversary. In this narrative, the display of military capabilities, expressed through all five mechanisms, is combined with the portrayal of a unified NATO. These elements are communicated as the primary response to the threat. The study concludes that further research is needed on how such communication is interpreted by the intended adversary, Russia.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2026. , p. 37
Keywords [en]
strategic communication, deterrence, social media, Sweden, Armed Forces, Swedish Armed Forces
Keywords [sv]
strategisk kommunikation, avskräckning, sociala medier, Sverige, Försvarsmakten
National Category
War, Crisis, and Security Studies
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:fhs:diva-14930OAI: oai:DiVA.org:fhs-14930DiVA, id: diva2:2073679
Subject / course
War Studies, Thesis
Educational program
Officersprogrammet (OP)
Uppsok
Social and Behavioural Science, Law
Supervisors
Examiners
Available from: 2026-06-18 Created: 2026-06-16 Last updated: 2026-06-18Bibliographically approved

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2425262728293027 of 55
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • harvard-cite-them-right
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf