The 1967 Six-day war remains a military anomaly, and despite extensive documentation a scientific debate regarding whether the one-sided victory resulted from Israeli brilliance or Arab failure continues. Simultaneously, discussions about the role air power played in the outcome of the war stay relevant, as researchers cannot unite on the matter.
Utilizing a qualitative, theory consuming single case study design, this study integrates two theoretical frameworks: John Warden´s Five Rings Model and Arash Pashakhanlou´s The Underdog´s Model. The result of the study indicates that the IAF´s success largely stemmed from acting in alignment with The Underdog´s Model. Especially through creativity, superior intelligence and an extreme concentration of force. The Five Rings analysis reveals that air power had significant effect on enemy fighting forces and infrastructure. Though air power functioned as an enabler rather than having a solitary deciding factor of the conflict. Ultimately, the study concludes that Israeli brilliance and Arab failures were interdependent. Israeli success was achieved through exploitation of enemy vulnerabilities.