In 2006, Israel conducted a 34-day long war against a technologically inferior opponent. With a strategy mainly focused on airpower and limited raids they failed to degrade Hezbollah’s strategic capabilities. When war broke out once again in 2024 a similar strategy appears to have been used by Israel, but this time with greater success. This study aims to explain why Israel through a similar strategy succeeded in 2024. The purpose of this is to contribute to the study of how strategy can affect a hybrid opponent through indirect effects. More precisely how Israels strategical effects affected Hizbollah in 2024. The study goes about this by analysing Israels physical manoeuvres and the psychological effects they had on Hezbollah through explaining-outcome process-tracing. By doing this the study found that the Israeli strategy in some cases contributed to physical effects that minimized Hezbollah rocket and missile strike capabilities. By striking Hizbollah leadership Israel likely contributed to a psychological effect which was acknowledged by the organisation and meant a degrading in capabilities. Through strikes on weapons depots and supply lines Israel did not achieve definite supply shortages for Hizbollah. A psychological explanation is possible but can also be attributed to Israeli activity in the air. The indirect effects of Israels strategy can therefore explain the outcome to a certain extent but not fully.