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This study examines the tactical success of the German Luftwaffe during the initial phase of Operation Barbarossa in 1941. While earlier research primarily attributes German dominance to Soviet failures, such as leadership collapse and technical deficiencies, this study addresses a research gap by analysing the Luftwaffe’s success due to the conscious use of asymmetric warfare. The purpose is to theoretically understand how a numerically inferior force achieved spectacular victories by applying Arash Heydarian Pashakhanlou’s “The Underdog’s Model”.

Through a qualitative case study and document analysis, the research evaluates Luftwaffe’s actions across six critical success factors. The results demonstrate that success was driven for example by superior intelligence and extreme concentration of forces, which enabled the destruction of Soviet airpower on the ground with an initial kill-ratio of nearly 1:100. Tactical innovations, including the “Rotte” and “Schwarm” formations, further compensated for quantitative disadvantages. Ultimately, the study highlights how identifying and striking critical vulnerabilities allows a numerically weaker party to seize the initiative, offering important insights for modern military strategy and the defence of smaller states.