This thesis purpose is to answer the question how the Ideal Model made by Thunholm and Henåker explain the tactical success made by the American coalition units during the second battle of Fallujah. By answering this question, the thesis will give a broader view on the reasons for success because previous research has shown a gap by not providing any explanations for the ground arena and the success the coalition hade.
The result the thesis result presents that all the sequences can be found during the battle, howeversome of them such as short decision-action loop is found but not a major reason for the success.The sequences that is most recurring is, modern system deployment of the force and use ofmanoeuvre warfare, aggressive ground reconnaissance and high tempo and surprise attacks onenemy rear/unprepared units. Methods such as combined weapons and arms, reconnaissance to map the enemy and their preparations to enable evading and attacking in their rear and unprepared areas. The last sequence Enemy organizational breakdown is not a breakdown as much as it is anannihilation of all insurgent resistance inside of Fallujah, therefore not the by Thunholm andHenåker argued wat the breakdown can be seen.