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This study examines Ukraine’s use of asymmetric maritime warfare in the Black Sea during the Russo-Ukrainian War. The starting point is the tension between Russia’s naval superiority and Ukraine’s ability to limit Russian freedom of action at sea. Russia entered the war with a clear maritime advantage, while Ukraine lacked a conventional fleet capable of challenging the Black Sea Fleet in a symmetrical naval confrontation. Yet the war at sea did not develop into uncontested Russian control.

The purpose of the study is to increase the understanding of how Ukraine’s actions can be analysed through Geoffrey Till’s concepts of sea control and sea denial. The study is designed as a qualitative theory-consuming case study. It analyses selected events in the Black Sea: the sinking of Moskva, the attack on Saratov in Berdiansk, the attack on Tsiklon, the attacks on Ivanovets, Caesar Kunikov and Sergei Kotov, and the attack on Novocherkassk. These cases are examined through four analytical dimensions: asymmetric method, effect on Russian risk calculation, operational limitation and maritime outcome.

The study finds that Ukraine did not establish conventional sea control. That is not the central point. Rather the cases show how Ukrainian actions contributed to making Russian naval operations more exposed and harder to sustain. The result suggests that sea denial can be militarily significant even when the weaker actor does not control the sea itself.