Sweden’s total defence relies heavily on maritime transport, but the current logistics system is built for peacetime efficiency rather than crisis resilience. This creates a major vulnerability because the state lacks legal control over foreign-flagged ships while the commercial market prioritizes low costs. This is especially dangerous for critical energy imports, where Sweden, until recently, lacked domestic tanker capacity. To address these challenges, this study analyses the Swedish merchant fleet's logistical capabilities during heightened readiness using Moshe Kress’s principles of military logistics. These theoretical principles reveal how limited jurisdiction directly undermines national survivability and operational endurance. The results show that state control is severely limited by legal restrictions and personnel shortages. Furthermore, a complex network of different actors slows down the mobilization process. For example, the total defence exercise DSM25 revealed how unclear responsibilities and poor communication can delay important decisions. The study concludes that these logistical vulnerabilities come from long-term political decisions and that defence logistics must therefore be managed as a shared civil-military system. Achieving this requires long-term strategic planning such as adapting to the NATO NCAGS framework. Implementing such international standards will help create unified command structures and reduce bureaucratic friction. This must be combined with continuous practical exercises to build vital trust between the Swedish Armed Forces and private shipping companies.