The second Nagorno-Karabakh war was a conflict fought between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan for control over the mountainous Nagorno-Karabakh and bordering regions, occupied by Armenia since 1994. The war ended in resounding Azerbaijani victory which reclaimed large parts of Nagorno-Karabakh and all the surrounding regions. How did the Azeris achieve such massive succuss during the second Nagorno-Karabakh war, also known as the 44-day war. Their armies were broadly similar in size with the Azeri army being slightly larger at 56 000 vs the Armenians 42 000. The Armenians were on the defensive however, which normally is an advantage. Two common explanations are drones and a strategic advantage in the form of better economy and allies. But since drones can’t seize territory, no allies directly intervened and BNP alone can’t win wars, the question remains. The goal of this thesis is to examine whether tactical prowess is a decisive factor on the modern battlefield or if battles are determined by technology and strategic advantages. By applying Brett Friedmans theory to the second Nagorno-Karabakh war, this thesis concludes that superior tactics still is a decisive factor on the modern battlefield despite technological advancements like strike drones and loitering munitions. The thesis also offers insight into the conflict through its analysis of the war.