This thesis examines the formation and expressions of Swedish tactical subcultures during the ISAF mission in Afghanistan (2002–2014). By applying Tony Ingesson's theoretical framework, the study analyses how Swedish strategic culture has influenced the tactical level regarding decision-making, autonomy, and attitudes toward risk. The study utilizes a qualitative text analysis of official government reports and previous research to deconstruct the cognitive filters governing actions on the ground. The results indicate a split between formal autonomy and actual autonomy, where the formal doctrine of mission command was in practice limited by political expectation on decisionmakers on the tactical level and a domestic fear of national prestige loss. The tactical subculture was characterized by a protective stance toward civilians but also by a reactive caution regarding combative risks, creating a discrepancy between formal and actual freedom of action. The conclusion highlights that this culture may create frictions within NATO's collective defence, where the demand for collective defence and high tolerance of loss collide with an established Swedish culture of caution.