The decision to extradite Baltic and German military personnel to the Soviet Union after World War II is for many a controversial part of Swedish history. The subject has been thoroughly discussed in both academic and non-academic settings, sparking debates aroundthe decision and the alleged connection to Swedish attempts to form favourable bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. Sweden's international position after World War II, which also has been heavily researched from many perspectives, is marked by its attempts to navigate the new international situation amidst both the end of the World largest conflict to date, and the emerging Cold War. While studies of the extradition of the Balts reached its peak in the 1980s, the study of Swedish grand strategy and foreign policy has enjoyed a substantial development with many new perspectives emerging in different principles. This study attempts to build on the existing body of literature in both of these fields and poses the question if the decision can be understood to be a part of a larger grand strategy amidst the sensemaking immediately following the end of World War II. Additionally, the study aims to pay greater attention to the different government bodies and agencies active in the extradition as well as the decision making process. By utilizing a qualitative text analysis, aiming to identify different perspectives and understandings from the involved parties from the source materials. By connecting the decision to a larger strategy, a new interpretation of how the decision came to be may be reached. In addition, by focusing more precisely on the different government bodies' roles in the process - in this case the military and the political leadership specifically - the study may give larger insight to how the different government bodies coordinate in reaching the overall goal. The results are interpreted through Jacob Westberg’s interpretation of the concept grand strategy, which is a fairly new analytical framework used in the Swedish context. Overall, the study indicates that the decision is heavily impacted by the government bodies’ perceptions of the Soviet Union. Additionally, the study suggests that the military’s and political leadership’s differing perceptions of the problem at hand may have impacted the overall coherence and effectiveness of the strategy. Lastly, regarding the overall grand strategy, one could argue that the decision has prominent features from the Swedish grand strategies of both World War II and the Cold War. Therefore, the decision may be viewed as a symptom of the transitional period between the two strategies.