This study examines why the Russian air assault operation against Hostomel Airfield in February 2022 failed despite achieving initial success. Using a theory-consuming single-case study design and process tracing, the analysis applies Stephen Biddle’s Modern System of Force Employment to assess competing explanations across three phases: preparations, assault, and defence. The findings indicate that the outcome is best explained by an inconsistent and unsustained application of key force employment mechanisms, including protection and concealment, dispersion, small-unit autonomy, suppressive fires, and combined arms integration. These deficiencies accumulated over time, progressively constraining survivability and operational freedom. Technological asymmetry is shown to have influenced the outcome, but primarily by exploiting existing vulnerabilities rather than acting as an independent cause. The study concludes that Biddle’s framework provides a coherent explanation for why early success at Hostomel could not be translated into enduring operational control.