On the 22nd of June 1941, Germany invaded the Soviet Union and began the so-called Midsummer crisis. While Germany started its invasion, they also made some demands. Particularly, they asked Sweden for permission to transfer an armed division, the 163rd Infantry Division, across Sweden to Finland. In the end, the coalition government decided to permit said request and therefor guilty of neutrality violations. Reasons as to why they did this has been explored many times but had never been examined through decision-making theory. The aim of this thesis was thus to explain why the Swedish coalition government decided to accept the German request by applying the Prospect theory. This was done by doing a content analysis on personal records made by relevant politicians and historical retellings of the Midsummer crisis. In short, the results from the analysis provided an indication that the coalition government show signs of being risk seeking. However, the conclusion of the thesisis that Prospect theory does not provide an adequate explanation as to why the Swedish coalition government approve the German transfer of its armed division.