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This study examines the legal framework prohibiting the starvation of civilians as a method of warfare, with a focus on the intent required to constitute a violation. The research seeks to answer the question: What degree of intent is required to constitute a violation of theprohibition against the starvation of civilians as a method of warfare? It is important to consider the intent required to hold a perpetrator liable for the war crime of starving civilians, particularly in light of the continued use of, for example, siege warfare in armed conflicts, where the starvation of civilians is often an inevitable consequence. Following an introduction to the legal framework prohibiting the starvation of civilians and the relevantmental elements, the thesis examines the war crime in detail, including its various elements, the intent required for each, relevant court decisions involving similar mental element requirements, and the drafting history of the provisions. It is demonstrated that, while the intent and knowledge under article 30 of the Rome Statute applies to the elements of the crime lacking an independent mens rea, the intent to starve civilians as a method of warfare requires dolus specialis, a specific additional intent that 'otherwise provides' article 30's default rule. While the main focus of this study is given to the required intent, it also examines several modes of liability, further illustrating that the liability a perpetrator may incur depends on the presence or absence of dolus specialis. The findings contribute to understanding the degree of intent required to the prohibition of starving civilians as a method of warfare, as well as its applicability in practice, particularly in cases of siege warfare.