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How does how intervener airpower affect civil war parties’ ability to take and hold territory? I argue that airpower can have both short- and long-term effects on an actor's ability to take and hold territory, by reducing its ability to effectively fight its adversary. Using novel, disaggregated data, I conduct a quantitative within-case study of 2011 NATO-led intervention in Libya. I find that the NATO air campaign made the Libyan government less likely to capture territory in the short term, and that airstrikes reduced its ability to capture territory in the long term.

What are the different ways in which an intervener can use airpower to enhance a rebel organization’s ability to capture government-held territory? Multiple studies have analyzed how foreign airpower can be employed as a counterinsurgency tool, intended to reduce the frequency and lethality of insurgent attacks. However, many civil wars are fought conventionally, and non-state actors can benefit from military interventions that helps them to overcome the advantage in capabilities often enjoyed by their government adversaries. I analyze how airpower can be used in support of a rebel organization engaged in a conventional civil war, contributing to its ability to produce salient battlefield information. I argue that that an intervener can employ direct attack against heavy weapons and anti-aircraft assets, and interdiction of command and control capabilities and logistics, in order to diminish the government’s advantage in conventional capabilities. In doing so, foreign airpower contributes to the rebels’ ability to capture territory, a crucial intermediary goal and source of battlefield information when attempting to impose defeat on the government. Through a quantitative case study of Operation Unified Protector and the 2011 Libyan Civil War, I find that coalition airstrikes against the Libyan government’s heavy weapons, logistics, and anti-aircraft assets contributed to the Libyan rebels’ ability to capture territory. By contrast, strikes against the government’s command and control capabilities had no effect.

¿Cuáles son las diferentes formas en las que una parte interviniente puede usar el poder aéreo con el fin de mejorar la capacidad de una organización rebelde para ganar territorios controlados por el Gobierno? Existen múltiples estudios que han analizado cómo puede emplearse el poder aéreo extranjero como una herramienta de contrainsurgencia, destinada a reducir la frecuencia y la letalidad de los ataques insurgentes. Sin embargo, muchas guerras civiles se libran convencionalmente, y los agentes no estatales pueden salir beneficiados de intervenciones militares que les ayuden a superar la ventaja a nivel de capacidades que, a menudo, disfrutan sus adversarios gubernamentales. Analizamos cómo se puede usar el poder aéreo en apoyo de una organización rebelde que esté involucrada en una guerra civil convencional, contribuyendo a su capacidad para producir información importante acerca del campo de batalla. Argumentamos que una de las partes intervinientes podría emplear un ataque directo contra armas pesadas y medios antiaéreos, así como la interdicción de las capacidades de mando y control y de la logística, con el fin de disminuir la ventaja del Gobierno en lo referente a las capacidades convencionales. Al hacer esto, el poder aéreo extranjero contribuye a la capacidad de los rebeldes para ganar territorio, lo cual resulta no solo un objetivo intermedio crucial sino también una fuente de información sobre el campo de batalla cuando se intenta imponer la derrota al Gobierno. Concluimos, a partir de un estudio de caso cuantitativo de la Operación Protector Unificado (Operación enmarcada dentro de la intervención militar en Libia de 2011) y de la Guerra Civil Libia de 2011, que los ataques aéreos de la coalición contra las armas pesadas, la logística y los medios antiaéreos del Gobierno libio contribuyeron a la capacidad de los rebeldes libios para ganar territorio. Por el contrario, los ataques contra las capacidades de mando y control del Gobierno no tuvieron ningún efecto.

Comment un intervenant peut-il employer les forces aériennes pour améliorer la capacité d’une organisation rebelle de s’emparer de territoires détenus par le gouvernement ? De nombreuses études ont analysé l’emploi des forces aériennes en tant qu’outil de lutte contre l’insurrection, dont le but est de réduire la fréquence et la létalité des attaques des insurgés. Cependant, nombre de guerres civiles se sont déroulées de façon conventionnelle, et les acteurs non étatiques peuvent bénéficier d’interventions militaires qui les aident à contrer l’avantage en matière de capacité que les adversaires gouvernementaux possèdent souvent. J’analyse comment les forces aériennes peuvent être utilisées pour soutenir une organisation rebelle impliquée dans une guerre civile conventionnelle, en contribuant à sa capacité de production d’informations cruciales sur le champ de bataille. J’affirme qu’un intervenant peut avoir recours à une attaque directe à l’encontre d’armes lourdes et d’actifs antiaériens, ainsi qu’à l’interception des capacités logistiques, de commande et de contrôle, afin de réduire l’avantage du gouvernement en matière de capacités conventionnelles. Ce faisant, les forces aériennes étrangères contribuent à la capacité rebelle de capturer des territoires, un objectif intermédiaire et une source d’informations sur le champ de bataille qui s’avèrent déterminants quand on essaie de l’emporter face à un gouvernement. Grâce à une étude de cas quantitative de l’opération Unified Protector et de la guerre civile de 2011 en Libye, j’observe que les frappes aériennes de la coalition à l’encontre des armes lourdes, des capacités logistiques et des actifs antiaériens du gouvernement libyen ont contribué à la capacité des rebelles libyens de capturer des territoires. En revanche, les frappes visant les capacités de commande et de contrôle du gouvernement n’ont eu aucun effet.

This article seeks to explain why governments sometime escalate their efforts to defeat a rebel organization when threatened by military intervention. Even though there is extensive knowledge about what motivates an actor to intervene, far less attention has been directed towards explaining why some military interventions end at mere coercive threats, whereas others result in full-scale invasions. Given that an intervention constitutes a strategic interaction between the intervener and the civil war actor it targets, the targeted actor’s response to the initial threat of intervention shapes the subsequent intervention process. I argue that a targeted government will respond to a threat of intervention with escalation against the rebels when it has opportunity to compartmentalize the strategy it has devised to defeat them. This implies that the government has a coherent strategic plan, which it believes it can execute in such a way that the intervener cannot effectively disrupt it. Furthermore, the targeted government also perceives that it can prevent the intervener from expanding its involvement outside of this favorable space. By employing theory-testing process tracing to analyze the Georgian government’s responses to Russian interference in South Ossetia 2004-2008, I find support for this argument. The Georgian government perceived that a limited military offensive against South Ossetia could be conducted in such a way that Russia would have limited opportunity to interfere with it. Furthermore, it also perceived that the restrained character of its strategy, favorable terrain, and international pressure would control Russian escalation.

What are the strategies an intervener can employ to control the trajectory of a civil war? Even though strategy and various strategic concepts are important parts of contemporary theoretical frameworks, empirical analyses of intervention do not fully account for its strategic dimension. More specifically, strategy’s control-oriented, contingent, and flexible and dynamic nature is not sufficiently developed and analyzed. To complement existing empirical analyses of intervention, I develop a novel framework that describes the different categories of strategies an intervener can employ, and which can be used to illustrate strategic change. The frameworks stipulates that the targeted civil war actor’s intermediary strategic goals – not its political ends – should be the main theoretical and empirical reference point. Furthermore, it uses two logics of escalation to outline several general categories of strategic action: influencing, indirect inducing, direct inducing, and imposing strategies. The framework primarily describes various military intervention strategies, but it also links them in a coherent way to different political, diplomatic, and economic strategies. To exemplify the different categories of strategies, I use illustrations from the Western – and later NATO – efforts to manage and terminate the Kosovo War (1998-99).