This thesis examines the variation in Iran’s control over its proxies within the regional “Axis of Resistance”, Focusing on Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthi movement (Ansal Allah) in Yemen. The purpose is to describe and compare why the degree of control differs between these two actors despite a substantial material dependence on Iran. Using a comparative case study based on a Most Similar System Design and grounded in Principal-Agent theory the variables of Agency Slack, information asymmetry, goal conflict, and control costs & dependence are analyzed. The results indicate that Hezbollah exhibits a low degree of agency slack, explained by deep ideological integration and minimal information asymmetry, which reduces the principals control cost. In contrast, the Houthi movement exhibits a high degree of agency slack where local Yemeni goals are often prioritized over Iran’s regional interests, primarily due to informational asymmetry and goal conflict. The study’s primary conclusion is that an agent’s ideological origin and interest are more decisive for the principal’s control than the extent of material and technical support.