Theorists of military effectiveness have, through the course of time, developed principles explaining ways in which victory is efficiently enabled in battle. However, as a result of technological developments as well as a lack of empirical research, the principle of concentration is now questioned in terms of its explanatory value when applied in the context of modern naval warfare. Its questioning finds even more foundation in light of the fact that it still has a place in naval doctrines. This study therefore aims to examine whether the fundamental basics of the principle are applicable as a concept leading to success in modern naval operations where missiles are used as the main source of weaponry. Thus, are theories on concentration of force, formed by Sun Zi, Antonie- Henri Jomini and Alfred Thayer Mahan, used to create a theoretical framework which then functions as an analytical tool in analysing the Israeli success in 1973 and the Argentine failure in 1982. Accordingly, the result of this analysis offers convincing evidence for the principle of concentration in terms of its continued applicability in modern naval warfare in spite of environmental changes caused by technology. However, more research is needed if further conclusions are to be drawn in terms of generalizability.