This study examines the Israeli Defense Forces' (IDF) success during the Yom Kippur War in 1973, with a specific focus on the battles in the Sinai Peninsula during the initial days of the conflict. Despite facing strategic surprise and extensive loss of commanders, the Israeli forces managed to regain the initiative and ultimately achieve victory. The purpose of this study is to analyze how Meir Finkel's theory of command-and-control flexibility can help explain the actions and success of Israeli units under these challenging conditions.
The study is conducted as a qualitative single case study, where eight tactical cases are analyzed using Finkel's theoretical framework. The results show that when Israeli commanders acted flexibly — that is, quickly, creatively, and with autonomous decision-making — success was often achieved. Conversely, when commanders acted dogmatically and strictly followed doctrine, this often resulted in severe losses.
The study concludes that command and control flexibility, particularly at the tactical level, was likely a crucial factor behind Israel's success in the Sinai Peninsula during the early days of the war. Furthermore, the study suggests that the insights gained from flexible command structures may also be applicable to crisis management and emergency preparedness in civilian organizations.