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War is a unique phenomenon that plays out in both the military and the non-military domains. Nonetheless, the respective dynamics of the two domains differ. This chapter discusses not only these differences but also how the two domains interact with each other. The impact of non-military means is often less direct than that of their military counterparts. Because non-military means are more varied and thus understood as more useful, they are increasingly important in modern war

War has traditionally been understood as an activity carried out by soldiers delivering kinetic energy with weapons on a delimited battlefield. Now, we struggle to define basic concepts such as soldiers, weapons, battlefields, and ultimately, war itself. War has expanded and increasingly given a greater role to non-military means – such as information and cyber warfare, political subversion, and economic statecraft. These are seen to equal, and even surpass, the role of military force. This poses fundamental questions regarding the utility of non-military warfare, the actors involved, and critically how states should act in times defined by non-military warfare. Therefore, this anthology investigates the phenomenon of non-military warfare in different domains, including its relation to military warfare, and how we should think about its utility, its actors, its legality, and how states can understand and counter this activity.

This volume analyzes the phenomenon of non-military warfare in theory and practice, including its relation to military warfare, and how states can understand and counter this activity.

War has traditionally been understood as soldiers with weapons fighting on a battlefield. Today, however, it is difficult to say who is a combatant, what weapons are, or even where the battlefield ends. Industrial-scale information operations and hacking attacks can be both an integral part of and a substitute for military operations. This book, which brings together scholars from different fields, goes beyond conceptual debates and provides a focused analysis of the advent of non-military warfare and its impact on strategy. The empirical chapters investigate non-military warfare primarily as conducted by the United States, Russia, and China in the areas of politics, cyber, diasporas, technology, and law. The theoretical chapters seek to answer broader questions about how we should think about victory, defeat, and participation in non-military warfare, and when it can complement and take the place of military operations. As modern warfare is moving into non-military domains, understanding this shift is vital to state survival in the 21st century.

This book will be of much interest to students of strategic studies, defense studies, foreign policy, and International Relations, as well as professional practitioners.

The classic conundrum in civil–military relations is the fear that  the military, because of their control of force, might militarize and supplant civil society and subvert democracy. Against this background, Finland is often deemed a successful case of combining both democracy and defense despite several wars and the almost constant threat of war. While the resiliency of Finnish democracy  is undeniable, on closer investigation responses to internal and external threats have historically threatened democratic civil–military relations in Finland. This study offers the first attempt to subject Finnish civil–military relations to social scientific study. The trajectory of Finnish civil–military relations is presented through chronological phases and models, each of which begins with an external shock:  the 1918 civil war, the interwar era, the Second World War, the Cold War, the post-Cold War era, and the ongoing NATO era. Several crucial variables that have affected Finnish civil–military relations are presented. These include concentration of power during crises, societal cleavages that cause domestic threats, external balancing that curtails sovereignty, and civil–military tension during times  of war. Ultimately, the widespread belief that civilian oversight and narrow professional military autonomy can be achieved and maintained even in challenging circumstances without major conflict or tension is questioned. The study concludes with lessons for Ukraine and possibly other countries.

This article argues that Ukraine offers a cautionary taleregarding the two main modern models of force generation. Neitherthe professional high-tech war model, favored by Western militaries,nor the whole-of-society war approach, said to have saved Ukraine in 2014and 2022, proved successful formulas for Ukraine. Considering that Ukraineis fighting for survival, with Russian forces inside the country, the failureof both models in action has serious implications for NATO member statesas they deliberate on their choices regarding future force generation.

The Western defeat in Afghanistan was due to an inadequate process of strategic reflection informed, first, by an overestimation of the attractiveness of the Western political agenda to Afghans and, second, by overconfidence in the effectiveness of its military approach. As a corollary, popular support for the Taliban was underestimated. The insurgents possessed a degree of what we term strategic cohesion-a sociopolitical and military embeddedness within society-that produced a far stronger strategic effectiveness than we could replicate in our Afghan allies. Furthermore, a military-professional mindset underestimated the degree to which political considerations permeated the battlefield. The political effect of military actions was insufficiently integrated into strategic practice. Specifically, the linchpin officer in staff planning and field operations in Western armies struggled to act as what we term strategic colonels. In both respects, the war continues to offer important lessons for Western involvement in future conflict, including with Russia and China.

It has been a year since the Russian invasion of Ukraine started. It is clear that the impact of this war goes far beyond Ukraine. We already know that it will have long-lasting consequences for the regional and global economy, in particular for energy and food security. The war is reshuffling old geo-political arrangements and alliances. It is also shaping the political landscapes of European states: international relations, inflation and migration are increasingly becoming key topics in national elections.