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This article examines Sweden’s adaptation of its national military logistics to align with NATO standards following its accession to the Alliance. Focusing on interoperability, strategic alignment, and logistical resilience, the study draws on expert interviews and a targeted literature review to evaluate Sweden’s capability transformation. The findings reveal key challenges in integrating national systems within NATO’s collective framework, including infrastructure limitations, and highlight the critical role of command systems, standardization, a unified taxonomy, joint exercises, and Host Nation Support in enabling seamless logistical coordination. Sweden’s experience offers valuable insights into broader discussions on alliance integration, military mobility, and defense planning within the Nordic region.

EU and NATO require member states to be resilient against natural disasters, terrorist attacks, and different forms of warfare. These requirements have implications for supply chains and critical infrastructure as they involve a shift of paradigm, from efficiency thinking to resiliency thinking. In addition, the expansion of NATO will change operational planning on the northern flank. The exact nature of these plans remains unknown, but they will require that the traditional focus on north to south in the Nordic countries is complemented with a new focus on west to east. This means that supply chains and critical infrastructure must be able to support reception, staging and onwards movement of military units, as well as the continuous sustainment of forces.

Det ryska kriget i Ukraina är en humanitär katastrof för det ukrainska folket. Folket, liksom hela samhället i övrigt, har dock visat en anmärkningsvärd resiliens. Det finns följaktligen mycket som andra länder kan lära sig genom att studera hur Ukraina har kunnat uppbåda en sådan resiliens inför den ryska fullskaliga invasionen. Denna rapport fokuserar på vad svenska myndigheter inom beredskapssektorena elektronisk kommunikation, energiförsörjning och transporter kan lära sig av vad akademiker, organisationer och nationer redan har publicerat om det pågående kriget avseende resiliens i kritiska infrastruktursystem.

Att döma av kriget i Ukraina är modern krigföring hybridkrigföring, som kombinerar kinetisk och cyberkrigföring. Mellan 2014 och 2022 utsattes ukrainska kritiska infrastruktursystem ofta för cyberattacker. Denna lärande erfarenhet, tillsammans med hjälp från bland annat Nato, gjorde Ukraina väl förberett för cyberkrigföring. Ukraina fick också avgörande hjälp från multinationella Big Tech-företag i krigets inledning, vilket hjälpte nationen att stå emot cyberattackerna mot dess kritiska infrastruktursystem. Ukraina var dock inte lika väl förberett för kinetisk krigföring mot dessa system. Detta illustreras av bristen på luftförsvar och det faktum att kärnkraftverken bevakades mot terroristattacker, inte kinetisk krigföring. Följaktligen har Ukraina varit tvunget att ta itu med konsekvenserna av kinetisk krigföring med improviserade, reaktiva lösningar snarare än med proaktiv beredskap.

Baserat på en metaanalys av 132 forskningsartiklar, böcker och rapporter analyserar denna rapport i första hand de improviserade, reaktiva lösningarna mot kinetisk krigföring. Rapporten identifierar flera olika områden av reaktiva lösningar, som kunde ha ingått i den proaktiva beredskapen i större utsträckning: lagstiftning, lärande, bemanning, decentralisering, redundans, anpassningsförmåga, skiktskydd, lågteknologiska teknologier, förändrade konsumtionsmönster, reparationsplanering, internationellt och offentlig-privat samarbete, samt differentierad energiproduktion. Att hantera dessa utmaningar i sin beredskapsplanering skulle göra Sverige bättre förberett för den typ av krig som nu pågår i Ukraina än vad Ukraina var den 24 februari 2022.

Innan man försöker efterlikna Ukrainas improviserade, reaktiva lösningar mot kinetisk krigföring finns det flera aspekter som svenska myndigheter måste beakta. Ukraina hade ett välutvecklat cyberförsvar, omoderna infrastruktursystem och fick betydande internationell hjälp. Dessutom har dess infrastruktursystem på grund av landets storlek, geografi, befolkning och naturresurser andra nätverksstrukturer än de svenska och är dimensionerade för mycket större krav.

The Russian war in Ukraine is a humanitarian disaster for the Ukrainian people. However, the people, and indeed the whole society, has demonstrated a remarkable resilience. There is consequently much that other countries can learn by studying how Ukraine has been able to muster such resilience in the face of the Russian full-scale invasion. This report focuses on what Swedish authorities in the communications, energy and transportation sectors can learn from what academics, organisations, and nations have already published regarding resilience in critical infrastructure systems.

Judging by the war in Ukraine, modern warfare is hybrid warfare, which combines kinetic and cyberwarfare. Between 2014 and 2022 Ukrainian critical infrastructure systems were frequently targeted by cyberattacks. This learning experience, together with help from, among others, NATO, enabled Ukraine to be well prepared for cyber warfare. Ukraine also received crucial help from multinational Big Tech companies in the early stages of the war, which helped the nation to withstand the cyberattacks on its critical infrastructure systems. However, Ukraine was not equally well prepared for kinetic warfare against these systems. This is illustrated by the lack of air defence and the fact that nuclear power plants were guarded against terrorist attacks, not kinetic warfare. Consequently, Ukraine has had to address the consequences of kinetic warfare with impromptu, reactive solutions, rather than with proactive preparedness.

Based on a meta-analysis of 132 research articles, books and reports, this report primarily analyses the impromptu, reactive solutions against kinetic warfare. The report identifies several different areas of reactive solutions, which could have been part of proactive preparedness to a larger extent: legislation, learning, staffing, decentralisation, redundancy, adaptability, layered protection, low-tech technologies, changing consumption patterns, repair planning, international and public-private cooperation, and differentiated energy production. To address these challenges in its preparedness planning would make Sweden better prepared for the type of war that is now taking place in Ukraine, than Ukraine was on February 24, 2022.

Prior to trying to emulate Ukraine’s impromptu, reactive solutions against kinetic warfare there are several considerations to be made by Swedish authorities. Ukraine had a well-developed cyber defence, unmodernised infrastructure systems, and received significant international aid. Furthermore, because of its size, geography, population, and natural resources, its infrastructure systems have different network structures than the Swedish ones and are dimensioned for much larger requirements.

The authors' goal was to understand how defense supply chains can better withstand unanticipated and highly impactful disruptions whose probability and impact cannot be readily calculated or quantified. Specifically, the project team set out to identify the current state of the research on supply chain risk management (SCRM), supply chain disruption management (SCDM), and supply chain resilience, both within the defense sector and across the broader commercial landscape. The project team explored the unique characteristics of defense sector supply chains and the ways in which practices from other sectors might or might not be applicable. The team also sought to identify knowledge gaps or broader questions that might not appear in the literature. This study was co-led by RAND and the Swedish Defence Research Agency (Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut).

The authors found that more research is required to identify good strategies for SCDM for defense, as well as to identify how supply chain specialists and defense and security policymakers might implement these strategies across both the private sector and government. The authors therefore created a research agenda to help fill existing gaps in understanding how defense supply chains can better resist and recover from disruption.

Key Findings

The authors determined that more research is required to identify good strategies for SCDM for defense. The main gaps in understanding also represent some of the key enablers for effective defense SCDM.The authors propose a research agenda with the following five areas to help fill gaps in understanding of how defense supply chains can better resist and recover from disruption: (1) Improve understanding of supply chain disruption, including the composition of defense supply chains and its associated stakeholders and actors. (2) Determine which commercial sector approaches to SCDM can be adapted for or adopted by defense. (3) Recognize and tackle challenges for SCDM stemming from the multisectoral nature of defense supply chains. (4) Clarify and distinguish between SCRM and SCDM to understand the benefits and challenges of each. (5) Define what resources are needed to enable implementation of defense SCDM.