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Resilience has become a prominent term in both academic and political contexts, though its use remains controversial. It often carries normative connotations of flexibility, adaptation, and recovery from external shocks, which can influence political practices. Some critics view resilience as a means of dispersing governmental responsibility and linking it to neoliberal agendas. In our study of the Swedish case, we use a multidimensional framework to examine resilience across environmental politics, crisis management, and total defence. We find that resilience is employed differently across these fields, which often conflict, and that its meaning has evolved over time within each. The tension inherent in resilience—between adaptation and resistance—complicates efforts to unify its application in policies. Overall, the concept’s varying interpretations and its contrasting implications demonstrate the complexities involved in integrating resilience into political and policy frameworks.

A security discourse that resides upon the concepts of the grey zone and hybrid threats iscurrently emerging among international security actors and policy-makers. In the currentsecurity environment, it is assumed that antagonistic actors threaten democratic statesthrough a range of hybrid threats aimed at instilling confusion and inertia concerning how torespond and disrupting political and administrative capacity. This article analyzes thisdiscourse and the policy responses that have been proposed, noting that the key organizingconcept in responding to hybrid threats is resilience. This concept is potentially problematicin that resilience has been critically examined as controversial and political in nature insofaras it promotes programmatic preparedness and social control, demanding that civil society,market actors, and individuals “rally ‘round the flag” and contribute to wide-ranging nationalsecurity management. Proponents of this view nonetheless continue to present resilience asa panacea for current security problems. This article reveals, however, that resilience is aproductive and organizing concept and practice that is presented without the necessaryboundaries and limits. This illustrates the need for a critical discussion concerning how muchresilience is enough.

Although grey zone and hybrid threats, such as cyberattacks, infor-mation campaigns, and sabotage against critical infrastructure, are becoming increasingly common in the contemporary world, rela-tively little attention has been directed to similar threats in the maritime environment. The recent global pandemic, Russian aggression against Ukraine, the Nord Stream sabotage in 2022, the sabotage of the Finnish-Baltic pipeline in 2023 in the Baltic Sea, as well as drone attacks on shipping in the Persian Gulf arebut a few examples that illustrate the fragility of international maritime communications. The present article explores the topic of grey zone and hybrid threats within the maritime environment. Based on an analysis of recent security events, particularly hybrid threats in the maritime environment, the article proposes that it isessential to seek a broader role for naval forces in supporting national sovereignty and international law and order regarding the Open Seas. The article aims to conceptualize and explore the foundations of maritime grey zone threats and the new roles of naval forces operating within this new context, asking whether the UN, through the International Maritime Organization, NATO, and the European Union, suffer from “sea blindness” concerning how they are preparing for the new world order.

Genetic technologies are revolutionizing human health. In parallel, geopolitical instability has prompted renewed discussions on the risks of DNA technology being weaponized in international conflict. With today’s changing security environment, we argue that risk assessments must be broadened from genetically targeted weapons to a series of new domains.

Sweden is well known as the first country in the world to adopt client criminalization in an effort to control and eventually eliminate prostitution. Less attention has been paid to the emergence of extensive collaborative governance arrangements that serve as complements to the legal framework. The aim of this article is to provide new knowledge as it investigates the multifaceted ways in which governance arrangements have developed in Sweden, employing collaborative governance theories and the Regulatory–Intermediaries–Target model for this purpose. The strategies of responsibilization directed toward target groups that have been utilized to implement policies to control prostitution and trafficking are also explored. The article analyzes not only the rationale behind the adoption of collaborative governance in Sweden, but also the complex governance practices that have emerged in this regard, in which a range of actors are involved in policymaking and application as well as regulation. We conclude that the previous understanding of the Swedish model needs to be revised, and that although collaborative governance has made a fruitful contribution to the field in question, it also introduces new types of problems, particularly a significant increase in informality and decisionmaking outside the legal framework, primarily by civil society actors.

Many countries in the “Global North” that have enjoyed relative food security for a number of decades now face challenges that may lead to disturbances in food supplies. Global markets and global flows are not as self-evident as they were a few years ago and new modes of governance for managing national food security during crisis are required. Recent events such as the COVID-19 pandemic have further showed that global production systems and communications are fragile to a range of different disturbances. This article examines the possibility of managing national food security through collaborative arrangements between public authorities and private food companies through a case study of the Swedish approach to food security. The analysis is based on a theoretical framework that highlights the importance of motivation, leadership, shared understanding, and trust as four dimensions that evaluate collaborative governance in precrisis situations. We conclude that although a broader understnding of the importance of food security has emerged, collaborative governance arrangements run the risk of creating only an illusion of readiness, due to unclear mandates and clear leadership not able to advance trust, legal structures, or concrete agreements for ensuring national food security.

The aim of this article is to assess how the European Union advances its role as a global security actor and how it deploys the military forces provided by the member states. Tracing the current debate of the identity and means of the European Union, we analyze the two maritime operations, EU NAVFOR Somalia (Operation Atalanta) and EUNAVFOR MED (Operation Sophia) from a naval diplomacy perspective. Naval diplomacy acknowledge a more versatile role for naval forces, not just military advancement and force projection. For this purpose, we need to go beyond mission descriptions and operational mandates in order to analyze and assess the two operations from within, relying on internal reports and interviews with senior officers who have participated in the operations. Results show that naval forces seeks cooperation with International organizations, NGOs, and third countries in order to facilitate security and good order of the global common of international water. Still, complex security problems are not resolved in this manner and EU maritime operations are highly political, thus facing an uncertain future as a tool of CSDP.