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This study develops a four-factor framework (4F model) based on fear, suffering, values, and characteristics for analyzing depictions of physical-risk martial heroism. Specifically, this framework is applied to assess representations of two World War II flying aces, the Royal Air Force pilot Douglas Bader and his German contemporary from the Luftwaffe, Erich Hartmann. On investigation, it is revealed that Bader and Hartmann are either described as fearless or capable of continuing their heroic journey despite their fears. Moreover, the literature contends that both these pilots experienced immense suffering but eventually overcame them. Regarding values, Bader is portrayed as a conservative patriot, whereas Hartmann is said to be a romantic and chivalrous hero. In terms of their characteristics, the depictions of Bader highlight both his positive and negative traits, whereas the darker sides of the hero are virtually absent in the rosy representations of Hartmann.

In contrast to the vast majority of Western countries, Sweden left large segments of the society open instead of imposing a lockdown to combat the spread of the coronavirus. As a result, the Swedish COVID-19 measures, largely devised by its expert agency on health, garnered widespread international attention. Despite the global interest in the corona strategy of the Public Health Agency of Sweden (PHAS), there are currently no systematic studies on their COVID-19 policy. The present investigation focuses on the controversies that have characterized PHAS' work with reference to risk assessments, facemasks, voluntarism, testing, and the protection of the elderly during the pandemic. Overall, this inquiry demonstrates that PHAS' risk assessments were initially overly optimistic and their facemask recommendations in conflict with large segments of the scientific community for an extensive period. Yet, their voluntary measures worked moderately well. In their testing, PHAS did not manage to deliver on their promises in time, whereas several measures implemented to protect the elderly were deemed inadequate and late. 

This article scrutinizes the assumption that friends support each other in times of war. Picking up the notion that solidarity, or 'other-help', is a key feature of friendship between states, the article explores how states behave when a friend is attacked by an overwhelming enemy. It directs attention to the trade-off between solidarity and self-help that governments face in such a situation and makes the novel argument that the decision about whether and how to support the friend is significantly influenced by assessments of the distribution of material capabilities and the relationship the state has with the aggressor. This proposition is supported empirically in an examination of Sweden's response to its Nordic friends' need for help during the Second World War - to Finland during the 1939-1940 'Winter War' with the Soviet Union, and to Norway following the invasion of Germany from 1940 to 1945.

Military pilots have long been central to airpower projection in both combat and non-combat operations. While the historical and contemporary roles of military aviators have been examined extensively in previous scholarship, the present study distinguishes itself by evaluating the future prospects of military aviators. By so doing, it argues that technological advances in autonomy and artificial intelligence (AI) will most likely lead to the development of pilotless aerial vehicles (PAVs), if current technological and social trends persist. In this new order, the military pilot will become a thing of the past.

It would be hard to overstate the importance of air power in humanitarian intervention (HI) and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Yet, the role of air power in HI and R2P has been understudied. This article seeks to remedy the lack of systematic investigation. It does so by developing a framework for assessing the effectiveness of air power during military operations in HI and R2P and applies it to NATO’s air campaigns in Kosovo (Operation Allied Force) and Libya (Operation Unified Protector). Upon examination NATO is revealed to have fared better in Libya than Kosovo in positively accomplishing its stated humanitarian objectives, minimizing collateral damage and reducing the costs for the interveners, all of which are aspects considered by the model. The relative effectiveness of Operations Unified Protector is generally attributed to geography, diplomacy and technology. It is argued that better ground support, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and burden sharing are needed to enhance the utility of air power in HI and R2P even further.

Determining whether the opposition is benign or malign is central to the security dilemma. In this context, states have to decide whether the military capabilities of others are for defensive or offensive purposes. Despite the importance of this issue, states’ use of intelligence and diplomacy to gauge others’ capabilities and intentions and its implications for exacerbating, ameliorating and escaping the security dilemma have hardly been addressed. The few who have engaged with the topic have only done so superficially. This article engages with the subject matter at length and argues that both intelligence and diplomacy are double-edged swords in the security dilemma. Intelligence is particularly useful in attaining information regarding the capabilities of others and diplomacy is of great value in acquiring information about their intentions. Yet, they are both prone to error. The best prospects of mitigating and escaping the security dilemma are therefore by utilizing intelligence to gauge others’ capabilities and diplomacy to decipher their intentions, even though these efforts may instead end up aggravating the security dilemma dynamics due to mistakes.

The classical realist writings of E.H. Carr and constructivist publications of Alexander Wendt are extraordinarily influential. While they have provoked a great number of reactions within the discipline of International Relations, the ethical dimensions of their works have rarely been studied at length. This article seeks to remedy this lack of examination by engaging in an in-depth scrutiny of the moral concerns of these two mainstream International Relations scholars. On investigation, it is revealed that Carr demonstrates a strong commitment to the ethical principle of fairness and Wendt a moral concern for the prevention of the use of organized violence. These concerns are shared by Rawlsians and cosmopolitans in International Relations, and these findings may thereby encourage closer engagement between these diverse communities that rarely speak to one another and strengthen disciplinary research on morals.