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This book provides the first comparative analysis of how state size and administrative scale influenced responses to the COVID-19 pandemic across the five Nordic states and two territories. It produces valuable insight into how state size, polity and structural arrangements, and culture influenced the management of the crisis in Denmark, the Faroe Islands, Finland, Greenland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. In an era of recurring global crises, the book offers critical lessons for policymakers, crisis leaders, and public administration scholars.

This chapter presents how the Swedish crisis-management system and governance culture shaped the early response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In particular, it highlights a curious mix of being, at the same time, a “larger” small state actor while also having a highly decentralised setup that, in many ways, makes its systemic units much smaller than those of the other Nordic small entities. This dichotomy informs a large number of the decisions being made and the leadership challenges faced in the national pandemic response. This context acts as an additional analytical filter on top of the themes used to analyse the other Nordic cases: preparedness/risk-reduction, decision-making and decision units, leadership, crisis communication, and learning (Hermann et al., 2006). The chapter mainly focuses on activities at the national level, but the background of the highly subsidiary nature of (in particular) the healthcare sector has a significant impact on these activities and requires some clarification as well.

This comparative study of the seven Nordic countries supports the assumption that cooperation problems and bureaucratic infighting in small states during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic were primarily the result of insufficient planning and unclear institutional rules, rather than conflicts over scarce resources. In Norway, Sweden, and Finland, ambiguity in legal mandates, overlapping agency responsibilities, and fragmented lines of authority significantly impaired coordination. These three cases reflect well-known vulnerabilities in small-state public administrations, where limited bureaucratic capacity and multi-role institutional structures can make decision-making processes both slower and more prone to miscommunication. The cases of Denmark and Iceland underscore how administrative cohesion and leadership clarity can compensate for size-related vulnerabilities. In both cases, informal coordination and trust-based decision-making – hallmarks of small-state governance – were mobilized effectively to maintain coherence under pressure. The Faroe Islands and Greenland present a different facet of small-state crisis management. Here, the main constraint was not coordination failure but capacity fatigue. While their compact administrative structures may have helped streamline decision-making, the chronic shortage of personnel and limited logistical resources meant that sustained response efforts taxed their systems heavily. These cases suggest that very small states may face a different kind of risk during protracted crises: not fragmentation, but exhaustion.

This paper analyzes whether the seven Nordic countries, by virtue of their limited administrative size and less formalized governance arrangements, were particularly well-suited to fostering rapid knowledge sharing and adaptive policy responses during the early stage of the COVID-19 pandemic. The cases reveal a spectrum of governance arrangements, with informality and social intimacy most pronounced and impactful in the smallest jurisdictions (Greenland, the Faroe Islands and Iceland), hybrid models dominating in mid-sized states (Finland, Norway, and Denmark), and formal structures prevailing in larger systems (especially Sweden). Our findings suggest that, while informal governance and elite proximity proved invaluable in certain contexts, their effectiveness depended heavily on structural factors unique to each state. Administrative size matters as a key variable that interacts with governance design, expert integration, and political leadership to shape crisis response outcomes. Smallness, when understood not merely as constraint but as a distinct administrative condition, can be a potent asset in navigating complex crises; if, however, it is accompanied by the right balance of informality, coordination, and institutional coherence.

This paper examines whether the small size of the public administration of the seven Nordic countries affected the nature of their crisis responses, focusing on the mix between proactive and reactive strategies, during the early phases of the COVID-19 pandemic. Comparing across all seven cases, a key pattern emerges: the smaller the state – in terms of both population and administrative depth – the more likely it is to rely on reactive mechanisms at the outset. However, these same states also tend to be more flexible and socially cohesive, allowing for rapid adaptation. In contrast, larger Nordic states have broader institutional structures and more expertbased capacity; this promotes proactive planning but may be hampered by decentralization, bureaucratic silos, or institutional inertia. This study confirms that small states are more likely to begin with reactive responses due to limited resources; but their capacity for quick adaptation, voluntarism, and tight governance networks leads them to develop proactive measures over time. Thus, size alone does not determine effectiveness; it interacts with governance structures, administrative culture, and public trust. The crisis responses across the Nordic region demonstrate that proactive and reactive strategies coexist on a continuum; and that agility, learning, and institutional coordination are crucial to successful pandemic management, regardless of state size.

Under sommaren 2018 utbröt ett stort antal skogsbränder runt om i Sverige på grund av det ihållande varma och torra vädret. Bränder uppstod även på flera av Fortifikationsverkets fastigheter. Den största brandutvecklingen skedde på Älvdalens skjutfält i Dalarna och krävde en gemensam insats från kommunala räddningstjänsten, Fortifikationsverkets egen personal, Försvarsmakten, Hemvärnet och frivilliga för att hantera. Som fastighetsägare ansvarade Fortifikationsverket främst för eftersläcknings- och bevakningsarbete. Fortifikationsverkets hantering av bränderna innehöll många positiva delar: initiativförmåga, improvisation och engagemang. Människor ville och kunde göra en insats. Alla dessa är viktiga komponenter i krishantering. Då detta är en av de största händelserna som Fortifikationsverket har fått hantera så har det lett till en rad nya kunskaper och erfarenheter som kan bidra till att utveckla myndighetens krisberedskap, men också till totalförsvarsplaneringen.

Fortifikationsverket gav Försvarshögskolans Centrum för totalförsvar och samhällets säkerhet (FHS/CTSS) i uppdrag att dels utvärdera myndighetens insats i hanteringen av skogsbränderna vid Älvdalens skjutfält, och dels myndighetens generella förmåga att hantera uppkomna kriser. Underlaget till utvärderingen består dels av en analys av de dokument som togs fram under insatsen, av myndighetens instruktioner och planer samt av gällande författningar. Därtill har intervjuer genomförts med medarbetare och chefer inom Fortifikationsverket som satt på viktiga krisledningsfunktioner vid insatsen, samt med räddningstjänsten som samverkade med Fortifikationsverket under bränderna. Utvärderingen har resulterat i ett antal slutsatser och rekommendationer som presenteras kortfattat nedan. Rapporten har även kompletterats med en bilaga, ”Typfall skogsbrand”. Bilagan består av ett scenario där utbredda skogsbränder drabbar Fortifikationsverkets fastigheter och olika situationer uppstår som måste hanteras av myndigheten. Därutöver finns en checklista som kan fungera som stöd både före, under och efter en händelse, till exempel en skogsbrand. Bilagan är tänkt att användas till utbildning, övning och planering.

During the evening of 19 May, the celebration of Sweden’s gold medal in the hockey World Championship took place in the centre of the city, while reports began coming in of an unusually large number of vehicles being set on fire in Husby. During the night, additional vehicles, and even a school and a garage, were set ablaze. Police and rescue personnel were attacked when they arrived on the scene, adding to the event an unusual component in that the police also had to protect the rescue workers on site. The riots in Husby that spread across the Stockholm suburbs lasted for two weeks, although there was nothing to indicate early on that it would last this long, and what crisis management needs would arise.

Crismart har genomfört en effektutvärdering av tolv 2:4-projekt med olika löptider. Projekten har bland annat genomförts av länsstyrelser, MSB och andra myndigheter. Syftet var att stödja MSB:s uppföljning av 2:4-projekt utförda inom åtgärden inriktning och samordning. Detta ska ske genom att projektens påverkan på krisberedskapsförmågan utvärderas.

I vår analys av de resultat och effekter som uppnåtts i de studerade 2:4-projekten framkommer ett antal större mönster rörande förutsättningarna för projekten att resultera i någon slags systemeffekt. Vi kan se:

- att det finns en inneboende problematik i hur effekter kan och bör mätas och utvärderas på systemnivå, inte bara ur ett utvärderingsmetodologiskt perspektiv utan även på ett mer praktiskt plan i hur 2:4-projekt drivs och kvalitetssäkras,

- att 2:4-anslagets avgränsning skapar problem för långsiktighet och förvaltning av de resultat som projekten mynnar ut i,

- att det samtidigt finns en risk att anslaget över tid får en skev inriktning på grund av hur denna systemnytta kan mätas och värderas,

- och att anslagets utformning skapar hinder för vilken slags systemnytta som går att uppnå baserat på vilka aktörer som har möjlighet att bidra till och dra nytta av projekten.

Organisations have been analytically conceptualised as being somewhat analogous to individuals for a long time. They have culture; they can learn; and they can behave in various odd ways. But how far can the simile be stretched? What other types of organisational cognition can we imagine? And what benefits can we gain by introducing new perspectives of this kind? 

This study shows that organisations can exhibit familiar symptoms of stress, such as closing themselves to the outside world and becoming unreceptive to external stimuli and input. They retreat to what is familiar and safe and put on blinders to hide anything that does not already fit with how they feel things should be, often in situations where they would be best served by being as open to and perceptive of these external stimuli as possible. Using a model of organisational behaviour that connects external pressure to an internal mode of operation and to specific knowledge-seeking behaviours, the study examines two case pairs—two success stories and two catastrophic failures—to examine patterns of organisational cognition. By comparing and contrasting the failure of the FBI during the 1993 Waco siege with its subsequent success during the 1996 Montana Freemen standoff, and doing the same with the Swedish Foreign Ministry’s handling of the 2004 Southeast Asian tsunami and the 2006 evacuation from the war in Lebanon, a pattern emerges where certain types of knowledge proved to be the key to staying as open-minded, responsive, and dynamic as these crises demanded. This knowledge can be used both during a crisis to resolve some of the confusion and time pressure that is endemic to such situations, as well as before a crisis to mitigate or even stave off the approaching chaos.

The goal of this study is to provide an analysis of cyber crisis management by identifying relations between this emerging field and the better established subject of general crisis management. This includes terminology and key concepts in these fields. This study further seeks to gain knowledge and understanding of the involved actors’ perspectives on the challenges for Cyber Crisis management within the European context.

The purpose of the study is twofold: to compare concepts from the general crisis management systems with the corresponding systems related to cyber crisis management, and to conduct a conceptual analysis of the language and terminology within these two fields. The primary aim is to analyse the similarities and differences between general and cyber crisis management, employing examples from countries and organizations within the EU.

Based on interviews with members of key national and EU institutions, and on an analysis of the differences between their practitioner perspectives and the theories of general crisis management, the study arrives at six key areas of recommendations for future activities in the cyber security realm.

During this study ENISA gathered and analysed a large set of over 200 exercises. In addition to the exercise dataset, ENISA analysed specialised literature such as after-action reports and previous studies that have contributed to the analysis. This report includes a model for describing and reporting on such exercises. The study is a step forward towards better resource for planning and collaboration between nations and agencies interested in cybersecurity exercises. The findings show a continuous and accelerated increase in the total amount of exercises held after 2012, as well as an increase in the number of cooperative exercises involving private and public actors. This indicates that it is not just a matter of public agencies running more exercises, but also of more actors benefiting from these exercises.