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How are partnerships between foreign states and armed groups formed? Previous research has suggested that the provision of external support is mainly based on group capacity and affinity ties. However, this neglects the fact that support provision is a dynamic matching process in which strategic adjustments often are made that enable the distribution of support. I argue that states place demands on rebel groups who may strategically rebrand, reform, and reorganise to facilitate the distribution of support. For state sponsors, this process serves the dual purpose of justification and control. For rebels, the process distinguishes them from competitors and increases their chances of receiving vital aid. Drawing on frame analysis, I illustrate how the Syrian Democratic Forces crafted narratives in tandem with the United States which created the necessary conditions that helped initiate and sustain the partnership. The findings highlight the importance of the strategic alignment process and show how it can supplement existing explanations related to battlefield performances and transnational affinities.

How do foreign states exercise control over armed groups? State support to non-state actors is never a risk-free strategy. The provision of support to armed groups abroad may backfire as proxies can divert resources, refuse to adhere to demands, or even turn against the state sponsor. To ensure compliance and mitigate the inherent risks involved in conflict delegation, we argue that states make use of 10 distinct control mechanisms when outsourcing violence to non-state armed groups: selection, programming, inducements, promises, threats, rewards, sanctions, checks and balances, reporting, and monitoring. In this article, we outline the logic underpinning each mechanism and illustrate how foreign state sponsors around the globe have employed them. In essence, we contend that state support to armed groups is much more formalized, structured, and regulated than what is assumed.

Policymakers sometimes argue that material assistance to rebels involved in a civil war can create a ‘ripe moment’ that is favorable for negotiations. Ripeness theory provides support for this idea. However, this notion has never been systematically assessed. This article evaluates this claim by using global data on negotiations in all intrastate armed conflicts from 1975 to 2009. Contrary to popular belief, the article demonstrates that external state support to rebel groups does not increase the prospect of negotiations. Instead, the results suggest that external support is likely to reduce the likelihood of negotiations between the warring parties, especially if the state sponsor is a great power. The study contributes to our understanding of civil war processes by demonstrating that military assistance hinders rather than promotes the onset of negotiations and by questioning the utility of ripeness theory as the most suitable framework for understanding this phenomenon.

In this article, we present the most up-to-date, fine-grained, global dataset on external support in armed conflicts: theUCDP External Support Dataset (ESD). The dataset encompasses data on states and non-state actors as bothsupporters and recipients and provides detailed information on the type of support provided to warring parties inarmed conflicts between 1975 and 2017. We use it to highlight three broader trends in the provision of externalsupport: (1) a dramatic increase in the number of external supporters, (2) a larger share of pro-government interventions, and (3) the rise of direct military intervention as the predominant mode of external support. In conclusion,we identify several avenues worthy of future inquiry that could significantly improve our understanding of externalsupport in armed conflicts. 

Most research to date has focused on understanding why states use proxies and the impact this indirect conflict strategy has had on various conflict dynamics. Much less thought has been devoted to the more pressing and policy-relevant question of what makes some proxy relationships endure while others break down. In this chapter, I review relevant research on this topic and present a framework that outlines various ways in which proxy relationships are terminated.

The provision of external state support to non-state armed groups in civil wars is a dynamic process. The calculus of state sponsors varies over time, which means that assistance provided to the armed opposition fluctuates. While we know much about the initiation of external support and its effects, we know less about why state sponsorship changes over time. To address this, I propose a theoretical argument that can account for policy adjustments over time. The theory builds on the notion that leaders change their support commitment when there is adverse feedback and that support increases as long as the causes of policy failure can be attributed to external actors, while cutbacks occur when failure is attributed to the state sponsor’s own actions. Process-tracing is used to illustrate the value of this framework in a within-case analysis of the United States’ support commitment to the armed opposition in Nicaragua in the 1980s. The study demonstrates the utility of focusing on shifts in leaders’ perceptions and domestic attribution processes rather than structural features of the international system or rebel behavior to understand temporal variation in external support.

This forum provides an outlet for an assessment of research on the delegation of war to non-state armed groups in civil wars. Given the significant growth of studies concerned with this phenomenon over the last decade, this forum critically engages with the present state of the field. First, we canvass some of the most important theoretical developments to demonstrate the heterogeneity of the debate. Second, we expand on the theme of complexity and investigate its multiple facets as a window into pushing the debate forward. Third, we draw the contours of a future research agenda by highlighting some contemporary problems, puzzles, and challenges to empirical data collection. In essence, we seek to connect two main literatures that have been talking past each other: external support in civil wars and proxy warfare. The forum bridges this gap at a critical juncture in this new and emerging scholarship by offering space for scholarly dialogue across conceptual labels.

The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of excombatants has become an integral part of peacebuilding. Although the main purpose of such interventions is to dissolve the military structures of armed groups, there is growing evidence that ex-combatant networks often remain intact. We investigate why such structures continue to thrive. We argue that ex-military networks are stronger when ex-commanders have weak links to elite patronage systems. Ex-combatants who are unable to rely on their former superiors for economic assistance must instead build denser ties to each other to gain access to a social safety net. To assess our argument, we conduct a comparative social network analysis (SNA) of two ex-military networks in Liberia. This innovative approach helps us uncover previously overlooked, but central, dynamics related to ex-combatant groups. We thereby show that SNA provides a range of underutilized tools and exact definitions that can increase our understanding of ex-military networks.