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In spite of the expectations of Moscow, the war in Ukraine has quickly turned into a war of attrition. Based on open-source military publications, this paper aims to present Russian views on the causes of positional war as well as on the future of manoeuvre warfare. While not questioning the purpose of the war, in between the lines, Russian military thinkers acknowledge the responsibility of the political leadership for underestimating Ukraine and using military force in a wasteful manner. On the other hand, they also recognise that the Russian military thinkers were selective when considering lessons of the previous decades, disregarding trends that were pointing to the heavily positional nature of contemporary wars. Finding ways to implement manoeuvre warfare in the current operational environment will most likely be high on the agenda of Russian military thought, as recent publications indicate.

Over the past 2 years, since the beginning of the full-scale war in Ukraine, there have been very few studies that have examined the war from the perspective of Russian military thinking. To be able to more accurately predict ways in which the Russian way of war and force structure may change, it is essential to study the Russian military scientific discourse on the lessons of the war in Ukraine. Taking for granted that the Russians come to the same conclusions as Western observers can lead to mirror-imaging and will ignore the likely prospect that Russian lessons learned from the war will not coincide with those of Western military experts. This article contributes to the understanding of Russian military thinking with regard to the war by focusing on three key aspects. (1) The evolution of Russian thinking about indirect strategy. (2) The changing Russian perspective on the concept of non-contact war. (3) The Russian military discourse about the challenge posed by the increasingly transparent battlefield of contemporary wars.