This study examines why the officer’s professional core task – to develop and sustain military capability – is being marginalised in today’s organisation. Despite the military profession being founded on expertise, judgement and continuous capability development, both research and practice describe how administrative requirements, juridification and governance principles have gradually gained increased influence within the Armed Forces. The issue is central to the officer profession and potentially of strategic significance for the operational effectiveness of the defence. The purpose of the study is therefore to analyse which organisational mechanisms drive this displacement and how officers manage the conflict between administrative demands and the military core task in their everyday work.
The study is based on a qualitative research design, using semi-structured interviews with officers at middle-management level within the Army. The analysis is informed by a theoretical framework consisting of profession and competence theory, Friedson’s organisational logics, and Lipsky’s theory of street-level bureaucracy. Together, these perspectives enable a multidimensional analysis of structural governance mechanisms, professional identity, and the practical actions of organisational actors.
The findings show that three interacting factors contribute to the crowding out of the core task: structural resource shortages, juridification, and an administratively driven logic of prioritisation. These mechanisms result in administrative tasks being systematically pushed down to the officer level, formal compliance being prioritised over military professional expertise, and planned activities being repeatedly disrupted by urgent governance signals. Officers develop coping strategies to make everyday work manageable, but these are individual in nature and risk reinforcing the structural problem. The consequences include reduced professional discretion, competence gaps, and increasingly reactive capability development.
The study concludes that the conflict between administration and military professionalism is structurally determined rather than individual, and that, in the long term, it may affect the operational capability of the Armed Forces.