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The aim of this thesis is to describe and compare Denmark´s and Iceland´s marine strategies in the Arctic region using Jacob Börresens theory The Seapower of the Coastal State. The Arctic region has for a long time been a low-intensity area but is nowadays characterized by increasing great power competition. This is a result of melting ice which has opened up new sea lines of communications and created opportunities to exploit natural resources. This study uses a  qualitative comparative  analysis and document analysis in order to describe how Denmark and Iceland have designed their marine strategies using public defense documents. 

The result of the study states that Denmark´s strategy can be described through Börresens perspective on the Coastal State but is also striving to be an independent actor in the Arctic region. Iceland´s strategy is characterized by Börresens theory but is dependent on alliances and bilateral agreements. Furthermore, the results indicate that both nations prioritize maritime surveillance and are forced to adopt hybrid strategies to balance foreign interests against increasing great power competition. 

This text examines the internal dimension of Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions, asking whether the obligation to “ensure respect” for international humanitarian law extends to fostering the moral engagement of its practitioners. Drawing in particular on empirical research by the ICRC, it argues that moral engagement is the primary factor of compliance and that key IHL norms are drafted on the assumption that such engagement will be operative. The text contends that the due diligence component of Common Article 1 includes a requirement to promote and maintain moral engagement within State armed forces and that, in light of existing structures of training and command, this represents a generally reasonable imposition on States.

In an era defined by hybrid warfare and sophisticated cyber-kinetic threats, the operational resilience of critical infrastructure serves as a fundamental pillar of Sweden's Total Defence (Totalförsvaret) strategy. As the Swedish power grid undergoes a rapid digital transformation to meet sustainability goals, legacy Operational Technology (OT) systems are increasingly exposed to modern network vulnerabilities. Concurrently, the regulatory landscape has evolved with the implementation of the European Union's NIS2 Directive, enacted in Sweden via the Cybersecurity Act (SFS 2025:1506) in January 2026. Whether legal compliance with this framework translates into verifiable technical security in practice, however, remains an open question. This thesis investigates whether the "appropriate technical and organisational measures" mandated by the new legislation are sufficient to mitigate advanced, multi-vector cyberattacks. Utilising a mixed-methods approach grounded in Sociotechnical Systems Theory, the research contrasts Work-as-Imagined (the regulatory framework and compliance audits) with Work-as-Done (the operational reality of legacy Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) environments). Through a custom, deterministic HTML/Three.js simulation grounded in IEC 60076-7 thermal physics, the study simulates a combined "Manipulation of View" (MITRE ATT&CK T0832) and "Unauthorized Command Message" (MITRE ATT&CK T0855) attack on a Swedish 400 kV substation transformer over the ubiquitous Modbus TCP protocol. By measuring the subsequent loss of Cyber Situational Awareness through the Integrity Visibility Metric, the research empirically demonstrates how technical blindness in the control room can cascade into a broader societal crisis. The thesis ultimately conducts a regulatory gap analysis using the Compliance vs. Resilience Matrix to determine whether current laws adequately compel the technical specificities required to protect the Swedish energy sector from systemic failure and deception.

This study aims to explain the cadets' reasons for choosing a different regiment during the officers program. While the Swedish Armed Forces is rapidly expanding, the need to recruit personnel remains essential. Therefore, it is interesting to explore what factors motivate the cadets enough to choose a different regiment. These findings can be used by different regiments to optimize their recruiting strategy and receive a greater number of officers.

The study uses a quantitative method, with cadets currently studying the officers' program as respondents. A survey was conducted to test three hypotheses. That geographical location, previous experience from the regiment, and the type of service at the regiment conducted would increase the probability of cadets choosing a different regiment.The main findings from the study are that there is no definite answer that can be generalized to explain the cadets' choices. With the exception of the regiment being in close vicinity to the cadets family and friends. The factors motivating the cadets doesn’t seem to depend on them choosing a different regiment. There are, however, factors that indicate a greater amount of impact on the cadets' choices, such as previous experience from the chosen regiment. When you disregard the choice of regiments. There is also a factor that indicates a negative correlation regarding choosing a different regiment.

This thesis studies the perception of deficient German army tactics and officers’ education 1871–1914 among Swedish officers through the lens of military attaché and study mission reports. The historiography paints a picture of increasing German influence on the Swedish military during the studied period, while also describing certain aspects of the German army tactics and officers’ education as deficient. The reports are studied qualitatively and thematically to map the Swedes’ attitudes toward concepts outlined in the historiography, such as mass cavalry charges against machine gun fire. The study mission reports are also subjected to a short quantitative study to illuminate patterns based on social class, arm affiliation and rank, as a complement to the qualitative analysis. The results are furthermore discussed through a theoretical framework concerning diffusion of military ideas. The analysis shows that the Swedish officers were in many respects rational, criticising the German practices, with no discernible increase in German influence over time, contrary to what can be extrapolated from the claims of the historiography. The application of the theoretical framework explains this discrepancy, by showing that the officers, serving as military-to-military contacts in the process of diffusion, having a different experience than their German colleagues, saw the German practices in a different light, and generally reported this soberly, while still having an overall positive view of Germany and its army.

The British victory in the Falklands War 1982 depends on many factors, yet the operational logistics support during the war is a neglected subject. This study aims to gain a deeper understanding of operational logistics from a British perspective during the Falklands war. The literature review describes the logistics as successful, but also as a difficult logistical situation, in a challenging environment and far from home. The chosen method for this study is a theory-consuming single case study. The study uses mainly books that describe the logistic situation as the material. The situation and implementation will be understood through Kress' theoretical frame Operational Logistics, supported by the literature describing the case of logistics during the Falklands war. The study's results show an extensive and advanced execution of the logistic operation, that on various levels follow Kress theoretical standpoints of mainly flexibility, simplicity and survivability, but also various levels of attainability, continuity, tempo, and efficiency. The effect is a solid logistic work that over all had an impact on the British victory in the Falklands war in its whole. This study further contributes insight into the logistics chain and logistic situation from a British point of view during the war on the operational level.  The result in this study shows that further research on the subject of operational logistics can lead to development of military logistic operations.

The Russian-Ukraine war in 2022 had a clear favourite during the initial phase of the invasion, due to Russia’s numerical and technological advantage. Despite this Russia did not manage to achieve any success during the wars first major battles. Earlier studies have attempted to answer why this was the case and the most common conclusions is due to logistical blunders and poor force deployment in the form of battalion tactical groups. However few studies have tried to explain why the Russians failed in Ukraine on a tactical level. Therefore, this paper will answer that question with the use of William S. Lind manoeuvre theory. This will be achieved by applying the theory on the Russian tactical decision-making during the battle of Kharkiv in 2022.

The manoeuvre theory states that by applying three principles and three mental filters during tactical decision-making, the enemy’s decision-loop can be broken which eventually will lead to victory. The three principles are decentralized command, accepting confusion and avoiding formulas. These three make up the foundation of an armed forces capable of utilizing manoeuvre warfare. The three mental filters are mission command, concentration of forces and the enemy´s surfaces and gaps. By applying these three mental filters during tactical decision making the manoeuvre theory states that the chances of a tactical success significantly increases. The results show that Russia only achieved two of these six principles and filters partially while they failed to achieve the other four at all. This shows that Russia failed on a tactical level due to a lack of manoeuvre warfare which led to them suffering big losses during the initial phase of the invasion of Ukraine. Further research regarding Russia’s tactical failure in Ukraine is recommended to focus on a Ukrainian victory and apply the manoeuvre theory on their  tactical decision-making, to attempt to explain why they have achieved success while the Russians have not

Special operations and raids against strategically significant targets have become increasingly important in modern warfare, particularly as a means of enabling conventional forces to achieve operational breakthroughs. This development underscores the need for research on the conditions under which such operations succeed. However, contemporary special operations are often subject to high levels of classification, limiting empirical accessibility and making historical case studies especially valuable. This study examines the success of Operation Prelim, a raid conducted by the SAS against an Argentine airfield on Pebble Island during the Falklands War. The objective of the operation was to destroy attack aircraft that posed a significant threat to the planned British amphibious landing at San Carlos. The study is conducted as a qualitative single case study, using William H. McRaven’s theory of special operations as an analytical framework. The purpose is to identify the mechanisms that led to tactical success against a numerically superior enemy. The findings show that SAS successfully implemented five of the six principles, particularly in relation to simplicity, security, surprise, speed, and purpose. However, the operation deviated from the principle of rehearsal as no full-scale or mission specific rehearsal was conducted. The analysis suggests that this shortcoming was mitigated by high levels of individual skill, clear objectives, and simulated planning.

This thesis examines the development of Sweden’s economic defence in relation to two formative processes: the Cold War and the planning breakthrough (the introduction of rationalistic planning methods). The research question is: How did the economic defence develop between 1962–1986 in relation to the Cold War’s varying intensity and the planning breakthrough? The empirical material consists mainly of the National Swedish Board of Economic Defence’s archives. Firstly, using a theoretical approach derived from Guy Oakes The Imaginary War (1994), the study finds alternative explanations to the corporatist interpretation of the state-private relationship within the economic defence. Secondly, the findings suggest that in relation to the Cold War, the conceptualisations of future threats were more hypothetical in de-escalatory periods, and threat-specific during a worsened security situation. Thirdly, and most importantly, a significant finding is that historical experiences remained heavily influential in contingency planning despite the introduction of rational planning methods in the late 1960s. The results highlight an overlooked aspect of the economic defence and shed light on the friction between institutional development and cognitive adoption. 

While the notion of ‘methods of warfare’ is found in a large number of provisions under international humanitarian law (IHL), there is no definition of ‘methods of warfare’. Suggested definitions, ranging from the ways in which weapons are used to any way of conducting hostilities for the purpose of weakening the enemy, differ to a large extent and leave more questions than answers. Therefore, this thesis seeks out to answer the question what is the meaning of ‘methods of warfare’ under IHL? 

Looking back in time, ‘methods of warfare’ have been regulated for long. However, it was not until within the Additional Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions that rules regulating ‘methods of warfare’ were codified. These rules all rely on the premises that the choice of ‘methods of warfare’ is not unlimited, that only what is necessary in order to overcome the adversary is permitted, and that humanitarian consequences of armed conflicts shall be limited. These are reflected in the number of provisions discussed throughout the thesis. The provisions, as well as a discussion on contemporary challenges such as cyber operations and influence operations, highlight certain parts of the notion of ‘methods of warfare’ that are necessary for a consistent application of the concept throughout IHL. These are primarily the inclusion of other ways of conducting hostilities than just that the use of weapons, as well as the importance of the definition being of a descriptive nature, rather than of a normative nature. 

When discussing the provisions and challenges in regard to the definitions offered, it is concluded that both the ways in which weapons are used as well as other strategic and tactical ways of conducting hostilities shall be included. There has to be a belligerent nexus between the ‘method of warfare’ and the armed conflict. However, there is no requirement of any violence or consequence for the purposes of an act being a ‘methods of warfare’, as the notion is only descriptive. Because of this, the thesis suggests the following definition: 

‘Methods of warfare’ under IHL are the ways in which weapons are used as well as other strategic or tactical ways of conducting hostilities. 

 This Master's Thesis develops a Monte Carlo framework for comparing two maintenance strategies under interdicted logistics conditions, illustrated through the CV90 infantry fighting vehicle: Strategy A (modular exchange), in which the entire failed module is replaced at a forward position, and Strategy B (component-level repair), in which only the faulty component inside the module is repaired. Logistic interdiction is represented by β and the physical footprint of the delivered item, which together determine the delivery-time function. β determines the expected number of delivery attempts required for a successful arrival, while the physical footprint determines the time cost of each delivery attempt. Transit time and transit distance are held constant between the strategies. The system contains five subsystems in series and is analyzed for a period of 30 days. Failures are assumed to occur according to a Poisson distribution, repair times according to a lognormal distribution, and delivery attempts according to a geometric distribution, whereby interdicted delivery attempts imply new delivery attempts. Owing to a lack of data specific to military platforms, civilian vehicle data are used as a proxy. Thus, β* (the intersection of Strategy A and Strategy B) needs to be regarded as an illustrative threshold under proxy conditions, and not as an actual platform-specific threshold for the CV90.

The results show that Strategy A provides higher operational availability (Ao) than Strategy B across most of the tested threat range. In the case of baseline values, Strategy A and Strategy B yield equal Ao at β* ≈ 0.80, corresponding to an expected five delivery cycles per successful arrival under the modeled geometric retry process. If the repair duration for both strategies is stressed to k_repair = 1.5, β* becomes approximately equal to 0.87. Considering the fact that Strategy B has longer baseline repair times, the same multiplier imposes a larger absolute repair-time burden on Strategy B. A supplementary hybrid strategy, which implies choosing the better strategy in each subsystem separately, surpasses both pure strategies in Ao only in a narrow window near the crossover point. 

The research demonstrates how maintenance depth in relation to logistics interdiction may be considered as a stochastic availability issue, linking repair strategy, logistical footprint, interdicted delivery attempts, waiting time, and Ao together.

The digitalisation of the energy sector and the introduction of the NIS2 directive create a highly complex landscape for crisis management. The directive mandates strict 24-hour incident reporting, which structurally conflicts with the operational realities of cyber-physical attacks on operational technology. This thesis investigates how the crisis leader’s operational scope of action is constructed in the tension between NIS2 compliance and dynamic crisis management within the Swedish energy sector. 

Employing Dynamic Decision-Making (DDM) as the theoretical framework, this study conducts a thematic document analysis of strategic guidelines published by leading cybersecurity consulting firms. The findings demonstrate that the formal leadership’s scope of action is limited during an acute cyber-physical incident. Faced with the conflict between rapid technical threat progression and administrative deadlines, the formal leadership experiences severe time constraints and information ambiguity. This leads to cognitive overload and a rapidly shrinking space of possibilities. 

The operational scope of action is constructed by external cybersecurity consultants acting as boundary spanners. These consultants filter technical noise, reconstruct operational feedback loops and dictate the available strategic options. The thesis concludes that while this outsourced expertise is a functional necessity to navigate the compliance trap, it introduces a systemic vulnerability. It creates a critical decoupling of accountability, where legal liability remains centralised with the formal leadership. However, practical operational understanding and decision-making are outsourced to commercial third-party entities.

Key words: dynamic decision-making, nis2 directive, cybersecurity, crisis management, critical infrastructure

It has long been contended that jus in bello has to be kept strictly separated from jus ad bellum, despite both being concurrently applicable to regulate situations of armed conflict. Very persuasive arguments, pertaining to the humanitarian nature of jus in bello and to the logical reciprocity of the application of jus in bello, have been developed to support this claim. However, is it not in the very nature of law to demand more than moral and logical arguments to govern the relationship between two distinct branches of international law?

The principle of separation inherently calls for a legal basis, a foundation that entrenches it in international law. Indeed, fundamental rules and principles of international law call into question the absoluteness of the separation. However, no argument in contemporary doctrine proved sufficient to justify, legally, the principle of separation. Maybe the answer is to find elsewhere, in a new understanding of the relationship between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. In a new understanding that does not presuppose an absolute separation between both bodies of law but accepts that they interact and mutually influence each other.

In this research, I propose to consider the relationship between jus ad bellum and jus in bello as being explicitly governed by a rule of jus in bello. Specifically, I contend that sufficient elements, including state practice and opinio juris, support the existence of a customary rule of jus in bello that prevents the illegal use of force under jus ad bellum from affecting the duty of any belligerents to equally respect their obligations under jus in bello. While a more exhaustive analysis is needed, there is certainly a case to be made that such a rule exists. 

This thesis examines the legal framework governing reparations for injuries caused by unlawful threats of force under international law. While Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits both the threat and use of force, attention from states and scholars has predominantly focused on the latter, leaving the legal implications of threats comparatively underdeveloped. The study addresses this gap by analysing the extent to which states may be obliged to make reparation for less obvious, indirect, intangible, and temporally remote injuries that may result from prohibited threats of force. By relying on the ILC’s ARSIWA, as well as case law and scholarly literature, the thesis evaluates how the obligation of reparation applies to such injury, with particular emphasis on the requirements of injury and causation. The study demonstrates that, although the obligation of reparation for injuries caused by unlawful threats of force follows as a legal consequence of the wrongful act once attribution and breach are established, uncertainty persists in practice, largely depending on the approach taken in assessing the requisite injury and causation. The absence of clear definitions and the limited judicial reasoning on the application and assessment of these concepts may contribute to uncertainty regarding legal outcomes and, in turn, to the unpredictability of reparations for unlawful threats of force. The findings suggest that a more flexible, context-sensitive approach to causation better accommodates the diverse and often indirect effects of unlawful threats of force. Furthermore, a more transparent, developed, and explicit articulation of causation assessments by judicial bodies could contribute to an enhanced understanding of the concept’s significance and strengthen legal certainty.

This thesis investigates how Swedish military pilot students experience their flight training across four national contexts; Sweden, Germany, Italy and the USA. Addressing a scarcity of qualitative research about cross-cultural experiences of military education, this study aims to create understanding about how culture and adult-centered teaching methods affect students’ perceptions in different educational environments. Twelve students were interviewed for this study while undergoing flight training abroad towards flying helicopter, fighter and transport aircrafts. Guided by Hofstede´s cultural dimensions and Knowles´ theory about andragogy, the comparative theoretical thematical analysis highlights significant variations. Swedish flight training is perceived as Student-centered with high psychological safety and a deep learning focus. Conversely, the American and Italian environment are perceived as highly hierarchical and performance-oriented, prioritizing grades over knowledge. Germany is overall perceived as a compromise between the two sides. Results indicate that culture actively shapes educational methods, which influence motivation and stress. The study concludes that understanding these nuances is vital for optimizing military education in different environments and cultures, which could enhance interoperability within NATO contexts.

This thesis is a qualitative case study of Sweden that examines the military utility of soft-kill counterspace capabilities for medium-sized states, as space has become an increasingly important domain for military, political, and economic activity. More states are developing capabilities for space operations. For medium-sized states, acquiring counterspace capabilities presents significant challenges due to limited resources, technological constraints, and competing defence priorities. Soft-kill capabilities, such as electronic warfare and cyber warfare, temporarily disrupt or degrade adversary space assets without physically destroying them, offering a reversible and scalable alternative to kinetic hard-kill systems such as direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles.  Applying the Military Utility framework across three dimensions: military effectiveness, military suitability, and affordability, the study evaluates a hypothetical Swedish ground-based electronic warfare anti-satellite system, referred to as SKADI. The thesis also proposes a new operational concept, Suppression of Adversary Space Assets (SASA), as a framework for how medium-sized states can achieve temporary localised space control without requiring the extensive space architectures of major powers. The findings indicate that soft-kill electronic warfare systems provide significant military utility for medium-sized states, offering lower political and escalatory risk and reduced financial and technological barriers. The thesis concludes that the primary constraint on such capabilities is not the system itself but the broader supporting infrastructure, particularly space domain awareness, required to make it operationally effective.

The rebuilding of the total defense has led to increased demands on municipalities' civil defense capabilities, with focus on crisis and war preparedness. The impact of governance on Swedish municipalities' crisis preparedness and their capability is relatively unexplored. The purpose of this qualitative study is to gain an understanding of municipal crisis preparedness in larger public organizations with decentralized governance. Based on ten semi-structured interviews with employees and managers in the municipality of Stockholm, employees' perceptions of how the municipality shapes its crisis preparedness and capability were examined, based on governance. The empirical analysis was conducted through abductive thematic analysis. The results showed that challenges could be related to the municipality's decentralized organizational model, governing documents, bureaucracy, leadership, information routes and capacity-building efforts. Uncertainty based on unclear priorities, preparedness-roles, laws and budget allocations are some examples. The last two mentioned are perceived to counteract long-term preparedness. Indirect leadership is considered to have a significant impact on the crisis preparedness culture, while the room for interpretation of policy documents makes it difficult to achieve an equal cross-municipality crisis preparedness capability. However, external collaboration networks, large resource assets, adaptability, uniform working methods and local experience of crisis management are perceived to contribute to organizational resilience. The study demonstrates a paradox between decentralized and centralized governance where a combination and balance of both seems to be favorable. Recentralization might facilitate the development of cross-municipality preparedness, at the expense of dynamic local crisis management capability and less democracy.

This thesis utilizes Fratini et. al.’s framework and qualitative content analysis in order to investigate how the European Union (EU) understands digital sovereignty. Digital sovereignty is an interesting concept, as it is typically associated with the state's role and responsibilities, something the EU has been cautious about in both policy and language. When the EU speaks of digital and technology matters, the concept of digital sovereignty is acceptable to use. Which of course raises the question of what the EU means with the concept. This is further complicated by the case of EuroStack, an industry-led initiative for EU investment into the EU tech industry to strengthen EU digital sovereignty. Private companies are using the terms of EU and European digital sovereignty in their petition for increased funding and increased usage of European tech companies. This is however in conflict with the traditional idea of sovereignty, polities retaining dependence on private companies do not achieve domestic primacy or a monopoly of violence. EuroStack thus represents a novel case in a rich scientific tradition of sovereignty and EU integration. The content analysis in this thesis which studied digital sovereignty in relevant documents, as well as the EU state of the union-speech (SOTU), showed a prevailing reluctance in using sovereignty even in this more accepted arena and that digital sovereignty is perceived in a state-based way as part of a securitized context. Allowing for the conclusion that, at least in this case, digital sovereignty is understood by the EU as a responsibility for the EU belonging to the security arena, strengthening EU statehood aspirations, as well as a leitmotif for EU expansion and cementing dependence on domestic companies who are expected to project EU values.