



## **Master's Thesis:**

Strategic Culture of the Finnish Defence Forces on Defence  
Cooperation within NATO

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**Abstract:**

Finland's accession to NATO in 2023 marks a turning point for how the country approaches defence cooperation as joining NATO requires new members to adapt to the expectation of collective defence. Contrary to the past strategy of military non-alignment, the Finnish Defence Forces (FDF) are now expected to adjust to fulfil these new obligations. The FDF, traditionally focused on national territorial defence, must transition to become an active security provider for others. Little academic attention has been given to how cultural factors condition how the FDF will approach defence cooperation within NATO. This thesis seeks to address this gap by answering the research question: How does the strategic culture of the Finnish Defence Forces condition its approach to defence cooperation within NATO?

Drawing on strategic culture theory and the Cultural Topography methodology this thesis aims to map out the strategic culture of the FDF on defence cooperation within NATO. The issue-based analytical approach allows for the distilling of critical cultural factors that inform boundaries of acceptable behaviour. A total of 72 various pieces of cultural data such as military doctrines, training materials, leadership speeches and military magazine articles were analysed to form the strategic cultural map across the categories of identity, norms, values and perceptual lens. The findings conclude that the FDF's strategic culture continues to be strongly conditioned by a national territorial defence mindset. Defence cooperation within NATO is welcomed, especially in circumstances where it contributes towards strengthening Finland's national or regional security.

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## 1. Introduction

“The era of military non-alignment in our history has come to an end. A new era begins... NATO membership does not change everything. But being an ally requires Finland to adopt new ways of thinking”

– Former Finnish President Sauli Niinistö, April 2023

Finland's NATO accession in April 2023 has had fundamental implications on the responsibilities of the Finnish Defence Forces (FDF). In the military non-alignment era, Finland engaged in defence cooperation through multiple bi-, tri-, and miniateral networks, without ever joining an alliance. During this period cooperation was perceived as an additional tool enhancing national defence capacities. The key difference now, is that FDF must adjust practices to account for the obligations of NATO's collective defence (Särkkä et al., 2024). This transition from to an active defence cooperator within NATO for all allies, which poses a new set of challenges (Kyllönen, 2025).

The main tension in this new era lies between Finland's traditionally territorially bound national defence thinking and NATO's collective defence expectations (Ålander & Pihlajamaa, 2024; Lawrence et al., 2024; Mikkola et al., 2025). NATO's military obligations include the commitment to collective defence, collective capability development to and contributions to NATO missions and operations. Practical implementation of these expectations requires a reconceptualization of Finland's defence thinking which is conditioned by national territorial defence traditions which is still prevalent in the FDF leadership the narratives. Upon NATO membership, the chief of staff of the Finnish Navy stated, “our biggest contribution to NATO is to take care of our own land and our own environment” (para 3, Mehta, 2023). This raises fundamental questions about how will the Finnish armed forces, historically oriented towards territorial defence, adapt to the expectations of defence cooperation within the alliance setting?

The FDF are the implementor's of Finnish military policy, as well as the institution that has upheld Finland's territorially focused national defence posture and thinking. Policy enactment can be conditioned by culture as it conditions what types of behaviour are considered appropriate acceptable or desirable. When discussed the influence of culture on security actors, the theory of strategic culture can yield insights. Strategic culture is defined as a “set of beliefs, values, norms and assumptions shared within a specific group that shapes how they conceive of threats, appropriate responses and the use of force” (p.6, Kartchner, 2024). By studying strategic culture, a researcher can understand the context of rationality of a specific actor and thus explain the boundaries of appropriate behaviour. This approach can help uncover

how and why actors, such as military institutions approach issues such as defence cooperation. A strategic cultural approach can produce insights into what cultural factors influence and condition the FDF and how these can impose boundaries of acceptable behaviour towards defence cooperation with NATO. Thus, this thesis seeks to answer the following research question: *How does the strategic culture of the Finnish Defence Forces condition its approach to defence cooperation within NATO?* Defence cooperation within NATO can encompass a wide range of practices. In this thesis, it refers to how the member states adapt themselves and approach cooperation with other member states to fulfill NATO obligations such as collective defence.

The main aim is to map the strategic culture of the FDF regarding defence cooperation within NATO and to discuss its implications. The thesis is interpretive and explorative in nature focusing on how meaning construction in specific contexts can condition actor positioning on an issue. To map a groups strategic culture, a methodology called the Cultural Topography (CTop) will be applied as it aims to systematically map strategic cultures of groups around specific issues (Johnson, 2024; Johnson & Berrett, 2011). This methodology allows for the exploration and mapping of enduring traditions, beliefs and world views within the FDF. Mapping the socially constructed context provide insights what the FDF considers appropriate, acceptable and expected behaviour in relation to defence cooperation with NATO. Thus, understanding the FDF's strategic culture will highlight potential Alliance integration tension points, and give preliminary indications of what kind of ally the FDF seeks to be. The following two sub-research questions will help guide the research:

1. What is the strategic culture of the Finnish Defence Forces regarding defence cooperation within NATO?
2. What are the implications of FDF's strategic culture on defence cooperation with NATO?

The research holds academic and empirical relevance. Academic relevance stems from the novelty of applying the CTops methodology in mapping FDF's strategic culture. Previous strategic cultural analyses of Finland have focused on a national level analysis but as the theory evolved, scholars called for a more nuanced approach of evaluating specific groups, on more specific issues (Bloomfield, 2012). The empirical relevance stems from providing a nuanced analysis on an ongoing policy issue. Finland's NATO integration is still ongoing; however, the thesis can provide insights on what kinds of defence cooperations within NATO is the FDF likely to embrace quickly, and friction points that may emerge.

The thesis will employ the following structure. The literature review will evaluate previous research on Finland's defence cooperation, situating this thesis in the realm of strategic cultural research. The theoretical framework will elaborate on strategic culture, justifying an issue-based analytical approach. The methodology explains the rationale behind the research design and how CTops was adapted and applied to align with the research aim. The analysis section analyses the critical cultural factors that constructs the strategic culture of the FDF. The map is evaluated to show how it creates powerful incentives, calls to action and red lines. The discussion section will evaluate the significance of these findings, by comparing them to previous research to evaluate the implications. The research concludes that the FDF's strategic culture is supportive of defence cooperation within NATO when it directly assists in increasing national and regional security. The FDF's thinking continues to be conditioned by prioritizing Finland's national territorial defence. Results imply a lack of urgency transformative changes, as the FDF perceives a highly competent military actor that already aligned with interoperability standards. The main incentives to participate in defence cooperation are framed as a means to strengthen NATO's northern flank and an opportunity to continue diversifying defence cooperation networks to form a stronger deterrent against Russia.

## **2. Literature Review**

The literature review highlights previous research on Finland's approach to defence cooperation. The purpose is to situate the thesis into scholarship and evaluate how scholars explain on Finland's approaches towards defence cooperation. Insights on Finland's past strategic culture scholarship and approach to NATO membership will also be examined to highlight the research gap.

The historically Finland's approach to defence cooperation has been restrained to prevent provoking Russia. The end of the Continuation War resulted in the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union which bound Finland to strict neutrality (Savolainen, 2024). Due to being a small state, Finland perceived defence cooperation as dangerous and provocative towards the Soviet Union (Edström et al., 2019b). Until the end of the Cold War Finland limited military cooperation to primarily peacekeeping and crisis management missions. This established a normative legacy of a peacekeeping identity which was based beliefs in the use of force for humanitarian causes outside national borders (Seppo & Forsberg, 2013). Furthermore, domestic political consensus was formed around non-offensive international engagement, which can be seen in Finland's decision to refrain from Operation Unified Protector which entailed military intervention in Libya (Doeser,

2017). These norms and taboos around military and defence cooperation persisted until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Despite Finland having consolidated a role as a “balancer” between the East and the West, it still perceived a security deficit in the post-Cold War period which led to it adapting from neutrality to military non-alignment (Forsberg, 2023). Finland’s military non-alignment manifested as a strategy whereby Finland began to engage in defence cooperation to help strengthen national defence without joining any official military alliances (Savolainen, 2024).

Realist scholars argue that Finland’s post-Cold War non-alignment strategy was result of rational adaptation to its structural environment. The post-Cold War period offered Finland more flexibility in its defence and foreign policy. Finland still perceived leading it to diversify defence cooperation through NATO’s Partnership for Peace Programme since 1994, several bilateral partnerships, and multilateral defence cooperation frameworks such as NORDEFECO and the Joint Expeditionary Forces (JEF) (Edström et al., 2019b; Kyllönen, 2025). The small state realist perspective argues Finland’s behaviour can be understood from an alliance hedging strategy. The approach maximized strategic flexibility by using non-aligned defence cooperation as a complementary tool to maintaining a strong national defence capability (Edström et al., 2019a; Edström & Westberg, 2020). This allowed Finland to balance its delicate relationship with Russia, by not officially joining alliances such as NATO. Other realists from the threat-perception approach scholars frame Finnish defence policy as the outcome of rational threat management. For example, Forsberg (2013; 2022) states that Finland’s focus on territorial defence, conscription and credible deterrence reflected a cost-benefit calculus rooted in its asymmetric power relations with Russia. Thus, Finland’s hesitation towards NATO membership was rooted in a pragmatic thinking to avoid escalations.

Realist interpretations struggle to account for normative and ideational factors that continue to underpin Finland’s thinking and decision making towards defence cooperation. By treating defence cooperation choices as response to structural pressures realist analyses overlook how norms, values and collective memory shape what Finland perceives as legitimate or desirable. For example, throughout the 2010s such as the annexation of Crimea in 2014 that cannot be explained through a realist balancing logic. Finland continued to frame military non-alignment as a necessary norm for stability and autonomy despite the destabilized security environment (Nokkala, 2022). Similarly, Finland’s continued participation in international military crisis management under the UN and EU were rooted in a stable national self-image as a peacekeeping actor, and as international law-abiding state rather than material security maximization (Vesa, 2007, 2025). A strategic cultural theoretical approach can assist in further

explaining how normative and ideational factors shape contexts where an actor defines what is rational behaviour. The theory of strategic culture highlights how actors 'rational' choices are understood through the contexts within which they operate, allowing for the consideration of ideational, and societal factors (Kartchner, 2023).

Finland's strategic culture is influenced by its defensive ethos and moral framing when the use of military force is appropriate. Historical experience with Russia has led Finland to believe that it must be self-reliant for national defence and the balance of power in Northern Europe to avoid risking another war. Throughout the Cold War and the non-alignment strategic orientation periods Finnish societal consensus favoured a defensive and to an extent isolationist normative frame (Siren, 2008). Republic civic values have further been argued to reinforce morality and legitimacy regarding the use of force (Heikka, 2005). Finland's limited engagement with defence cooperation with other Western states during the Cold War has been explained to stem from Finland's 'pragmatic' and 'realist' strategic culture that aimed to not provoke Russia. (Seppo & Forsberg, 2013). Finland's strategic culture academics unanimously highlight that Finland's perceives national defence, and the use of force for national defensive purposes (Doeser, 2017; Seppo & Forsberg, 2013; Siren, 2008).

Past strategic cultural research explains continuity of Finland's defence identity and reluctance to joint military alliances. With the primary goal of self-defence, Finland's non-alignment strategy and military engagements since the end of the Cold War are contextualized. While offering depth into Finland's norms and identity regarding use of force literature is limited in two ways. Firstly, Finland strategic culture is treated as static favouring a long-term continuity. This would imply Finland avoiding drastic changes in how it approaches issues such as defence cooperation. However, Finland seeking NATO membership which previous strategic cultural interpretations deemed highly unlikely challenge this notion. Secondly, the monolithic treatment of strategic culture reflects a theoretical gap. As strategic cultural research has evolved, a more multi dimensional view has been adopted to explain strategic cultural change. NATO accession thus has required the reinterpretation or renegotiation of these norms and identities for Finland to make sense of its new reality as an alliance member.

Academics studying Finland's defence cooperation, especially within NATO, suggest Finland is yet to undergo a cultural and mental mindset shift. Since membership the Finland's fundamental pillars of a strong national defence remain unchanged, regarding maintaining the universal conscription system and societal comprehensive security strategy. Though it is positive for NATO to have an ally with strong national defence capability, scholars flag that reluctance to enact change in adopting new alliance principles such as forward

deterrence and joint defence planning could potentially cause issues (Iso-Markku et al., 2023; Suorsa, 2024). Specifically, the shift in mindset from focusing on national defence to fulfilling collective defence obligations is pointed to. Lawrence et al. (2024) highlight how Finland's narrative after membership has articulated sentiments of not expecting much in terms of assistance from NATO, as well as a reluctance to develop additional capacities to contribute toward Allied defence. This was concurred by Ålander and Pihlajamaa (2024) while studying how the FDF discussed the influence of NATO membership military innovation and capability development, with results implying continuity and technical finetuning. Furthermore, there is a reluctance from Finland to defend the Euro-Atlantic community values through NATO if these actions come at the cost of Finland's core security interests of a strong national defence, stability in Europe, or a weakening U.S. commitment to NATO (Linnainmäki, 2025). This mindset shift is highlighted as particularly crucial as Finland NATO integration where defence cooperation within NATO entails proactively fulfilling Alliance obligations. (Kyllönen, 2025).

The most recent report on Finland's defence cooperation with NATO allies, has focused on how compatible and receptive other allies are to cooperating with Finland (Särkkä et al, 2024). Strategic culture is accounted as one of four factors that influences results. The results suggest that Finland will continue to seek bi-, tri-, and minilateral cooperation formats within the Alliance, with a prioritization of deep cooperation with geographically close partners. Here strategic culture is concluded "not to a limiting factor for intensifying defence cooperation. Rather, the challenge is posed by deviating perception of the security environment and where armed forces should operate" (Särkkä et al., 2024, p.147). However, the study shortly summarizes Finland's strategic culture "pragmatic and nationally focused", with limited insights given into how this will influence Finland's likelihood to engage in defence cooperation with other allies. The report also concludes by emphasizing how "Finland needs to start defining its main contributions, and how it wants to profile itself in the multilateral framework of NATO" (Särkkä et al., 2024, p.153).

This raises questions about what Finland's current strategic culture toward military cooperation within NATO is. While receptive to defence cooperation, scholars argue that Finland's mindset continues to be plagued by "frontline realism" implying it continues to be selective around when to participate in defence cooperation (Linnainmäki & Karjalainen, 2025, p.1). Further research is required into understanding this "mindset", and especially how it influence Finland's approach towards defence cooperation within NATO. Furthermore, even if current scholarship is correct about a lack mindset shift, it is still important to understand

*why* this mindset persists. A strategic cultural analysis of the FDF, the institutional enactor of Finnish defence policy, can yield insights into this gap.

### **3. Theoretical Framework**

Strategic culture is a theory that seeks to understand how ideational factors influence the context that inform an actor's rationality. It is defined as a "set of shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behavior, derived from common experiences and accepted narratives (both written and oral), that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups, and which determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives" (p.6, Kartchner, 2024). Developed by Snyder (1977) to explain how the Soviet's conception of nuclear doctrine differed to the United State, strategic culture provides insight into behavioral patterns that cannot be explained by material factors alone. Scholars highlighted how strategic culture is influenced by multiple factors such as historical experiences, institutional traditions, political myths, role conceptions and geopolitical environments. A group's strategic culture influences worldviews, threat perception and norms around the use of force which in turn shapes security priorities. The theoretical approach accounts for interpretative and ideational elements of security policy formation and enactment which is a relevant lens for the thesis.

Strategic culture has evolved to from a nation state centric analysis to a group-based analysis. The first and second generations of strategic cultural scholars, defined strategic culture as only existing on the national level, being monolithic, and claiming culture interacts and influences policy-making processes and institutional practices (Gray, 1999). The third generations of scholars treated strategic culture as a causal mechanism which could be operationalized into variables and become a more deterministic theory (Johnston, 1995). These generations contain two significant limitations. Firstly, scholars assumed strategic culture to be a nation state level phenomena which ignores the existence of internal variation as well as making analyses very broad and vague. Secondly, earlier scholars struggled to explain strategic cultural evolution or change. The fourth and current generation rejected the notion of a monolithic strategic culture which has made scholarship focus on a few key areas of debate and research; 1) the existence of multiple subcultures within a state, 2) whether strategic culture should be issue-oriented or a state-based study, 3) existence of strategic culture outside of state structures, for example supra-, sub- or non-state actors, 4) whether strategic culture is constant or continually changing, and 5) methods used to asses cultural data and provide an effective map of strategic culture (Hugh, 2023).

This thesis adopts an issue-oriented approach to studying strategic culture, with the assumption that a state is made up of multiple strategic cultures. The strategic cultures of groups in different decision making and policy enacting positions thus interact to produce specific variations on different issues (Johnson, 2024). This suggests that strategic culture, and particularly the strategic cultural narratives, play a role in how groups justify acceptable forms of strategic behavior to navigate challenges. Strategic culture should be treated as malleable and changeable, especially when adapting to new circumstances. Groups employ different strategic cultural narratives depending on the challenge they are faced with, which helps understand how they justify continuity or change (Bloomfield, 2012). Groups utilize strategic cultural narratives to justify decision making or policy implementation processes depending on their role within the state. Studying the strategic culture of a group within a state highlights ideational normative underpinnings of a group's thinking which defines what is perceived as acceptable and unacceptable behavior. However, studying a group's strategic culture by itself risks a broad, unfocused and methodologically difficult (Hugh, 2023). Hence, a solution is to study a group's strategic culture in relation to a specific issue.

An issue-oriented approach focuses on mapping a group's strategic culture, within a particular issue. Examples of particular issues are the role of the military, disease transmission, responses to internal protests, or cybercrime (Hugh, 2023). This approach suggests that a group's strategic culture is issue-dependent and is formed by selecting and reproducing narratives stemming from multiple cultural domains. Cultural domains (herein referred to as domains) are shared sources of meaning that capture a cohesive collection of distinctive cultural codes. A collection of distinctive cultural codes can be classified as a domain when they provide a clear sense of "us vs them" and sets implicit rules or taboos about accepted or unaccepted behavior. Each of them represents a separate "culture" that informs "default settings for behaviour, prioritize values over others, and provide us with stories and experiences color our perceptual lens" (Johnson, 2024, p.419). Domains can be nationally focused, or transnational. Common examples are religions, nationalities, ethnicities, social class or organizational (e.g. workplace or military service). Issue dependency is critical to understanding why and how groups "code switch" between different domain narratives. Johnson (2024) argues "groups draw on narratives of certain domains (perhaps religious or class based) in responding to some issues but may draw entirely different domains (perhaps ideological or generational) to inform thinking and behavior on other issues" (p.417). This is because different drawings on different domain narratives allow groups to position themselves to act as either key enablers or potential obstructors to the issue at hand. An issue-based

analytical approach therefore provides an explanation as to how a group rationalizes their position and justifies legitimate behavior given the context and issue.

The issue-oriented approach requires a group to be studied. Any group with influence over the issue can be studied, with strategic cultural “keeper” groups highlighted as yielding significant insights. Strategic cultural “keepers” refer to groups or institutions that carry, maintain, and enact particular strategic cultural narratives within task area. “Keeper” groups prefer to preserve strategic cultural continuity in their task area as they repeatedly activate these narratives when interpreting tasks and implementing policies. As defined by literature, “keepers” maintain narratives relevant to their functions (Johnson, 2024), have narratives that persist due their structured practices (Pirani and Hines, 2024) and are usually institutions that socialize individuals of that organization into specific behavioral norms, which stabilize cultural patterns (Latis, 2014). Particularly state institutions or organizations are often strategic cultural keepers as they have stable functions through mandates, slow changing practices due to strict procedures, and internal professional norms. Strategic cultural narratives are tied to these functions as they justify their necessity, and the scope of their roles. If the keepers are institutions, they are not only representative of strategic cultural narratives, but also have a gatekeeper role in implementing policy. Institutional keeper groups can enable, constrain and/or shape how elite driven strategies are transformed into practice. Studying an institutional keeper groups strategic culture has two main benefits. Firstly, they embody strategic cultural narratives in action by practicing strategy. Secondly, they show if cultural adjustments are occurring or whether traditional narratives remain dominant. Military institutions have been labelled as such a “keeper” due to its institutional structures, and mandates that preserve strategic cultural narrative patterns regarding defence and security policy (Lantis, 2014; Menke, 2023).

The FDF represents a strategic cultural keeper making them a critical group for examining how strategic cultural narratives are activated in response to the demand of NATO's defence cooperation. The FDF has long been a “keeper” group of strategic culture which has been unilaterally oriented and primarily focused on national defence, with defence cooperation used as a tool to strengthen national defence. NATO requires its member states to become legitimate security providers for other alliance members. Thus, the FDF must adapt to the expectations of NATO obligations which can be observed through mapping their strategic culture. This analysis can demonstrate how and to what extent FDF has narrated norms, and boundaries around acceptable behavior on defence cooperation within NATO.

Johnson and Berrett (2011) have developed a methodology around how to study issue-based strategic culture called the Cultural Topography framework (herein referred to as CTops). It is designed systematically to map a group's strategic culture which highlights how groups activate strategic cultural narratives for a particular issue. The method assists in identifying cultural domains that contribute towards a group's strategic culture and distills which critical cultural factors condition the group when discussing the specific issue. CTops has been applied for military institutions in the past when investigating issue such as nuclear decision-making (Menke, 2023), alliance adoption (Biggs, 2023), and narration about the use of force internationally (Brummer & Oren, 2022). The following section will explain how the CTops methodology has been used and adjusted to align with the aims of this thesis.

#### **4. Methodology**

The aim of this section is to explain the choice of the Cultural Topography (CTops) methodology and how it will be applied for this thesis in the following four subsections. An interpretivist research design will be employed seeking to understand how the cultural influences shape the social reality of the FDF in relation to defence cooperation within NATO. CTops is an inductive methodology and facilitates the identification of patterns and meanings within cultural materials expressed in textual form. Thus, this thesis focuses on analyzing textual sources produced by the FDF such as policy documentation, speeches, educational materials and soldier magazines to reveal the most prevalent strategic cultural narratives on defence cooperation within NATO. CTops methodology requires the researcher to immerse themselves within the data, and the context of the actor (Johnson & Berrett, 2011). As the researcher has native level Finnish language abilities, they were able to be understand the intricacies of cultural messaging within the data and translate this for an English-speaking audience. The next section will outline the steps and application of CTops in this thesis.

##### **4.1. Cultural Topography Methodology**

The CTops methodology was “designed as a systematic and deliberate honing method for analysts seeking to isolate and assess cultural factors weighing most heavily in the thinking and decision making of a particular group, on a particular issue, at a particular point in time” (Johnson, 2024, p. 415). Johnson (2024) has developed and tailored CTops to be applicable an issue-oriented of strategic culture analyses. CTops suggest that analytical categories of identity, values, norms, and perceptual lenses need to be understood to be able to map a group's strategic culture in relations to the issue. The methodology in total outlines seven steps, however, Johnson (2024) notes that these steps can be adjusted and combined depending on the aims of

the researcher. Out of the seven steps of the CTop methodology, five steps are applied to this thesis. The five steps are summarized in the figure below:

- Step 1: Identify issue to scope the research
- Step 2: Identify a relevant group for the focused study
- Step 3: Amass a range of cultural domains from which members of this group draw cultural cues.
- Step 4: Catalogue data across the categories of Identity, Norms, Values, and Perceptual Lens.
- Step 5: Distill findings into Critical Cultural Factors (CCFs).

*Figure 1: Steps of Cultural Topography Methodology Steps adapted from Johnson (2024)*

These steps have been applied to the thesis in the following manner. Step 1 of issue definition has been addressed through defining defence cooperation within NATO as a central strategic issue under examination. Step 2 was implemented by selecting the FDF as the primary group of study, as discussed in the theoretical framework, military institutions are considered institutional “keeper” group of strategic culture, especially in the implementation of security and defence policy. Step 3 of amassing cultural domains and data will be structured in section 4.3. *Cultural Domains and Data Collection*. Here cultural domains that contribute toward FDF’s thinking regarding defence cooperation within NATO are defined through previous literature. These domains inspire data collection sites and data collection strategies were developed accordingly. Step 4 of sorting data into the categories of identity, values, norms and perceptual lens as well as coding for cultural factors was the core of the data processing phases. Step 5 of distilling critical cultural factors guides analysis. This includes subjecting the most reoccurring cultural factors to relevance, robustness and likelihood of provoking a response criterion. This helps filter which results are the most relevant to include in the final strategic cultural map. Section 4.4.2. *Distilling Critical Cultural Factors*, in the methodology will explain these criteria and how they were applied in the analysis. Throughout the following methodology sections, the CTop methodology further be explained where relevant to avoid repetition.

## **4.2. Cultural Domains and Data Collection**

This section explains and justifies the cultural domains that were utilized for this thesis. Following Johnson’s (2024) definition cultural domains must serve as distinct institutional or social “worlds” that represent collections of distinctive cultural codes. To qualify as a domain two criteria must be met; firstly, domains must serve as meaning making spaces which helps a

community defines what is right or wrong, important or unimportant. Secondly, if the domain does not supply a sense of “us/them” boundaries and enforce taboos, it does not qualify as one.

This thesis identifies three domains: professional military culture, conscription service and Euro-Atlanticists. The domains are described in their respective sections but in short, all domains are sense or meaning making spaces where the FDF is likely to draw cultural cues. The following subsections justify the relevance of the domains and what data selected to represent them. Following Johnson's (2011; 2024) recommendation a large volumes of data with the objective was to collect diverse data from various institutional and communicative spaces. For transparency, data collection strategies are articulated for each domain. the scope of data was collection was limited publicly available sources. The time period of data collected is from May 2022 when Finland joined NATO to December 2025. All the data collected for each domain can be found in appendix A.

#### *4.2.1. Professional Military Culture*

Professional military culture constitutes a cultural domain as it provides military officers with a share meaning-making norms that define appropriate, and legitimate officer behaviour. As Ählbäck (2014) argues, the organizational culture of the FDF shapes internal norms, expectations regarding the professional ethos which it socializes officers into through training, hierarchy and professional soldier standards. According to Kouri (2023) the “us” consists of professional, apolitical and disciplined soldiers. The “us” also includes what makes these military officers “Finnish” in terms of historical experiences informing mindsets of defence preparedness and self-sufficiency. The “them” are represented by militaries that are politicized and aggressive. Professional military culture thus influences how the institution understands risks, responsibility and legitimacy.

Data that is representative of this domain are FDF officer training program manuals, officer codes of conduct, cadet oaths, officer magazines, the Finnish Defence Universities development strategy, internal military reports and FDF leadership speeches. These reflect the professional military culture on the grassroots, institutional and elite level. . The data regarding officer education and codes of conduct were collected from the Finnish National Defence University websites, and FDF leadership speeches and internal military reports from the FDF's official website. The FDF official magazine *Ruotuväki* was also analyzed as it represents how the officers rearticulate and enact the meaning making frames of the professional military culture. Two other magazines of *Upseeriliitto* and *Kylkirauta*, both Finnish military officer ran magazines, were also collected as they contain opinion pieces and

articles from officers themselves. Due to the abundance of magazine articles, these were collected if they mentioned NATO.

#### 4.2.2. *Conscription Service*

Conscription constitutes a cultural domain because it forms a space where the military and wider society connect. It socializes almost all Finnish men and volunteer women into the norms and obligations around national defence. The domain differs from the professional military culture, as it is civic meaning making space. The conscript service domain's internal cohesion stems from sentiments of collective sacrifice and duty. Empirically the support for conscription increases during geopolitical crises highlighting its significance as a cultural anchor (Jonsson et al., 2024). The "us" in this domain is defined by citizens fulfilling their societal obligation and contributing toward territorial defence. The "them" is defined conscript dropouts or refusers who are framed negatively (Kosonen et al., 2019).

Data that is representative of this domain stems from institutional sources such as FDF conscript handbooks, training materials and the conscript soldier oath that reveal values, civic norms and military expectations within conscription culture. At the grassroots level the conscript reservist magazine *Reserviläinen*, the conscript reservist magazine, shows how these institutional norms are interpreted, endorsed or contested. Additionally, articles from *Ruotuväki* written by conscripts were also collected. Together these data sources provide insights into the cultural influences in both official and lived experience elements of conscription. Data from magazines was collected particularly from conscripts and reservists involved in defence cooperation with NATO.

#### 4.2.3. *Euro-Atlanticists*

The Euro-Atlanticists domain represents an ideological sensemaking space adopted by Finnish political parties who construct and cooperatively implement policies with the FDF. This Finnish foreign and security policy school of thought has been identified as a group by Linnainmäki (2022) who describes Euro-Atlanticists as believers of internationalism and great power politics. This school of thought gained popularity in the aftermath of the Ukraine war and were the most adamant supporters of NATO membership. Examples of actors associated with this domain are the National Coalition party (*Kokoomus*), and academic elite of Finnish defence and security policy. The Euro-Atlanticists serves as a political-strategic meaning making space, that frames Finnish security through memberships with the Western community, particularly through NATO and the U.S. It's internal cohesion stems from the belief that Finland's sovereignty would be permanently guaranteed from an unpredictable Russia, through

official military alignment with NATO and other great powers such as the U.S. NATO membership is framed as a right, and a means to defend the Finnish and the liberal world order. Along with NATO membership, the U.S. is perceived as the only ally able to fully deter Russia. The “us” of this domain is defined by supporters who share liberal ideology in terms of foreign and security policy, as well supporters of Western military alignment. The “them” are non-alignment and anti-internationalists.

Data representative for this domain is military partnership agreements, specifically between Finland and the U.S. (DCA Agreement), and the Finnish joint NATO doctrine. In 2023 the National Coalition party won the elections, becoming the largest party in the current coalition government. As such, they hold the key positions of Prime Minister, Defence Minister, and Foreign Minister. Furthermore, the current President Alexander Stubb, and his predecessor, Sauli Niinistö, are both from the National Coalition party. The committee contributing to national security and defence planning in Finland is the *Tasavallan Presidentti-Ulko- ja Turvallisuus-poliittinen ministerivaliokunta (TP-UTVA)*, translating the ‘Presidential, foreign-, and security-, political-, ministerial committee’ (Suorsa, 2024). The committee makes decisions on how to approach recent security developments and defence cooperation and is advised by the FDF. Thus, the TP-UTVA Report on Security from 2024 and Finnish Government Report on Security from 2024 will be analyzed. Speeches from the President and Defence Minister will also be included. Finally, the military magazine *Ruotuväki*, has conducted interviews with the Defence Minister, as well as other experts and elites of Finnish foreign and security policy which will also be collected.

### **4.3. Data Analysis**

This section explains how Johnson’s (2024) CTop framework’s 4 and 5 were adapted into the study. Step 4 of cataloging the data across identity, norms, values and perceptual lens categories informed data processing. Step 5 of distilling critical cultural factors guided the structuring of the analysis.

#### *4.3.1. Data Categorization and Coding Cultural Factors*

Step 4 of the CTop methodology informed data processing. This entailed cataloging the data into identity, norms, values, and perceptual lens categories. Within these categories, the data is coded inductively to identify themes and patterns that form the cultural factors.

The purpose of initially categorizing the data into identity, values, norms and perceptual lens, is to give analytical clarification of what the data represents. Johnson (2024) defines each of the 4 categories followingly. The identity category represents “the character

traits the group assigns itself, the reputation and role it pursues, and the 'identity goods' – individuals and statuses – designated to its members" (Johnson, 2024, p.420). In other words, who the group is. The norm category represents "accepted, expected, and preferred modes of behaviour, including shared understandings concerning taboos" (Johnson, 2024, p. 421). In other words, what are the specific actions and behaviours the group prefers. The value category highlights, "material goods or personal characteristics that result in increased status for members, including deeply held beliefs about what is desirable, proper, and good that serve as broad guidelines for social life" (Johnson, 2024, p. 421). In other words, it highlights what ideational underpinnings guide and/or motivate the group. And finally, the perceptual lens category reveals "the cognitive filter through which this group views the world, including the default assumptions that inform its opinions and ideas about self and others" (Johnson, 2024, p. 421). In other words, the groups assumptions about the world, its rules as well as who are considered allies, or enemies.

Each piece of data was added to the qualitative software analysis tool called Atlas.ti. The data was sorted into document groups, that represented the domains. This enabled easy cross-domain comparison of the results utilizing the code-document function in Atlas.ti at a later stage. Once the document groups were organized and the data was given an initial label of identity, values, norms or perceptual lens, depending on its content. Then a second round of coding followed within the categories for key themes and patterns, which formed cultural factors. The results of the cultural factor coding were displayed in the code-document table function as this displayed cultural factor frequency occurrences per domain. These were inferred as initial indicators of robustness, and enabled trace of which domains contributed to the production of certain cultural factors. These results are displayed in the analysis section *5.1. Relevance and Robustness of Cultural Factors* (see table 1, 2, 3, and 4). The full code book for the cultural factors which includes definitions, the category they belong to, and an inclusion and exclusion criteria of how they were coded can be found in appendix B.

#### *4.3.2. Distilling Critical Cultural Factors*

The analysis was guided by step 5 which aims to distil critical cultural factors. Critical cultural factors (CCF) are defined by Johnson (2024) as factors "weighing in on group thinking ... when this group engages on this issue" (p. 423). To distil CCFs the cultural data must be leveraged against *robustness*, *relevance* and *likelihood to provoke a response* criterion. These three criteria are central to structuring data analysis. The first part of the analysis will entail subjecting cultural factors to the *relevance* and *robustness* criteria. The second part of the

analysis will be evaluating and arguing which cultural factors are most likely to *provoke a response* from the FDF regarding the issue thus qualifying as CCFs. The output will be a mapping the critical cultural factors found that compose the identity, values, norms and perceptual lens of the FDF's strategic culture in relation to defence cooperation within NATO.

Evaluating *relevance* of a cultural factor refers to determining if there is clear tie between the factor and influencing the group's thinking and decision making. As cultural narratives are "a shared group commodity" (p.424), it must be shared and resonate amongst multiple members. Additionally, the researcher must evaluate the *robustness*. Johnson (2024) highlights there is not one metric to determine robustness. Data should be analyzed for signals such as frequency at which cultural factor occur and across how many types of data sources, or whether this cultural factor is in the prominent discourse of the decision makers of that group. The full list of robustness questions can be found in appendix C. In the analysis section *5.1. Relevance and Robustness of Cultural Factors* the results will be subjected to these criteria. This will help justify which themes were deemed most relevant and frequently occurring to be included in the main analysis.

The final stage of distilling CCFs is to evaluate if the cultural factors are likely to provoke a response in relation to the issue. This involves analyzing relevant and robust cultural factors against series of questions for each category (Johnson, 2024). To yield the most use of these questions, the author takes inspiration from Brummer and Oren's (2022) application of the CTop methodology, where they adapt some of these questions to be applicable to their case to maximize utility. A similar logic is applied here. Thus, the following questions have been adapted and will guide the author's analysis in section *5.2. Critical Cultural Factors* (see figure 1). The insights from this analysis will inform the final CCFs that influence the FDF strategic culture. In section *5.3. Strategic Cultural Map* a final synthesis and interaction of the CCFs are

highlighted to show how the inform power incentives, calls to action and red lines that condition the FDF regarding defence cooperation within NATO.

<p><b>Identity:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. What sort of problems do the FDF see itself as responsible for?</li> <li>2. What characteristics are assigned to the FDF in relation to defence cooperation within NATO?</li> </ol> <p><b>Norms:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>3. What are the acceptable and expected modes of organizational behaviour in relation to defence cooperation within NATO?</li> <li>4. What are the FDF's taboos surrounding defence cooperation with NATO?</li> </ol> <p><b>Values</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>5. What values are emphasized when the FDF leadership is encouraging cooperative behaviour on defence cooperation within NATO?</li> </ol> <p><b>Perceptual Lens:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>6. How is the threat environment that Finland is in depicted by the FDF?</li> <li>7. What defines "victory" for this group on this issue?</li> </ol>
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Figure 2: Guiding analysis questions inspired by Johnson (2024) and Brummer & Oren (2023).

## 5. Analysis

### 5.1. Relevance and Robustness of Cultural Factors

This section will present the results of all the cultural factors discovered in the data categorization and coding process. Results will be presented per analytical category showing cultural factor occurrences in each domain. The purpose of this section is to evaluate which cultural factors are most significant by subjecting the themes to the *relevance* and *robustness* criteria. The relevance criteria examines if the cultural theme has a connection to the issue, through evaluating if the cultural factor is linked to how the FDF thinks about, frames, or approaches defence cooperation within NATO. The robustness criteria examine the strength and durability of the cultural factors by observing how stable, and shared are they across different domains. This can be inferred from how many domains and frequently the cultural factor occurred. This assists in establishing if a cultural factor is a shared community understanding. Tables will be used to show the occurrence and distribution of cultural factors across the different domains. Definitions for all cultural factors can be found in the codebook of appendix C. The cultural factors considered most relevant and robust will be more thoroughly explained in the analysis section 5.2. *Critical Cultural Factors*.

Table 1 shows the occurrence of cultural factors in identity category across different domains. The identity category represents who the group is. Three cultural factors were analysed to be relevant. Firstly, the *Credible National Security Provider* characterizes credibility and trustworthiness to be the core national characteristics of Finnish defence. This influences the FDF's thinking, because engagement in defence cooperation must not compromise this reputation. Secondly, the *Contributing Ally* theme, highlights the role conception Finland has, of what kind of ally it wants to be within NATO. This sets a precondition of defence cooperation by wanting to uphold this reputation. Thirdly, the theme *Multilateralist State* suggests that cooperation through institutions is another significant national characteristic trait and should be the framework through which to engage with defence cooperation.

<b>Cultural Factor</b>	<b>Conscript Service</b>	<b>Euro-Atlanticists</b>	<b>Professional Military Culture</b>
Collective Resilience (Sisu)	1	4	3
Credible National Security Producer	17	10	21
Excellent Conscription System	25	2	0
Historical Victims of Russian Aggression	3	4	8
Multilateralist State	0	21	0
Contributing Ally	1	9	8
Patriotism	14	6	9

*Table 2: Identity cultural factor occurrences and distribution across domains*

All three cultural factors pass the robustness check, as they occur in multiple domains and across a variation of document types. Even through, the *Multilateralist State* theme only occurs in one domain, it occurs in a variety of document types such as multiple presidential speeches, policy documentation. This implies a longevity of this theme, not situational of rhetorical incitement, which make it robust.

Table 2 shows the occurrence of cultural factors in the norm category across different domains. Norms represent the specific actions and behaviours the group expects, accepts and prefers. Five cultural factors were considered relevant. Firstly, *Alliance Compatible Training Practices* is a cultural factor that influences decision making on the issue, because it reflects preference of proactive action towards adjusting soldier training practices to be compatible with NATO integration. Secondly, *Alliance Membership Not Substituting National Defence* conditions the thinking around defence cooperation, as the alliance membership alone is framed as not provide enough security. Thirdly, *Obligations Arising from NATO Membership* articulates the new commitments and obligations that NATO membership entails, which is relevant as this informs the standards for acceptable behaviour in future decision making. Fourthly, *Joint Exercise Conduct and Interoperability as Normalized* reflects a continuity in behaviour by highlighting how elements of defence cooperation within NATO are already normalized in the FDF routines.

<b>Cultural Factor</b>	<b>Conscript Service</b>	<b>Euro-Atlanticists</b>	<b>Professional Military Culture</b>
Alliance Membership Not Substituting National Defence	3	4	8
Alliance Compatible Training Practices	10	0	12
Discipline	11	0	1
Good Leadership	10	0	11
Increasing Number of Joint Exercises	3	4	2
Infrastructural and Tactical Development of FDF	4	0	16
Joint Exercises and Interoperability as Normalized	8	1	2
Obligations Arising from NATO Membership	1	15	6
Participating in Crisis Management	1	6	1

*Table 3: Norm cultural factor occurrences and distribution across domains*

All four cultural factors demonstrated a high level of robustness. Each of the five cultural factors were articulated in magazines, doctrines, FDF leadership and presidential speeches. Additionally, all cultural factors can be seen in at least two domains.

Table 3 shows the occurrence of cultural factors in the values category across different domains. The values category highlights what ideational underpinnings guide and/or motivate the group, where four cultural factors were considered relevant. Firstly, *Consent Based NATO Service* reflects the ideational conditions advocated for soldiers and conscripts to perform NATO duties. This is tied to the how the FDF thinks and makes decision regarding how to ensure personnel engage with defence cooperation within NATO. Secondly, *International Military Cooperation as a Source for Learning*, highlights why defence cooperation within NATO is desired. Thirdly, the “*Stronger Together*” cultural factor reflects a grounding ideational justification for supporting defence cooperation; military cooperation within NATO provides better security guarantees than unilateral defence.

<b>Cultural Factor</b>	<b>Conscript Service</b>	<b>Euro-Atlanticists</b>	<b>Professional Military Culture</b>
Commitment to Skill Development	10	1	7
Consent Based NATO Service	2	0	6
High National Defence Willingness	12	3	8
International Military Cooperation as Source of Learning	8	0	4
Moral Obligation of Every Finn to Serve the Nation	9	1	9
Preparedness and Calmness in Crises	2	13	2
Professional Excellence	1	1	18
Responsibility and Integrity in the Use of Force	7	2	8
Right to Safety, Freedom, and Democratic Self-Determination	9	1	4
“Stronger Together”	0	7	4

*Table 4: Values cultural factor occurrences and distribution across domains*

Out of these three relevant cultural factors, *Consent Based NATO Service* is not robust. The cultural factor *Consent Based NATO Service* is expressed in only one type of data source, military magazine articles, across in two domains, highlighting a lack of robustness. Though the discourse is relevant to the issue it cannot be considered as robust enough to influence the whole FDF's thinking. Additionally, the cultural factor only occurs 8 times it cannot be considered a widely held ideation amongst soldiers. All other relevant cultural factors are expressed across more diverse data types showing their wider spread manifestations, in

document types such as the Defence University Strategy Doctrine, multiple military magazine documents, presidential, defence minister and FDF leadership speeches.

Table 4 shows the occurrence of cultural factors in the perceptual lens category across different domains. The perceptual lens category shows the groups assumptions about how the world, its rules, their place in this world as well as who are considered allies, or enemies. Six cultural factors had strong relevance to the issue. Firstly, the cultural factor *Hybrid and Non-Conventional Threats*, influence the decision making of the FDF as it emphasises how the world is more uncertain and facing more complex security threats. This is linked to the issue, as it recognizes that a single state will struggle to combat all these complex threats, hence why an assumption of defence cooperation is preferred. Secondly, *NATO as a Stable Security Community* reflects an assumption about NATO being a provider of security. This is relevant to the issue, highlighting a new willingness to cooperate more closely. Thirdly, *Revisionist Russia as Primary Threat* is relevant as it is labelled the primary threat that has driven Finland to engage in further defence cooperation. The fifth and sixth cultural factors *Nordic States as Important Security Partners*, and *U.S. as a Security Provider* are relevant as they highlight the main allies of the FDF on this issue.

<b>Cultural Factor</b>	<b>Conscript Service</b>	<b>Euro-Atlanticists</b>	<b>Professional Military Culture</b>
Hybrid and Non-Conventional Threats	2	7	6
EU as Strategic and Political Partner	2	11	1
Finland as Upholder of Rule Based International Order	2	14	3
Internationally Recognized Military Credibility	3	7	11
Nordic States as Important Security Partners	0	11	1
Revisionist Russia	9	12	23
U.S. as a Security Provider	0	11	1
Ukraine Support as Vital	0	7	1
NATO as Stable Security Community	8	16	15

*Table 5: Perceptual lens cultural factor occurrences and distribution across domains*

The first five cultural factors were highly robust due to having occurrences across all domains, data types, being prevalently articulated amongst key decision maker and leadership speeches. The fifth and sixth cultural factors do not have occurrences in all domains

but are still robust. Both cultural factors are articulated in FDF and presidential speeches, interviews with the defence minister, as well as official strategy doctrines. They are also enduring factors, as they occur consistently throughout all years from when data is collected.

In sum, 11 out of 35 cultural factors across all categories, were analysed to be relevant and robust enough to be considered for the main analysis. The following section will further evaluate the content of these cultural factors, and argue which ones are the most likely to provoke a response in the FDF, which would make them critical cultural factors.

## **5.2. Critical Cultural Factors**

This section will assess which of the relevant and robust cultural factors qualify as critical cultural factors by evaluating how they are connected to plausible group responses in relation to the issue of study. This is determined by subjecting the themes to the *likelihood to provoke a response* check. As Johnson (2024) suggests this stage helps discover ‘red lines’ alluding a non-negotiable, ‘powerful incentives’ indicating a strong motivator for action, and ‘likely calls to action’ signifying a cultural pressure to act. The relevant and robust cultural will be leveraged against questions developed and in the methodology section 4.4.2 *Distilling Critical Cultural Factors*. In the subsequent sections, these questions will be reintroduced and guide the analysis and final evaluation of critical cultural factors per category. Translated quotations will be used to exemplify the points made in the analysis.

### *5.2.1. Identity*

Identity represents who the group is. Evaluation of these cultural factors is guided by two questions; 1) what sort of problems are the FDF framed as responsible for? 2) What characteristics are assigned to the FDF in relation to defence cooperation within NATO?

The main problems the FDF frames itself as being responsible for are Finland's territorial defence and preventing Finland from getting involved into other wars. These themes mainly occurred in the *Credible National Security Provider* cultural factor. The FDF emphasizes the necessity of the combined approach of conscription and a professional military force to “be at the disposal of the state to secure the independence of our country” (Finnish Defence Forces, 2025a, p.11). To maintain credibility towards the Finnish population, the FDF is transparent and strict about upholding their organizational principles which are listed as “patriotism, professionalism, responsibility, trustworthiness and cooperative spirit” (Finnish Defence Forces, 2024, p.204). This highlights that a strong sense of self, and continuity in FDF's identity are valuable identity goods, and are not subject to changing.

Additionally, the FDF articulates a role of ensuring Finland does not get involved in a war. This is achieved through preserving stability in what are labelled as strategically significant areas, such as the Arctic and the Baltic Sea. Due to over 90% of trade to Finland travels via shipments in the Baltic Sea, and Finland being an Arctic Council member, both areas are of strategic significance. Cultural narratives suggest calmness and consistency when ensuring stability of these regions emphasising “we will not provoke, and we will not be provoked. But for a guaranteed long-term peace, we need strong defence capabilities” (Kylkirauta, 2025, para 5). This emphasises how the geographic location has placed a burden on the FDF but also informed how it approaches challenges. Characteristics highlighted when dealing with problems are continuity, credibility, strength and trustworthiness. Furthermore, it shows how the main problems the FDF is responsible for are beginning to extend to a regional dimension.

Since NATO accession in 2023, the FDF has role conception of a regional security provider through NATO has strengthened. The cultural factor *Contributing Ally* contains themes of the FDF acting as an active security provider through NATO. The FDF has had past experiences working through multilateral frameworks such as NORDEFCO, Pfp and JEF, however, the language expressed in new doctrines, leadership speeches, and magazine articles reflect a more active role. For example, “as a NATO member, Finland is a part of a military alliance even more intertwined and involved in European and Transatlantic security cooperation” (Finnish Defence Forces, 2025b, p.44). This reflects that the FDF is utilizing NATO multilateral frameworks to consolidate and solidify their reputation in NATO as a Northern, and Baltic Sea security providing experts.

The FDF assigns itself positive and proactive characteristics when it participates in defence cooperation, to frame itself as a desirable and influential ally. Frequently occurring characteristics found in the *Contributing Ally* cultural factor are active ally, quick learner, committed to allied security. These characteristics reflect how the FDF is utilizing its competence and high national defence willingness to frame Finland as a desirable ally. Furthermore, FDF military officers articulate how should claim an influential position in the alliance with reference to their excellent reputation: “If Finland wished, it could be a significant wielder of power in NATO. We have reason to recognize our value... we are not a small state within NATO” (Upseeriliitto 2023a, para 11). This self-understanding implies the FDF engages with defence cooperation with confidence in their ability to contribute to the alliance as well as aspirations to become an influential member state.

In sum, the *Credible National Security Provider* and *Contributing Ally* are evaluated to be critical cultural factors for the identity of the FDF. The prior CCF acts as a call to action and a red line, as it emphasizes a culturally conditioned expectations for the FDF to fulfil its main national duties. The latter CCF provides a powerful incentive for the FDF to pursue its new role conception within NATO as it solidifies its reputation and benefits its group members. Consolidating a good position in the alliance assists the FDF fulfil their main responsibility of maintaining territorial integrity and ensuring Finland stays out of conflict.

### 5.2.2. Norms

Norms refer to the specific actions and behaviours the group expects, accepts and prefers. Evaluation of these cultural factors is guided by two questions; 1) What are the acceptable and expected modes of organizational behaviour in relation to defence cooperation? 2) What are the FDFs taboos surrounding defence cooperation within NATO?

The FDF expects defence cooperation within NATO will not bring many changes for conscript and reservist services. The cultural factor *Joint Exercises and Interoperability as Normalized* emphasizes that military cooperation with international actors is not exceptional for the FDF. The Reservist Officer Union chair highlights how “reservists have been cooperating with other NATO countries since the mid 1990s” (Reserviläinen, 2022, para 3). Furthermore, Finnish general Janne Jaakkola views “exercises will continue to become more international, following the same pattern as the past” (Reseviläinen, 2024, para 2). The cultural factor implies NATO membership is not expected to change the conscript or reservist services as cooperative behaviour is already a routine and expectation. Regarding interoperability, Lieutenant General Timo Kakkola highlighted how “military equipment and operating systems have been NATO compatible for a long time” (Kakkola, 2023, para 14). This preparedness demonstrates long-term thinking, and an expectation of continuation, and implies that the FDF prefers to keep the conscription and reservist services relatively unaffected by NATO membership.

New behavioural expectations are articulated for military officers and the FDF's leadership structures. The cultural factors *Obligations Arising from NATO Membership* and *Alliance Compatible Training Practices* both identify two effects of defence cooperation. Firstly, professional military officer curricular will see minor changes, with increased emphasis on English language training and NATO courses. Secondly, the FDF leadership must learn how to plan, participate and implement NATO concepts such as 360 defence, alliance defence planning, and article 5. The *Alliance Compatible Training Practices* factor contains more

specific articulates suggesting more substantive action such as “in the future, Finland must have regiments that can quickly be employed for NATO tasks” (Keränen, 2023, para 6). This suggests that the FDF has begun implementing changes to further align with NATO standards as preferred modes of organizational behaviour for the professional military branches. Despite these articulations containing ambitious plans, they are carefully crafted considering the prepared and readiness stance of the FDF. These proposed changes are often framed as a necessity that contribute towards strengthening the FDF's reputation as an ally or bettering national defence capabilities.

A taboo can be identified regarding the FDF's expectation of maintaining a strong national defence capability. The cultural factor *Alliance Membership Not Substituting National Defence* highlights that the FDF considers it unacceptable for Finnish national defence standards from declining because of NATO membership. This course of action constitutes a taboo, because it would influence the FDF reputation by risking it being labelled a slacking ally and weaken the ability to defend itself. This can be seen in how the FDF places heavy emphasis on adhering to NATO's article 3, committing its members to uphold capacities to resist armed attacks. The FDF leadership has taken this expectation and placed it as the highest priority highlighting “the fundamental basics of defence do not change...the main task of the FDF in NATO is the territorial defence of Finland” (Reserviläinen, 2023, para 3). Article 3 is one of the most frequently mentioned NATO concepts suggesting that defence cooperation within NATO should help strengthen it. Furthermore, this taboo can also be seen in the FDF's justification of not forcing conscripts or reservists into performing NATO service tasks, as this will remain on a “voluntary basis”. (Upseeriliitto, 2023b, p.24).

In *Joint Exercise Conduct and Interoperability as Normalized, Alliance Membership Not Substituting National Defence* and *Alliance Compatible Training Practices* are the main critical cultural factors within the norm category. These three factors, how changes to expected organizational behaviour regarding the issue are framed as incremental, with taboo's arising out of the FDF maintaining a high national defence capability. *Joint Exercise Conduct and Interoperability* and *Alliance Compatible Training Practices*, are ‘calls to action’ CCFs because of they promote conformity to FDF reputation of being a good ally, and a strong military state. *Alliance Membership Not Substituting National Defence* acts as a red line, clearly highlighting how engaging in defence cooperation cannot intervene in the FDF's ability to defend itself. These preferred behaviours do not contradict or prevent defence cooperation. It suggests that the FDF will continue similar behavioural patterns towards defence cooperation,

implementing small changes to achieve increased NATO integration, while simultaneously prioritizing maintaining strong national defence.

### 5.2.3. Values

Values highlight what ideational underpinnings guide and/or motivate the group. The evaluation of these cultural factors is guided by the following question: What are the values emphasized when the FDF leadership is encouraging cooperative behaviour on the issue?

The FDF leadership frames continuous learning from Allies as a key value. This is reflected by the cultural factor *International Military Cooperation as a Source of Learning* where cooperation treated as a valuable source of knowledge. Defence cooperation is said to “help us understand our own strengths and weaknesses (Reserviläinen 2022, para 16). Defence Minister Antti Häkkänen also emphasises how “our national defence capability is strengthened with international defence cooperation as it teaches now to be more compatibility within NATO structures” (Upseeriliitto, 2023c, p.23). This sentiment of cooperation facilitating learning is also expressed in the National Defence Universities strategy goals, where academic and officer exchanges are set as a higher priority (Finnish National Defence University, 2025). This highlights how international military cooperation enhances professional excellence by maximising performance in exercises and fostering knowledge exchanges. This reveals a powerful incentive for the FDF to engage in defence cooperation.

FDF leadership emphasized the idea that being a part of a multilateral defence organization provides greater sense of security than unilateral action. This value was highlighted in the cultural factor “*Stronger Together*”, a narrative that persisted throughout FDF leadership speeches at different occasions, taking slightly different forms such as “never alone again” (Heiskanen, 2023, para 3), and “with out allies we are stronger” (Stubb, 2025, para 27). These value narratives allude to historical experiences of Finland fighting against Russia alone during the Second World War. The “*Stronger Together*” cultural factor highlights that the FDF has autonomy and can freely choose how to conduct military cooperation. This encourages cooperative behaviour on the issue, by highlighting evoking emotional historical memories. This value and narratives were found leadership speeches and interviews when discussing the opening of the new NATO Multi-Corps Land Component Command, and the announcement of a NATO Forward Land Forces Finland unit being established in the North of Finland (Häkkänen, 2025). This value employed as a ‘call to action’ cultural factor, emphasizing the FDF’s ability to build more agency for itself through cooperative behaviour with NATO allies.

Both *International Military Cooperation as a Source for Learning* and “*Stronger Together*” are considered as critical cultural factors, provide powerful incentives and likely calls to action, when the FDF leadership is encouraging cooperation on the issue. Both values express benefits of defence cooperation, one assisting in building military competence and the other strengthening military capability. Increasingly internationalized military cooperation is thus labelled as an honourable and desired behaviour by the FDF leadership.

#### 5.2.4. *Perceptual Lens*

The perceptual lens shows the groups assumptions about the world, and who are considered allies, or enemies. The evaluation these cultural factors is guided by two questions; 1) How is the threat environment that Finland is depicted in? 2) What defines a “victory” for the FDF regarding defence cooperation within NATO?

Russia is labelled as the main source of instability in the threat environment was expressed within two cultural factors. Firstly, the cultural factor *Revisionist Russia* expresses how Russia's intentions are to destabilize the Europe, the U.S. and the rule-based world order. The war in Ukraine was highlighted as a turning point in Finnish Russian relations, which broke all prior assumptions of regional stability. This has meant that in “2020s, power political has made a major comeback to international relations... the relationship between Finland and Russia has hit rock bottom” (Finnish Defence Forces, 2025c, p.7). Russia's revisionist and unpredictable behaviour are labelled as the main reason for joining NATO. Secondly, the cultural factor *Hybrid and Non-Conventional Threats* lists means of war such as infrastructure sabotage, disinformation campaigns and cyber space war as threats primarily wielded by Russia, which caused regionally more instability. The FDF highlights that this threat environment contains new and more complex threats compared to conventional war means, advocating for international cooperation. NATO is referenced as an answer, as “with time the organization as honed the ability to counter modern threats” (Ruotuväki, 2025, para 29). The way the FDF frames Russia as the primary enemy and contributor of instability creates a red line as inaction and risking further instability is deemed unacceptable.

A “victory” for the FDF is to utilize its NATO membership to balance the complex threat posed by Russia. NATO is characterized as the only organizational actor that is capable to assist the FDF in creating a credible deterrent in Northern Europe. The cultural factor *NATO as a Stable Security Community* suggest that effectiveness of the alliance stems from strengthening defence ties amongst multiple actors. The FDF's political leadership claims NATO “memberships strengthens Finnish security. NATO plays a central role in strengthening

the transatlantic relationship... and play a more significant role as a stability produce in Northern Europe” (Finnish Defence Ministry, 2024, p.8). Defence cooperation within NATO provides an excellent additional form of protection to compliment the FDF's national defence capability. This achieved through FDF developing deep and diverse relationships with allies it perceives as strategically important.

Another “victory” for the FDF is the development of deeper and divers cooperation relationships with the Nordic states and the U.S. The cultural factor *Nordic States as Important Security Partners* contains two key themes of the Nordic countries being key to regional stability, as well as being trustworthy allies. The Nordic states are labelled as traditional cooperation partners, with references made to longstanding cooperation through NORDEFECO and the JEF. Particularly Sweden is mentioned as the most important bilateral partner, with the new cooperation initiative within NATO such as the formation Forward Land Forces in Lapland, mostly consisting of Finnish and Swedish troops, hailed as a great success. Given the deteriorating security environment, the Nordic states are described as Finland's closest security partners who “share the same values, and interests, making our stability ever more important” (Finnish Defence Ministry, 2024, p.22). While other countries such as France, Britain and Poland are also mentioned as key contributors to regional security, the tone in which the Nordic countries are discussed is different. The cultural factor *U.S. as a Security Provider* describes the U.S. and the transatlantic relationship as a priority. The bilateral Defence Cooperation Agreement with the U.S. is described as a “significant addition to Finnish security. Finland's security is guaranteed behind many locks” (Niinistö, 2024, para 29). The lock analogy refers the multiple types of agreement bi- and multilateral defence cooperation agreements the FDF is working to implement. The strong transatlantic relationship is framed as key to regional stability, because U.S. military backing it perceived to a provide a powerful deterrent which assists in balancing against Russia. This highlights how the FDF prioritizes the development deep and diverse relationships with specific allies it perceives as strategically important and provides a powerful incentive for the FDF to pursue defence cooperation.

*NATO as a Stable Security Community, Revisionist Russia, U.S. as a Security Provider* and *Nordic State's as Important Security Partners* are evaluated to be critical cultural factors, that condition why the FDF should pursue active defence cooperation within NATO. The CCF *Revisionist Russia* constitutes a red line. Russia's invasion of Ukraine crossed a non-negotiable line of respecting a rule-based world, which justifies the necessity of the FDF to pursue defence cooperation with NATO as Russia is not the primary threat. The CCFs *NATO as a Security Community* and *U.S. as a Security Provider* form powerful incentives,

highlighting how defence cooperation with these actors forms an effective deterrent and balancing force against Russia. The CCF *Nordic States as Important Security Partners* acts as both a powerful incentive and a call to action. This is because Nordic defence cooperation is characterized as part of the strategy of creating a diverse and multilayered defence cooperation network. Additionally defending the Nordics is framed as an expectation because it represents defending the Nordic life, traditions and values.

### **5.3. Strategic Cultural Map**

This section will synthesise and present the final strategic cultural map of the FDF on defence cooperation within NATO. The purpose is to synthesis the findings of the main categories and explain how the CCFs overlap and interact to form the main powerful incentives, red lines and calls to action.

The FDF's strategic cultural map regarding defence cooperation within NATO is as follows. The *identity* of the FDF suggests it is a dutiful, trustworthy and credible group, that will continue to perform its core tasks of Finland's territorial defence while balancing this with new alliance obligations. The FDF strives to uphold a similar reputation within the Alliance, as it has domestically, reliable and competent. The *norms* of the FDF emphasise gradual adaptations to NATO standards. This is framed as a continuation of past behavioural expectation with openness to adopting new practices. However, along with these new adaptations, any behaviour that weakens the FDF defence capability is deemed unacceptable. The *values* of the FDF emphasise a positive attitude towards internationalization, welcoming support. The idea that defence cooperation within NATO strengthens Finland's security due to alliance security guarantees. The *perceptual lens*, frames defence cooperation within NATO as a necessity, due to Russia changing the strategic environment permanently. NATO is not only an organization capable of deterring Russia but also provides an opportunity for the FDF to expand and strengthen bi-, and multilateral military cooperation ties, especially with deepening cooperation with Nordic allies. This opportunity allows the FDF to increase the involvement of the U.S. and regional allies in strengthening Finland's security.




Figure 145: Visualisation of the Critical Cultural Factor interactions created by the author

The CCFs interactions construct the context that informs how the FDF deliberates and makes decisions on the issue. The analysis has shown that cultural traits expressed themselves in multiple ways across categories. Figure 2 visually summarizes these overlaps and organizes them into what functions the CCFs have in accordance with powerful incentives, red lines and calls to action, showing patterns in each function. CCFs in the powerful incentive's function all emphasize the benefits of NATO membership either to strengthening Finland's security, reputation and deepening cooperation bonds with strategic allies. These CCFs the rhetorical anchors of how the FDF justifies and motivates its engagement because the FDF has a lot to gain. The CCFs in the calls to action function shows the FDF having pressure to act and deliver upon multiple obligations. Adapting to NATO standards is balanced along with demands of maintaining the status quo national defence operational capability capacity. The norms of the FDF on this issue also highlight that changes are not urgent, as much of the work for alliance integration is already framed as normalized. Finally, CCFs in the red line's function, show a theme of prioritizing national defence. These CCFs together inform thinking, by prioritizing forming a strong deterrent against Russia through traditional means of having a strong national defence capability.

## 6. Discussion

This section presents a critical discussion on the findings, which addresses the second sub research of this thesis, discussing the implications of the FDF's strategic culture on defence cooperation within NATO. To provide an answer, the strategic cultural map of the FDF, along with the powerful incentives, calls to action and red lines it creates are discussed in relation to previous literature. Additionally, recent empirical developments of the FDF are recontextualized and explained through the lens of the findings.

The strategic culture mapped in this thesis shows similarities and differences to previous scholarship. Past scholarship has mapped Finnish strategic culture on a national profile level; however, a comparison can still help highlight continuities and changes. The strategic culture of the FDF on defence cooperation implies two major similarities between previous scholarship of Finland's national strategic culture. These include, national territorial defence being a high priority (Seppo & Forsberg, 2013), Finland's action being performed through official multilateral frameworks for increased legitimacy and security maximizing tendencies (Doeser, 2017). Defence cooperation through NATO is framed as a necessary response to changes to the strategic environment displaying a pragmatic attitude toward approaching security maximization. This highlights how the FDF's context of rationality is consistent with the frames that have persisted in Finland's wider foreign and policy decision makers throughout the Cold War and up until the 2022 Ukraine invasion.

A major difference is in how the FDF treats NATO as a provider of stability. In past strategic cultural scholarship, Finland has been characterized as being fearful of official military alliances (Angstrom & Honig, 2012; Seppo & Forsberg, 2013). However, the thesis analysis results demonstrate a departure from this thinking, implying NATO is viewed now as a legitimate military-political security producing organization. This adaptation can be understood when accounting for the second major shift, openly labelling Russia as a revisionist security threat. This highlights a theoretical contribution to strategic cultural scholarship, highlighting that strategic culture is not always static and continuation.

The main findings of this thesis are consistent with past literature in flagging a lack of "mindset" shift in relation to defence cooperation in NATO. This can be seen when analysing the implications of the powerful incentives, red lines, and calls to action of the FDF's strategic culture. The powerful incentives imply active military cooperation is framed as a positive because it benefits Finland's security. NATO is framed as an alliance that offers the opportunity to further strengthen, bi-, and multilateral cooperation with existing alliance members, deemed as capable to contributing towards Finland's security. This is consistent with

the analysis of Lawrence et al. (2025) highlighting how Finland does not expect much in terms of what it receives from the alliance. The thesis findings concur with this by highlighting how the FDF is keen to utilize the alliance network itself, rather than relying on article 5 security guarantees. This can also be seen in the red lines identified in the analysis. FDF's main priority overwhelmingly remains the national territorial defence of Finland. This is not necessarily an inherent negative, however the framings suggest a clear arrangement of priorities of Finland's defence first, echoing concerns flagged by Linnainmäki et al. (2025).

One could argue that the findings suggest that the FDF's strategic culture employs narratives demonstrating willingness and a positive attitude towards defence cooperation within NATO. Specifically critical cultural factors within the norms category demonstrate acknowledgement that the FDF must adapt training practices and adopt NATO conceptions such as 360 security and forward deterrence. There are also pledges to work with allies to counter new complex security threats such as disinformation, weaponized migration and terrorism. What is interesting to note, what is not mentioned. For example, an action plan how the FDF would allocate resources, or personnel to combat these new complex issues as an alliance member is not mentioned. There is also no mention of developing an expeditionary force to be allocated to NATO operations abroad. Conscript and reservist services are not expected to undergo significant change in relation to defence cooperation with NATO. These troops are not detailed to participate in NATO exercises or operations abroad which further highlight the reluctance to utilize FDF capabilities and resources outside of Finnish territorial borders. This means that only 22,000 of FDF professional military troops (Kaplan, 2022) will be available for NATO tasks. Furthermore, the FDF's professional military forces are not obligated to serve abroad, as the FDF adheres to a volunteering principle. Only willing professional military officers will serve in NATO tasks abroad. This raises concerns about future staffing of Finnish officers in NATO roles and availability of troops to be used for NATO missions.

These findings are also in line with Särkkä's et al. (2024) report on Finland's defence cooperation partnerships within NATO. The report suggested how Finland would continue to seek bi-, tri-, and multilateral defence cooperation formats, which aligns with the thesis' findings on the FDF's strategic culture encouraging such defence cooperation networking behaviour. The thesis' findings highlight how Finland's main contribution within these cooperations will be to maintain a strong national defence capability and frequently conduct joint exercises with allies. The FDF has been found to profile itself as a competent ally, that has high expertise and knowledge to share. The FDF's reluctance to participate

participating in defence cooperation with Southern NATO allies, does not necessarily stem from a lack of willingness. It can be understood through how critical cultural factors contribute towards conditioning the FDF's thinking in prioritizing maintaining a credible national territorial defence. This further concurs points made by Linnainmäki and Karjalainen (2025) which highlights how Finland is a capable ally plagued by "frontline realism", making the FDF reluctant to risk stretching its resources to defence cooperation efforts that do not directly strengthen national or regional security.

## **7. Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research**

There are three main limitations of this thesis. Firstly, the temporal limitation. The thesis' scope has been narrowed by design to a specific issue, in a specific moment in time. This specific time has covered from May 2022 when Finland made their initial NATO membership bid until December 2025. Therefore, the findings serve as insights into the conditions assist in understanding the FDF's thinking until this point. The findings do not aim to produce a universal explanatory frame of how the FDF will continue to approach defence cooperation. As has been shown by the findings, future approaches are likely to be contingent on the developments of the strategic regional environment of the FDF.

The second limitation is the reliance on discourse and documentary data. This data has captured the articulated and institutionalized elements of the strategic culture of the FDF. However, this does not capture the contemporary debates, internal discussion and possible renegotiations of the FDF's strategic culture on the issue. Further research, such as interviews with FDF organizational members at different levels could help capture this nuance. This highlights the challenge of investigating an empirically ongoing event, as the status quo is subject to change. Thirdly, the CTops methodology has limitations. The methodology provides insights into how critical cultural factors condition the context of rationality of an actor. However, this conditioning does not set out static cultural laws, meaning actors can be still able to act in entirely different ways. Especially given the FDF is still adapting to NATO's new obligations.

There are two main recommendations for future research. The first recommendation pertains to a topic mentioned in the discussion, theory development. This is not a new challenge to strategic cultural literature, as strategic cultural change and continuity constitutes one of the main debates in the field. The issue-based strategic cultural analysis can provide insights into what is the strategic culture of a specific actor on a specific issue *is*, but it still struggles to explain *how* it evolved to be. This highlights that future strategic cultural

theory development should focus on conceptualizing the evolution mechanism (Helwig et al., 2025).

The second recommendation is an empirical one, pertaining to empirical dimension of Finnish security and defence policy development and implementation. This thesis has treated the key political elites such as the defence minister and president as a part of the FDF organization. This is because these specific political elites, along with advice from FDF leadership, are a part of the TP-UTVA committee which is responsible for making decisions on how to approach recent security developments and defence cooperation. The political elite was operationalized through creating a different domain of Euro-Atlanticists. However, the relationship between the key political elite and FDF as the policy implementors should be further studied. When the critical cultural factors are traced back to which domains they are most prevalent in, this shows demonstrate differences in which cultural factors are most likely to condition thinking. Future research should focus on how this political elite dimension, and the FDF organization makes sense of their differences, and find common ground on the issues. Applying the Step 6 and 7 of the CTops methodology could be useful. These final steps places emphasise on explaining the context within which the domains exist in and how the groups that belong to these domains clash or cooperate. These steps were outside of the scope of this thesis which aimed to map and make sense of the FDF's strategic culture.

## **8. Conclusion**

This thesis has answered the research question *How does the strategic culture of the Finnish Defence Forces condition its approach to defence cooperation within NATO?* Through the application of the CTops methodology the thesis mapped the strategic culture of the FDF in relation of defence cooperation. Through distilling the critical cultural factors that make up the identity, norms, values and perceptual lens of the FDF on this issue, the findings suggest the following. The FDF's strategic culture implies it is supportive of defence cooperation within NATO when it directly assists in increasing its own national and regional security. Consistently with previous research, the findings suggest the FDF has a lack of a "mindset" shift on the issue, still directed by cultural factors which favour and prioritize national territorial defence. Defence cooperation within NATO is not characterized as a drastic change from the past, but rather a continuation of Finland's pragmatic defence policy construction of securing its position in current threat environment. This is not to say FDF is a bad ally, but to highlight it is largely guided by its own context of rationality shaped by cultural and ideational factors. This highlights how the FDF has been conditioned to be proactive and receptive to defence

cooperation within NATO, particularly when it indicates strengthening NATO's Northern flank.

Implications of this thesis suggest that the FDF will take time to adapt to all Alliance defence obligations. This is partially natural, given Finland only became a member in May 2023. The FDF's strategic culture on active military cooperation in NATO suggests the strengthening of the Northern NATO flank, providing a strong deterrent against Russia are the main priorities. The findings suggest that the FDF is still committed to upholding an image of a good and contributing ally, however, for it to fulfil all obligations of NATO in providing defence guarantees for allies in different regions will take significant time to develop.

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uudenvuodenpuhe-1-1-2025/](https://www.presidentti.fi/tasavallan-presidentti-alexander-stubbin-<br/>uudenvuodenpuhe-1-1-2025/)

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# 10. Appendices

## 10.1. Appendix A: All Data Collected per Domain

### *Professional Military Domain Data*

<b>Data Type</b>	<b>Data Collection Site</b>	<b>Link</b>	<b>Date Accessed</b>
Finnish National Defence University Strategy Document	Defence University Website	<a href="https://maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu.fi/strategia">https://maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu.fi/strategia</a>	24/11/2025
Finnish National Defence University Bachelors Curriculum	Defence University Website	<a href="https://doria.fi/handle/10024/188694">https://doria.fi/handle/10024/188694</a>	27/11/2025
Finnish National Defence University Masters Curriculum	Defence University Website	<a href="https://doria.fi/handle/10024/188499">https://doria.fi/handle/10024/188499</a>	27/11/2025
Finnish National Defence University PhD Curriculum	Defence University Website	<a href="https://doria.fi/handle/10024/180794">https://doria.fi/handle/10024/180794</a>	27/11/2025
Leadership Handbook	Finnish Defence Forces Website	<a href="https://puolustusvoimat.fi/asiointi/aineistot/ohje-saannot-ja-oppaat">https://puolustusvoimat.fi/asiointi/aineistot/ohje-saannot-ja-oppaat</a>	27/11/2025
Finnish Military Intelligence Review 2025	Finnish Defence Forces Website	<a href="https://puolustusvoimat.fi/documents/1948673/2014902/PV_sotilastiedustelu_raportti_EN_2025_web.pdf/c0125ed9-1467-23e7-e7b6-a7891c4fb5fe/PV_sotilastiedustelu_raportti_EN_2025_web.pdf">https://puolustusvoimat.fi/documents/1948673/2014902/PV_sotilastiedustelu_raportti_EN_2025_web.pdf/c0125ed9-1467-23e7-e7b6-a7891c4fb5fe/PV_sotilastiedustelu_raportti_EN_2025_web.pdf</a>	28/11/2025
Cadet Promise	Kadettikunta Website	<a href="https://kadettikunta.fi/kadettiupseeri/kadettilupaus/">https://kadettikunta.fi/kadettiupseeri/kadettilupaus/</a>	02/12/2025
Ruotuväki PA1	Ruotuväki Website	<a href="https://ruotuvaki.fi/-/ann-sofie-forssten-olinnaisupseerien-edellakavija-1">https://ruotuvaki.fi/-/ann-sofie-forssten-olinnaisupseerien-edellakavija-1</a>	02/12/2025
Kylkirauta A2	Kylkirauta Website	<a href="https://kylkirauta.fi/index.php/2025/03/16/vihij-ohtaja-kestavaan-johtamiseen-kasvattavasta-oppimisesta-ei-pida-tinkia/">https://kylkirauta.fi/index.php/2025/03/16/vihij-ohtaja-kestavaan-johtamiseen-kasvattavasta-oppimisesta-ei-pida-tinkia/</a>	02/12/2025
Kylkirauta A1	Kylkirauta Website	<a href="https://kylkirauta.fi/index.php/2025/08/29/tasavallan-presidentin-puhe-109-kadettikurssin-ja-92-merikadettikurssin-ylentamis-ja-nimittamistilaisuudessa-29-8-2025/">https://kylkirauta.fi/index.php/2025/08/29/tasavallan-presidentin-puhe-109-kadettikurssin-ja-92-merikadettikurssin-ylentamis-ja-nimittamistilaisuudessa-29-8-2025/</a>	02/12/2025
Kylkirauta A3	Kylkirauta Website	<a href="https://kylkirauta.fi/index.php/2025/10/28/kadetin-ajatuksia-24-nuorten-maanpuolustuskeskustelut-santahaminassa/">https://kylkirauta.fi/index.php/2025/10/28/kadetin-ajatuksia-24-nuorten-maanpuolustuskeskustelut-santahaminassa/</a>	02/12/2025
Kylkirauta A4	Kylkirauta Website	<a href="https://kylkirauta.fi/index.php/2025/03/20/pertti-tervonen-maanpuolustusta-monella-tapaa/">https://kylkirauta.fi/index.php/2025/03/20/pertti-tervonen-maanpuolustusta-monella-tapaa/</a>	02/12/2025

Kylkirauta A5	Kylkirauta Website	<a href="https://kylkirauta.fi/index.php/2025/03/19/risto-sinkko-naton-resilienssi-kasite-ja-suomen-kokonaisturvallisuus/">https://kylkirauta.fi/index.php/2025/03/19/risto-sinkko-naton-resilienssi-kasite-ja-suomen-kokonaisturvallisuus/</a>	02/12/2025
Kylkirauta A6	Kylkirauta Website	<a href="https://kylkirauta.fi/index.php/2024/06/18/risto-sinkko-mtsn-seminaari-seinajoella-ilmensi-suomalaista-kokonaisturvallisuuden-ajattelua-ja-luottamusta-nato-jasenyteen/">https://kylkirauta.fi/index.php/2024/06/18/risto-sinkko-mtsn-seminaari-seinajoella-ilmensi-suomalaista-kokonaisturvallisuuden-ajattelua-ja-luottamusta-nato-jasenyteen/</a>	02/12/2025
Upseeriliitto A1	Upseeriliitto Website	<a href="https://upseeriliitto.fi/verkkolehti/nato-suomi-ei-ole-pienvaltio/">https://upseeriliitto.fi/verkkolehti/nato-suomi-ei-ole-pienvaltio/</a>	02/12/2025
Upseeriliitto A2	Upseeriliitto Website	<a href="https://upseeriliitto.fi/verkkolehti/upseerikoulutus-nato-kuntoon/">https://upseeriliitto.fi/verkkolehti/upseerikoulutus-nato-kuntoon/</a>	02/12/2025
Upseeriliitto A3 p.23-29	Upseeriliitto Website	<a href="https://upseeriliitto.fi/verkkolehti/valmiuttajoka-hetki-2/">https://upseeriliitto.fi/verkkolehti/valmiuttajoka-hetki-2/</a>	02/12/2025
Upseeriliitto A4 p.22-27	Upseeriliitto Website	<a href="https://upseeriliitto.fi/verkkolehti/osaava-upseeristo-on-puolustuksen-avaintekija-myo-nato-suomessa/">https://upseeriliitto.fi/verkkolehti/osaava-upseeristo-on-puolustuksen-avaintekija-myo-nato-suomessa/</a>	02/12/2025
Upseeriliitto A5 p.34-37	Upseeriliitto Website	<a href="https://upseeriliitto.fi/verkkolehti/upseerin-tyo-perhe-ja-parisuhde/">https://upseeriliitto.fi/verkkolehti/upseerin-tyo-perhe-ja-parisuhde/</a>	02/12/2025
Upseeriliitto A6 p.24-46	Upseeriliitto Website	<a href="https://upseeriliitto.fi/verkkolehti/nato-tehtaviin-innolla-muttei-pakolla/">https://upseeriliitto.fi/verkkolehti/nato-tehtaviin-innolla-muttei-pakolla/</a>	02/12/2025
Upseeriliitto A9 p.22-32	Upseeriliitto Website	<a href="https://upseeriliitto.fi/verkkolehti/upseerikoulutus-uudistuu/">https://upseeriliitto.fi/verkkolehti/upseerikoulutus-uudistuu/</a>	02/12/2025
Upseeriliitto A11 p.20	Upseeriliitto Website	<a href="https://upseeriliitto.fi/verkkolehti/jokainen-meista-on-kokonaisturvallisuuden-avaintekija/">https://upseeriliitto.fi/verkkolehti/jokainen-meista-on-kokonaisturvallisuuden-avaintekija/</a>	02/12/2025
Ind. Speech A1	Valtioneuvosto	<a href="https://valtioneuvosto.fi/-/1948673/kenraaliluutnantti-kakkolan-puhe-itsenaisyyspaivan-valtakunnallisessa-paraatissa-6.12.2022">https://valtioneuvosto.fi/-/1948673/kenraaliluutnantti-kakkolan-puhe-itsenaisyyspaivan-valtakunnallisessa-paraatissa-6.12.2022</a>	4/12/2025
Ind. Speech A2	Puolustusvoimat Website	<a href="https://puolustusvoimat.fi/-/kenraaliluutnantti-mikko-heiskasen-puhe-itsenaisyyspaivan-paraatissa-2023">https://puolustusvoimat.fi/-/kenraaliluutnantti-mikko-heiskasen-puhe-itsenaisyyspaivan-paraatissa-2023</a>	4/12/2025
Ind. Speech A3	Puolustusvoimat Website	<a href="https://puolustusvoimat.fi/-/1950813/kenraaliluutnantti-pasi-valimaen-puhe-itsenaisyyspaivan-paraatissa-2024">https://puolustusvoimat.fi/-/1950813/kenraaliluutnantti-pasi-valimaen-puhe-itsenaisyyspaivan-paraatissa-2024</a>	4/12/2025
Vet Speech A1	Puolustusvoimat Website	<a href="https://puolustusvoimat.fi/-/puolustusvoimain-komentajan-puhe-kansallisen-veteraanipaivan-paajuhlassa">https://puolustusvoimat.fi/-/puolustusvoimain-komentajan-puhe-kansallisen-veteraanipaivan-paajuhlassa</a>	4/12/2025
Vet Speech A2	Puolustusvoimat Website	<a href="https://puolustusvoimat.fi/-/puolustusvoimain-komentajan-tervehdys-lotta-svard-jarjeston-lakkauttamisen-muistotilaisuudessa">https://puolustusvoimat.fi/-/puolustusvoimain-komentajan-tervehdys-lotta-svard-jarjeston-lakkauttamisen-muistotilaisuudessa</a>	4/12/2025
Flag Day Speech	Puolustusvoimat Website	<a href="https://puolustusvoimat.fi/-/ilmavkom-puhe">https://puolustusvoimat.fi/-/ilmavkom-puhe</a>	4/12/2025

*Conscript Service Domain Data*

<b>Data Type</b>	<b>Data Collection Site</b>	<b>DCS URL</b>	<b>Date Accessed</b>
Conscript Handbook 2025	Intti.fi	<a href="https://intti.fi/etusivu">https://intti.fi/etusivu</a>	28/11/2025
Reserviläinen A1	Reserviläinen website	<a href="https://reservilainen.fi/maanpuolustusnaisten-liiton-jasenmaara-on-yli-kaksinkertaistunut-venajanhyykkaysodan-aikana/">https://reservilainen.fi/maanpuolustusnaisten-liiton-jasenmaara-on-yli-kaksinkertaistunut-venajanhyykkaysodan-aikana/</a>	02/12/2025
Reserviläinen A2	Reserviläinen website	<a href="https://reservilainen.fi/reservilaisjarjestot-ovat-jopitkaan-tehneet-nato-maiden-kanssa-yhteistyotallaista-se-on/">https://reservilainen.fi/reservilaisjarjestot-ovat-jopitkaan-tehneet-nato-maiden-kanssa-yhteistyotallaista-se-on/</a>	02/12/2025
Reserviläinen A3	Reserviläinen website	<a href="https://reservilainen.fi/ukraina-ja-nato-muuttavat-arkea/">https://reservilainen.fi/ukraina-ja-nato-muuttavat-arkea/</a>	02/12/2025
Reserviläinen A4	Reserviläinen website	<a href="https://reservilainen.fi/hyva-johtaja-vaatii-itseltaan-enemman-kuin-joukoltaan-rukn-uusi-johtaja-sanoo/">https://reservilainen.fi/hyva-johtaja-vaatii-itseltaan-enemman-kuin-joukoltaan-rukn-uusi-johtaja-sanoo/</a>	02/12/2025
Reserviläinen A5	Reserviläinen website	<a href="https://reservilainen.fi/jukka-nurmen-kolumni-reservilainenkin-natottuu/">https://reservilainen.fi/jukka-nurmen-kolumni-reservilainenkin-natottuu/</a>	02/12/2025
Reserviläinen A6	Reserviläinen website	<a href="https://reservilainen.fi/nato-avaa-uusia-ovia-myos-osaaville-reservilaisille-puolustusvoimien-komentajan-jaanne-jaakkola-uskoo/">https://reservilainen.fi/nato-avaa-uusia-ovia-myos-osaaville-reservilaisille-puolustusvoimien-komentajan-jaanne-jaakkola-uskoo/</a>	02/12/2025
Reserviläinen A7	Reserviläinen website	<a href="https://reservilainen.fi/kertausharjoituksista-pyritaan-tekemaan-aiempaa-pidempia/">https://reservilainen.fi/kertausharjoituksista-pyritaan-tekemaan-aiempaa-pidempia/</a>	02/12/2025
Reserviläinen A8	Reserviläinen website	<a href="https://reservilainen.fi/reservilaisjarjestot-ovat-jopitkaan-tehneet-nato-maiden-kanssa-yhteistyotallaista-se-on/">https://reservilainen.fi/reservilaisjarjestot-ovat-jopitkaan-tehneet-nato-maiden-kanssa-yhteistyotallaista-se-on/</a>	02/12/2025
Reserviläinen A9	Reserviläinen website	<a href="https://reservilainen.fi/tyoryhma-suunnittelee-kutsuntojen-laajentamista-koko-ikaluokalle/">https://reservilainen.fi/tyoryhma-suunnittelee-kutsuntojen-laajentamista-koko-ikaluokalle/</a>	02/12/2025
Reserviläinen A10	Reserviläinen website	<a href="https://reservilainen.fi/jukka-nurmen-kolumni-reservilainenkin-natottuu/">https://reservilainen.fi/jukka-nurmen-kolumni-reservilainenkin-natottuu/</a>	02/12/2025
Reserviläinen A11	Reserviläinen website	<a href="https://reservilainen.fi/suomi-aikoo-sijoittaa-vapaaehtoisia-reservilaisia-naton-valmiusjoukkoihin/">https://reservilainen.fi/suomi-aikoo-sijoittaa-vapaaehtoisia-reservilaisia-naton-valmiusjoukkoihin/</a>	02/12/2025
Reserviläinen A12	Reserviläinen website	<a href="https://reservilainen.fi/reserviupseeriliitto-kaipaa-selkeampaa-tiedon-jakamista-naton-tarjoamista-tehtavista/">https://reservilainen.fi/reserviupseeriliitto-kaipaa-selkeampaa-tiedon-jakamista-naton-tarjoamista-tehtavista/</a>	02/12/2025
Reserviläinen A13	Reserviläinen website	<a href="https://reservilainen.fi/maanpuolustus-on-kulkenut-jone-nikulan-matkassa-aina-jo-pikkupoikana-han-opetteli-sotilasarvot-ja-leikki-pyssyilla-seka-puumiekoilla/">https://reservilainen.fi/maanpuolustus-on-kulkenut-jone-nikulan-matkassa-aina-jo-pikkupoikana-han-opetteli-sotilasarvot-ja-leikki-pyssyilla-seka-puumiekoilla/</a>	02/12/2025
Reserviläinen A14	Reserviläinen website	<a href="https://reservilainen.fi/vuonna-1902-kutsunnoista-kieltäytyminen-oli-isanmaallinen-teko/">https://reservilainen.fi/vuonna-1902-kutsunnoista-kieltäytyminen-oli-isanmaallinen-teko/</a>	02/12/2025
Reserviläinen A15	Reserviläinen website	<a href="https://reservilainen.fi/voiko-maanpuolustuksesta-kertoa-viilteen-keinoin-komppania-ke-tonen-gustafsberg-alkaa-tvsta/">https://reservilainen.fi/voiko-maanpuolustuksesta-kertoa-viilteen-keinoin-komppania-ke-tonen-gustafsberg-alkaa-tvsta/</a>	02/12/2025

Ruotiväki CA1	Ruotiväki website	<a href="https://ruotuvaki.fi/-/ruotuvaki-paasi-seuraamaan-arkea-haminan-hiltonissa">https://ruotuvaki.fi/-/ruotuvaki-paasi-seuraamaan-arkea-haminan-hiltonissa</a>	02/12/2025
Ruotiväki CA2	Ruotiväki website	<a href="https://ruotuvaki.fi/-/potretti-toni-wirtanen">https://ruotuvaki.fi/-/potretti-toni-wirtanen</a>	02/12/2025
Ruotiväki CA3	Ruotiväki website	<a href="https://ruotuvaki.fi/-/miksi-puolustaa-suomea">https://ruotuvaki.fi/-/miksi-puolustaa-suomea</a>	02/12/2025
Ruotiväki CA4	Ruotiväki website	<a href="https://ruotuvaki.fi/-/yhdedssa-selvisimme">https://ruotuvaki.fi/-/yhdedssa-selvisimme</a>	02/12/2025
Ruotiväki CA5	Ruotiväki website	<a href="https://ruotuvaki.fi/-/kun-eurooppa-haastetaan-eurooppalainen-identiteettini-vahvistuu">https://ruotuvaki.fi/-/kun-eurooppa-haastetaan-eurooppalainen-identiteettini-vahvistuu</a>	02/12/2025
Ruotiväki CA6	Ruotiväki website	<a href="https://ruotuvaki.fi/-/jututtavatko-ihmiset-enaavarusmiehia">https://ruotuvaki.fi/-/jututtavatko-ihmiset-enaavarusmiehia</a>	02/12/2025
Ruotiväki CA7	Ruotiväki website	<a href="https://ruotuvaki.fi/-/marssiminen-vapauden-puolesta-jatkuu-varuskunnan-ulkopuolella">https://ruotuvaki.fi/-/marssiminen-vapauden-puolesta-jatkuu-varuskunnan-ulkopuolella</a>	02/12/2025
Ruotiväki CA8	Ruotiväki website	<a href="https://ruotuvaki.fi/-/intti-opetti-etta-riittaa-kun-tekee-parhaansa">https://ruotuvaki.fi/-/intti-opetti-etta-riittaa-kun-tekee-parhaansa</a>	02/12/2025
Ruotiväki CA9	Ruotiväki website	<a href="https://ruotuvaki.fi/-/alikersantti-johtaa-esimerkkia-nayttamalla">https://ruotuvaki.fi/-/alikersantti-johtaa-esimerkkia-nayttamalla</a>	02/12/2025
General Soldier Handbook	Finnish Defence Forces Website	<a href="https://puolustusvoimat.fi/asiointi/aineistot/ohjesaannot-ja-opaat">https://puolustusvoimat.fi/asiointi/aineistot/ohjesaannot-ja-opaat</a>	28/11/2025
Conscription Code of Conduct	Finnish Defence Forces Website	<a href="https://puolustusvoimat.fi/asiointi/aineistot/ohjesaannot-ja-opaat">https://puolustusvoimat.fi/asiointi/aineistot/ohjesaannot-ja-opaat</a>	28/11/2025

### *Euro-Atlanticist Domain Data*

Data Type	Data Collection Site	DCS URL	Date Accessed
Joint NATO Doctrine	Finnish Defence Forces Website	<a href="https://puolustusvoimat.fi/asiointi/aineistot/ohjesaannot-ja-opaat">https://puolustusvoimat.fi/asiointi/aineistot/ohjesaannot-ja-opaat</a>	27/11/2025
DCA Agreement	Puolustusministeriö Website	<a href="https://defmin.fi/en/areas-of-expertise/international-defence-cooperation/international-conventions/defence-cooperation-agreement-with-the-united-states-dca-#939f9b30">https://defmin.fi/en/areas-of-expertise/international-defence-cooperation/international-conventions/defence-cooperation-agreement-with-the-united-states-dca-#939f9b30</a>	4/12/2025
Government Defence Report on Security	Puolustusministeriö Website	<a href="https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/items/d0eaa6a1-5f35-402d-a452-440329eb27ee">https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/items/d0eaa6a1-5f35-402d-a452-440329eb27ee</a>	4/12/2025
Ruotiväki WA1	Ruotiväki Website	<a href="https://ruotuvaki.fi/-/jos-nato-ja-eu-menettaisivat-toimintakykynsa-olisimmepulassa">https://ruotuvaki.fi/-/jos-nato-ja-eu-menettaisivat-toimintakykynsa-olisimmepulassa</a>	4/12/2025

Ruotuväki WA3	Ruotuväki Website	<a href="https://ruotuvaki.fi/-/naton-artiklat-maarittelevat-liittouman-perusperiaatteet-ja-jasenvaltioiden-vastuut-puolustuksessa">https://ruotuvaki.fi/-/naton-artiklat-maarittelevat-liittouman-perusperiaatteet-ja-jasenvaltioiden-vastuut-puolustuksessa</a>	4/12/2025
Ruotuväki WA4	Ruotuväki Website	<a href="https://ruotuvaki.fi/-/eversti-kajanmaa-kertoi-kokemuksistaan-nato-esikunnassa-palvelemisesta">https://ruotuvaki.fi/-/eversti-kajanmaa-kertoi-kokemuksistaan-nato-esikunnassa-palvelemisesta</a>	4/12/2025
Ruotuväki WA6	Ruotuväki Website	<a href="https://ruotuvaki.fi/-/nain-vahvaa-puolustusyhteistyota-ei-suomen-ja-ruotsin-valilla-ole-ollut">https://ruotuvaki.fi/-/nain-vahvaa-puolustusyhteistyota-ei-suomen-ja-ruotsin-valilla-ole-ollut</a>	4/12/2025
Häkkinen Speech	Puolustusministeriö Website	<a href="https://defmin.fi/en/-/minister-of-defence-antti-hakkanen-s-speech-at-the-opening-of-nato-s-multi-corps-land-component-command-on-3-october-2025#939f9b30">https://defmin.fi/en/-/minister-of-defence-antti-hakkanen-s-speech-at-the-opening-of-nato-s-multi-corps-land-component-command-on-3-october-2025#939f9b30</a>	4/12/2025
Niinistö NATO Speech	Presidential Archive Website	<a href="https://www.presidentti.fi/niinisto/puheet/tasavallan-presidentti-sauli-niiniston-puhe-naton-liittymisseremoniassa-brysselissa-4-4-2023/index.html">https://www.presidentti.fi/niinisto/puheet/tasavallan-presidentti-sauli-niiniston-puhe-naton-liittymisseremoniassa-brysselissa-4-4-2023/index.html</a>	4/12/2025
Ulko- ja Turvallisuuspoliittinen Selonteko	Valtioneuvosto	<a href="https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/items/4c3ebc54-00a2-48ef-8a46-eadab8f2e70c">https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/items/4c3ebc54-00a2-48ef-8a46-eadab8f2e70c</a>	4/12/2025
Pres Speech A1	President of Finland Website	<a href="https://www.presidentti.fi/tasavallan-presidentti-alexander-stubbin-uudenvuodenpuhe-1-1-2025/">https://www.presidentti.fi/tasavallan-presidentti-alexander-stubbin-uudenvuodenpuhe-1-1-2025/</a>	4/12/2025
Pres Speech A2	President of Finland Website	<a href="https://www.presidentti.fi/niinisto/puheet/tasavallan-presidentti-sauli-niiniston-uudenvuodenpuhe-1-1-2024/index.html">https://www.presidentti.fi/niinisto/puheet/tasavallan-presidentti-sauli-niiniston-uudenvuodenpuhe-1-1-2024/index.html</a>	4/12/2025
Pres Speech A3	President of Finland Website	<a href="https://www.presidentti.fi/niinisto/puheet/tasavallan-presidentti-sauli-niiniston-uudenvuodenpuhe-1-1-2022/index.html">https://www.presidentti.fi/niinisto/puheet/tasavallan-presidentti-sauli-niiniston-uudenvuodenpuhe-1-1-2022/index.html</a>	4/12/2025
Pres Speech A4	President of Finland Website	<a href="https://www.presidentti.fi/niinisto/puheet/tasavallan-presidentti-sauli-niiniston-uudenvuodenpuhe-1-1-2023/index.html">https://www.presidentti.fi/niinisto/puheet/tasavallan-presidentti-sauli-niiniston-uudenvuodenpuhe-1-1-2023/index.html</a>	4/12/2025
Pres Speech A5	President of Finland Website	<a href="https://www.presidentti.fi/tasavallan-presidentti-alexander-stubbin-uudenvuodenpuhe-1-1-2025/">https://www.presidentti.fi/tasavallan-presidentti-alexander-stubbin-uudenvuodenpuhe-1-1-2025/</a>	4/12/2025

## 10.2. Appendix B: Code Book for Cultural Factors

Category	Cultural Factor	Definition	Inclusion	Exclusion
Identity	Credible and Trustworthy National Defence System	Self-understanding of Finland's national defence system as credible and trustworthy with	Descriptions of defence capability as core national trait with the primary task of defending Finland	State of national defence system as results of policy outcomes or reforms

		support from domestic audience.		
Identity	Collective Resilience (Sisu)	Resilience, endurance, societal robustness and strong will as an inherent characteristic of Finnish society.	In addition to using words in code, descriptions of Finns as hardworking, stable, and full of grit as a part of who we are. Especially if "sisu" used.	Collective resilience as a trained skill
Identity	Historical Victims of Russian Aggression	Allusions to conflicts and Cold War coercions by Russia shaping how Finns are today.	Narratives about victimhood, and survival	Assessments of how Russia is dangerous today without explicit allusion to the past
Identity	Patriotism	Prideful and positive descriptions about national belonging	Pride and patriotic spirit a natural part of being Finnish	Patriotism given as a reason to defend the country, as this is a value
Identity	Excellent Conscript System	Reputation of conscription system producing skilful, competent and legitimate citizen soldiers	Positive and pride based narratives about conscription service	Action based narratives about conscription service, technical discussions of training reforms
Identity	Contributing Ally	Role conception of Finland as an ally that is a security provider, not only consumer	Narratives/descriptions about what kind of ally Finland seeks to be	Alliance benefits for Finland,
Identity	Multilateral State	Role conception of Finland as a state that engages with multilateral institution as its a part of who they are	Multilateralism as inherent to who Finland is	Strategic endorsements of the multilateralism improving Finland's position in the world
Values	Commitment to Skills Development	Belief that developing individual and institutional skills is status enhancing	Moral or aspirational statements about the benefits and commitments to skills development	Simple descriptions about military exercises

Values	Consent Based NATO Service	Expresses that NATO-related tasks should be grounded in individual consent	Ideational reasoning about NATO task or service legitimacy	Formal rules governing participation
Values	International Military Cooperation Source for Learning	International military cooperation as valuable as it enables learning, and assessments of strengths	Statements emphasizing benefits of joint exercises, specifically in regards to Finnish self-development	Simple claims about exercises being "good"
Values	Moral Obligation of Every Finn to Defend the Nation	Deeply held belief that national defence is moral responsibility of every Finn, beyond legal requirements	Moral justifications of defence participation	Conscription laws,
Values	Preparedness and Calmness in Crises	Endurance, calmness, tolerance, and pragmatic problem-solving skills as social guidelines during crisis	Praises and reminders of how Finns should follow these characteristics in uncertain times	Operational procedures about crisis management
Values	Professional Excellence	Belief that high professional standards increase the groups legitimacy	Descriptions of what are professionalism ideals, and how they help the group build trust with the rest of society	Technical performance evaluations
Values	Right to Safety, Freedom, and Self-Determination	Political and fundamental rights that are labelled as important to uphold and defence	Listing any of these rights as important to defend	Listing these rights as characteristics about who we are
Values	"Stronger Together"	Belief that collective international defence produces greater security than past unilateral action. Special emphasis on how Finland wants to work together	Narratives about how Finland has pivoted towards the West. References of how the age of past unilateral resilience is over.	Talking of alliance in terms of operationally being able to overpower enemies
Value	High National Defence Willingness	Ideational underpinning about what Finland should be defended	Expression about pride of belonging to Finland and why its worth defending	Descriptions about technical capability strengthening without

				ideational motivating sentiments
Norms	Alliance Compatible Training Practices	Expected adjustments to training practices for better compatibility with NATO standards	References to how exercise conduct will be adjusted and soldier training curricular changes	Ideational or moral expressions about cooperation
Norms	Alliance Membership Not Substituting National Defence	Normative expectation that NATO membership will not replace national defence obligations	Narratives highlighting importance of article 3, and statements about national defence continuity along with NATO membership	NATO membership increasing Finland's defence
Norms	Increasing Joint Exercise Conduct	Expectation of that joint exercises will be more frequent as a part of normal military activity	Normative and behavioural expectations about current and future cooperation	Praise of increase being good as this is value
Norms	Joint Exercise conduct and Interoperability as normal	Joint military exercises and interoperability articulated as something that has occurred for a long time		
Norms	Infrastructural Development of National Defence Forces	Expectation that defence infrastructure is to be continuously developed	Statements about future investments and capability upgrades	
Norms	International Military Cooperation as Normalized	Highlighting how international cooperation has been a preferred mode of behaviour for a long time	Language that describes international military cooperation as normal and nothing out of the ordinary	Evaluations about the benefits of cooperation
Norms	Maintaining Strong National Defence Capability	Normative expectation that national defence system will not change in terms of funding or procedures	Statements describing a strong national defence capabilities as preferred course of action	Statements about alliance strengthening national defence capability

Norms	Participation in Crisis Management	Accepted behaviour of Finland contributing to crisis management operations	Expected contribution to missions, continuation of actions	Moral endorsements of peacekeeping
Norms	Good Leadership	Standards that guide appropriate leadership behaviour	Expectations, rules and opinions about good leadership conduct	
Norms	Soldier Discipline	Expected standards including, obedience and willingness to follow orders	Behavioural expectations in soldier handbooks, and speeches given by leaders	
Perceptual Lens	Changing Nature of Modern Warfare	How warfare is evolving technologically, strategically, and operationally	Explanations of hybrid warfare tactics and calls for Finland to adjust to this new strategic environment	
Perceptual Lens	EU as Strategic Political and Economic Partner	Perception of EU as a community based on political norms and values such as democracy, rule of law, peace and free market	Framing of the EU's primary function as a political and/or economic partner	EU being framed as security community
Perceptual Lens	Finland as an Upholder of Rule Based International Order	Perception that Finland's role in strategic environment is to uphold rule-based global system	Internal statements about Finland's role in the global system	Role being a vital characteristic of "who we are"
Perceptual Lens	Internationally Recognized Military Credibility	Perceptions that Finland is externally respected and viewed as militarily competent, credible and capable	References to international recognition	Internal narratives suggesting Finland is better than others
Perceptual Lens	NATO as a Stable Security Community	Worldview assuming that NATO is reliable, cohesive and tackles complex modern warfare problems, and increases Finland's Security	Descriptions about alliance stability, and NATO membership benefiting Finland.	
Perceptual Lens	Nordic States as Important	Perception that Nordic Countries are		

	Security Partners	trusted and important security partners		
Perceptual Lens	U.S. as Security Provider	Perception that US is central guarantor of security		
Perceptual Lens	Ukraine Fighting for Europe	Ukraine war representing a larger fight of fighting for European and Western values, and rule based international order	Praises about Ukrainian resilience if connected to how they are defending the rest of Europe	Narratives about how Finland wants to end the Ukraine war due to being a supporter of the rule based international order
Perceptual Lens	Revisionist Russia	Russia is a revisionist state that seeks to challenge the rule based world order, alter borders and gain more influence. Russia is a destabilizing actor.	Descriptions how Russia is a threat and destabilizing in differing arena’s such as cyberspace, hybrid warfare, disinformation, militarily etc	Narratives (especially historic ones) about how Finland will resist.

### 10.3. Appendix C: List of Robustness Questions

- How frequently did this cultural factor appear across multiple and diverse data sources?
- How enduring is this factor? Is it relatively new or an embedded aspect of historic belief or practice?
- How widely shared is this factor across cultural domains experienced by members of the group?
- To what extent is opinion or behavior that is in line with this factor rewarded and that is out of line punished?
- Is this cultural factor prominent within the discourse of key decisionmakers within the group?
- Is this cultural factor manifest in multiple ways across the IVNPL research categories?