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Satellite ground stations in the Arctic and High North are of strategic importance to NATO, given their ability to collect intelligence from space assets in polar Earth orbit. Commercial space infrastructure such as ground systems are increasingly dual-use, employed for both civilian and defense purposes. Their dual-use could cause them to become military targets. As such, commercial operators must strategically consider ground station placement to optimize for utility, while accounting for their security risk. This research presents a frame-work to assess the commercial satellite ground station security landscape by outlining security and performance tradeoffs given geographic location, including proximity to potential adversaries, and designates eight separate risk regions. Particularly, Sweden's and Finland's space infrastructure is of focus given their recent application to join NATO in the wake of Russian aggression. The paper concludes that, to secure ground stations and the assets and services that they enable, a comprehensive risk evaluation including positioning of ground stations is critical.

A 'hybrid space architecture' has been proposed to facilitate robust and resilient satellite data downlink, integration and analysis; however, the technical details for what may comprise a hybrid space architecture are severely lacking. Thus far, 'hybrid' principally entails the diversity of commercial providers. While diverse suppliers can contribute to hybrid space architectures, we argue that robustness and resilience will only be achieved through heterogeneous network and asset architectures. A connected satellite services ecosystem composed of the union of different networks with different characteristics would limit single points of failure, thereby generating high levels of redundancy, resilience and scalability. This research outlines parameters of a hybrid space architecture, documents satellite service reference architectures and provides a comparative analysis of the features for each architecture. Further, through a case study of existing satellite service providers, we propose how a hybrid space architecture could be piloted in Northern Europe and the High North.

As the Ground Station as a Service (GSaaS) paradigm transforms space infrastructure operations, new attack surface emerges for malicious actors. While the space community generally refers to GSaaS as a singular model, there are several flavors of these systems. After a description of the general GSaaS network's basic structure, this paper presents an analysis of four reference architectures of GSaaS. On the basis of this systems engineering analysis, a cybersecurity analysis of the critical nodes will be carried out through the attack tree method. Later the cybersecurity implication both of technical and strategic characteristic of GSaaS networks will be discussed and put in relation with the current state of space cyberwarfare landscape.

HALFLOOP-24 is a tweakable block cipher that is used to protect automatic link establishment messages in high frequency radio, a technology commonly used by government agencies and industries that need highly robust long-distance communications. We present the first public cryptanalysis of HALFLOOP-24 and show that HALFLOOP-24, despite its key size of 128 bits, is far from providing 128 bit security. More precisely, we give attacks for ciphertext-only, known-plaintext, chosen-plaintext and chosen-ciphertext scenarios. In terms of their complexities, most of them can be considered practical. However, in the real world, the amount of available data is too low for our attacks to work. Our strongest attack, a boomerang key-recovery, finds the first round key with less than 2¹⁰ encryption and decryption queries. In conclusion, we strongly advise against using HALFLOOP-24.

For the purpose of Technology Forecast 2022 five reports from the German Fraunhofer Institute were chosen by FMV (and SwAF) and given to the Department of Systems Science for Defence and Security to analyse and assess within the timeframe up to 2040.

The following research reports were reviewed by the working group at SEDU:

·       AI Hardware 

·       Explainable Artificial Intelligence

·       Human-Agent Teaming

·       Photonic Radar

·       Satellite Independent Navigation 

The aim of the Technology Forecast seminars and the finished product, this report, is to assess the potential military utility of the reviewed technologies and how they may contribute to the Swedish Armed Forces’ operational capabilities based on the presented concept(s) and scenario(s). 

The military utility is categorised by one of four assessments: Significant, Moderate, Negligible or Uncertain. 

The following technologies were assessed to potentially have significant military utility:

·       Explainable Artificial Intelligence

·       Human-Agent Teaming

·       Photonic Radar

The following technologies were assessed to have uncertain military utility:

·       AI Hardware 

·       Satellite Independent Navigation 

Many countries around the world are facing a shortage of healthcare resources, especially during the post-epidemic era, leading to a dramatic increase in the need for self-detection and self-management of diseases. The popularity of smart wearable devices, such as smartwatches, and the development of machine learning bring new opportunities for the early detection and management of various prevalent diseases, such as cardiovascular diseases, Parkinson’s disease, and diabetes. In this survey, we comprehensively review the articles related to specific diseases or health issues based on small wearable devices and machine learning. More specifically, we first present an overview of the articles selected and classify them according to their targeted diseases. Then, we summarize their objectives, wearable device and sensor data, machine learning techniques, and wearing locations. Based on the literature review, we discuss the challenges and propose future directions from the perspectives of privacy concerns, security concerns, transmission latency and reliability, energy consumption, multi-modality, multi-sensor, multi-devices, evaluation metrics, explainability, generalization and personalization, social influence, and human factors, aiming to inspire researchers in this field.

Over the last thirty years, suggestions for how to develop defence capability have developed rapidly. However, supporting theory and structured concept development lag behind. Despite this imbalance, countries need to continuously spend resources on defence development. This study identifies central challenges in relation to the scientific perspectives and approaches needed to support the development of defence capability. The results show that the support for developing interactions between technology and social components is especially weak and that relevant supporting theories and methods from related fields are not considered. This study also shows that it is important to be able to address these questions from various perspectives and not to be limited by a specific scientific tradition. Finally, this study also identifies a possible emerging cluster of reports on capability-related research that provide a base for a much-needed cross-disciplinary approach to the development of defence capability.

An extended number of people still risk their life today, while illegally crossing the Mediterranean and/or the Aegean Sea as part of an effort to reach a European country. Border management constitutes a crucial tool for effectively dealing with illegal and irregular migration via sea. However, migration and border management literature is lacking studies that address the genuine drivers of migrant crisisfrom a (geo)strategic viewpoint, or rely on the theoretical underpinning of border management from that same angle. This article aims to examine the root causes of a specific national security challenge currently faced by Greece and the EU in large part, namely mixed migratory flows in the Aegean Sea. It explores the theoretical(geo)strategic underpinning of border management at the external EU borders inthe Aegean Sea; merely desk research was used for the collection/analysis of the data. Relevant results suggest that (geo)strategic considerations provide improved understanding not only of the root causes of seaborne migration that are identified as heightened status of insecurity and extreme poverty in the States of origin, but also of strategy formulation in the field of border management at European and national level (Greek sea borders). Results are discussed in terms of existent (geo)strategic theories and models, with a special focus on the ‘strategic thinking in 3D’ framework, the ‘Heartland’ and ‘Rimland’ theses, as well as topographical features and demographics.The aim is to shed light on strategic thinking and planning in the wider domain of security and provide recommendations to improve the current situation.

Project Maven is an AI-induced information technology for military applications initiated by the United States Department of Defence (DoD) in 2017 and originally signed on to a civilian contractor, namely Google. However, this initiative raised massive resistance from a substantial amount of Google employees, eventually leading to the contract's annulation. This article uses narrative analysis to investigate enabling and constraining arguments of AI for military purposes that appeared in the debate following the public announcement of Project Maven. In addition, the article highlights the co-production of ethics, technology, and the complex issues that arise from civilian-military exchanges in technology development. Enabling arguments associated with consequentialist ethics are identified as narratives of accuracy and maintenance. Accuracy constitutes a guiding principle for saving civilian lives, while maintenance is directed at keeping the power balance intact. In contrast, constraining arguments proceed from deontological ethics that emphasize disengagement and ambivalence. Disengagement amplifies a civilian/military divide, while ambivalence exhibits conflicting views concerning the prospect of supplementing technological solutions that have the potential to contribute to war and civilian casualties. Conclusively, security narratives and technological storytelling are important aspects to consider since they hold a performative function that influences the framing and mobilization of security and technology development.

Based on a report made by the Swedish Higher Education Authority from 2017, which covered all of Sweden’s 47 higher education institutions, this paper examines the work with sustainable development at universities. The text also gives suggestions on how the area could be developed for those institutions in higher education that have not yet measured up to the criteria for successful sustainability work. The analysis bases its findings on the Swedish National Defense University as a case and a representative for a smaller university but identifies general lessons that are applicable to other universities. The text also identifies lessons from current pedagogical research in higher education and highlights success factors taken from three other higher education institutions that have received high ratings for their sustainability work. The universities that have been successful in this work show that integrating a sustainability approach initially in the daily operations does not have to include all aspects of sustainable development in business planning and education. On the other hand, the aim must be clearly set on a holistic and interdisciplinary approach, where education for sustainability initially creates a base from where issues that are more complex can be included, and generate education specifically aimed at promoting sustainable development.

Heightened political tensions and advances in technological development have prompted Scandinavian countries to increase investment in military research and capability development. The aim of this study is to gain a better understanding of why actors sharing similar strategic cultures implement new technology for military purposes differently. The research is founded on a cognitive-psychological perspective comparing two cases of innovation processes: Swedish nuclear weapons development during the Cold War and developments in Swedish cyber defence during the first decades of the 21st century. The main finding is that military innovation is better explained through a consideration of shared mental models of new technology than it is through a consideration of strategic cultures. The analysis shows there are implications for capability development. First, military innovation processes are only initiated if and when new technology appears militarily relevant to an actor; thus, the ability to correctly assess the military relevance of technology at an early stage is crucial. Second, the forming of shared mental models can both contribute to and counteract military innovation and, thus, decision-makers need to be aware both that mental models can be shared and that confirmation bias affects actors on a collective level. Third, it is likely that military innovation processes benefit from mental models being challenged and from diverging mental models being made evident. Consequently, it is good practice, also from this study’s perspective, to diversify and welcome different views on the use of new technology. Further studies are solicited in order to develop practical guidelines.

Fewer qualified platforms and reduced personnel within the navy are the reality for many nations, although operational requirements might have remained the same or increased over time. At the same time, research is advancing in unmanned and autonomous systems, which have also found application in military use. Therefore, navies need to develop approaches for effective technological transformation. To fulfil this need, this study aims to identify and describe the relevant research from different disciplines and their respective relation to the design of future navies. The study commences with a literature review related to knowledge support for understanding how emerging technologies, such as maritime autonomous systems (MAS), find their place in a military organisation. The findings suggest that the armed forces should be categorised as a sociotechnical system, built of systems-of-systems that together enable capability, and that it is as a capability enforcer that the overall system should be developed. This highlights the importance of structural and organisational changes in making the best use of the technology, as well as in making the sociotechnical system as efficient as possible. Therefore, the armed forces need to be learning organisations, exercising joint planning, where there is room for knowledge sharing and flexibility within the organisation despite different hierarchical layers.

The COVID-19 pandemic has had drastic effects on societies around the world. Due to restrictions or recommendations, companies, industries and residents experienced changes in their routines and many people shifted to working from home. This led to alterations in electricity consumption between sectors and changes in daily patterns. Understanding how various properties and features of load patterns in the electricity network were affected is important for forecasting the network's ability to respond to sudden changes and shocks, and helping system operators improve network management and operation. In this study, we quantify the extent to which the COVID-19 pandemic has led to shifts in the electricity consumption patterns of different sectors in Sweden. The results show that working from home during the pandemic has led to an increase in the residential sector's total consumption and changes in its consumption patterns, whereas there were only slight decreases in the industrial sector and relatively few changes in the public and commercial sectors. We discuss the reasons for these changes, the effects that these changes will have on expected future electricity consumption patterns, as well as the effects on potential demand flexibility in a future where working from home has become the new norm.

Within the globalization era, the conduct, resolution, and impact of international conflicts are frequently not limited solely to the belligerent states involved. Conflict influences distant countries and often illustrates the vulnerability of sea access to the security of coastal and landlocked nations, by factoring in that: import/export commodities are impacted; access to vital energy resources is undermined; and/or international resource distribution is threatened. Therefore, the maritime domain (and its military, legal, and commercial components) represents a Russia/Ukraine conflict cornerstone and the epicenter of this analysis. This conflict highlights maritime trade importance and re-establishes the strategic significance of protecting multi-polarity, the “rule of law”, and freedom of the seas within the Black Sea region (BSR), which today represents a very large concentration of power (involving actors like Russia, USA, NATO, EU) and has been the site of ten post-Cold War conflicts. Resultantly, maritime domain objectives and tactical events (on, above, and below the seas) require detailed analysis as hostilities continue, the norms and principles of international law are threatened and/or undermined, and prospective combat end-state(s) are considered. Such will define Russia’s and Ukraine’s future(s), as well as economic-diplomatic stability and the future of rules based international order across the BSR, which is a vital maritime transport corridor.

Amidst increasing maritime emphasis, this conflict also illustrates transformational warfighting facets. In addition to troops, ships, and aircraft, modern battlefields now include issues like: Information Warfare outlets; “lawfare”; cyber threats; and adversaries with unprecedented Artificial Intelligence capabilities. The international community must acknowledge these skills yield warfighting capability to nations lacking capacity. As naval warfare equipment and tactics change, protecting sea lanes, preventing maritime hegemony, and upholding the “rule of law”,  -and are enhanced by globalization.

This chapter analyses the evolution of technological tools to improve port and maritime security, in relation to relevant regulations for their effective use and implementation on board ships and port facilities, based on the legal provisions established under the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. New technology applications can contribute to reducing security threats at sea. However, international regulations and national laws are not reformed at the same speed as the evolution of technological innovation in ships and other sea-going vessels. The slow reform of regulations and laws is delaying the benefits that novel solutions might bring to the maritime industry and to the whole world in terms of maritime security. In this chapter, the authors introduce a limited number of technology applications instruments, with the use of Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (AUV) systems, similar to those used for inspection and maintenance, but combined with sensors to strengthen port and maritime security and, at the same time reduce the illegal trafficking of drugs. Desk research and relevant selected literature from this wide research field were used for the collection/analysis of the data and identification of a suitable solution. The authors suggest changes to the ISPS Code to standardize such equipment on board vessels, equating its need and significance to the Automatic Identification System (AIS), or the Long-Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT), to counter drug traffic by sea threats of the type of packages affixed to the bulbous bow of vessels, which is quite common, especially in the Latin-American region. Finally, outline future trends in drug detection on board vessels due to continuous technical improvement, which is also used by criminal ring organizations, arguing that in the same way as transnational organized crime is adapting and implementing innovative technology, governments and international organizations must also follow this adaptability to deter such security threats and improve the security of ports and oceans.