Logo: to the web site of the Swedish Defence University

While traditional and non-traditional issues of security are at the very top of the policy agenda, security studies has been subject to much criticism. These concerns have often been framed in terms of challenges to the field’s relevance. This paper seeks to further the debate on relevance in security studies. Specifically, the paper examines the field in three major dimensions of relevance: responsiveness, diversity, and intellectual pluralism. Unlike previous disciplinary investigations, which have solely focused on United States (US) security studies, this paper examines trends pertaining to relevance in security studies in the USA as well as in Europe. The paper finds some evidence of responsiveness, a slight trend toward a more equitable share of female authors, and conflicting evidence when it comes to intellectual pluralism. The paper suggests that the field appears more as a ‘broad church’ than ‘irrelevant cult’ when its output in the USA, as well as in Europe, is taken into account.

This article contributes to an understanding of the backlash against liberalism by reconstructing the emergence and development of an increasingly influential strand of Anglo-American thought that challenges liberalism, known as postliberalism. The central diagnostic claim of postliberalism is that the two dominant forms of post-WW2 liberalism, market liberalism and social liberalism, instead of being somehow opposed, have coalesced around an all-encompassing sociopolitical project that above all else seeks to maximize individual autonomy. As a result, postliberals hold, the liberal order has become increasingly unable to cultivate the communal resources on which human sociability depends and erodes the values liberalism purportedly defends. The article argues that a central, albeit not necessarily insurmountable, challenge for postliberalism lies in moving from a critique of liberalism to proposed remedies for its perceived deficiencies, without slipping into a political project with clear illiberal rather than merely non-liberal implications.

Concerns raised over the impact of changing demographics, domestic polarization, and the return of near-peer competition on US military manpower challenges are overstated. Drawing on open-source materials and interviews, this article discusses factors often neglected in conversations on this topic and provides leadership and policymakers with a scholarly overview of an important yet understudied issue facing the US armed forces.

This chapter analyses if the EU is developing a defence union, and what that would imply for the EU. In order to analyse the development of EU defence policy since 2016, this chapter first discusses what measures would need to be in place in order for the EU to have a defence union, given previous literature on defence union. Then it analyses the development from 2016 to 2022. The conclusion is that the EU so far has not developed a defence union, even though the traits of union in EU security and defence policy have increased. In particular, three aspects found are of importance. The first is the European Defence Fund, the second the common capability development, that in combination with islands of specialization increase future possibilities of specialization and burden sharing; and the third some of the PESCO-projects which indicate defence of the member states within their own territory.

Departing from Russia’s full-scale invasion in Ukraine in 2022, this article analyses the OSCE-based security order that prevailed since the Cold War and that later was formalised in the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. The first conclusion is that the OSCE-based European security order was successively weakened, and at the longest can be said to have functioned until 2014. The second conclusion is that this security order will not reappear even if the OSCE survives the consequences of the war. The article then analyses the partially parallel development of the EU as a security actor in Europe, and the potential of the EU to become a node in a new European security order. The third and fourth conclusions are that the EU has the potential of being a node in a new European security order, but that it will also need to become a node in a larger global order.

Genetic technologies are revolutionizing human health. In parallel, geopolitical instability has prompted renewed discussions on the risks of DNA technology being weaponized in international conflict. With today’s changing security environment, we argue that risk assessments must be broadened from genetically targeted weapons to a series of new domains.

This year marks the 75th anniversary of what the UN itself understands to be its first peacekeeping operation. It is therefore an appropriate time to reflect on the track record of UN peacekeeping in its efforts to try to maintain and realize peace and security. Moreover, this milestone invites us to ponder what lies ahead in the realm of peacekeeping. For this reason, this forum article brings together both academics and UN officials to assess the achievements and challenges of UN peacekeeping over the past 75 years. Through a dialogue among peacekeeping scholars and practitioners, we hope to identify current trends and developments in UN peacekeeping, as well as explore priorities for the future to improve the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations in terms of achieving their mandate objectives, such as maintaining peace, protecting civilians, promoting human rights, and facilitating reconciliation. This forum article is structured into six thematic sections, each shedding light on various aspects of UN peacekeeping: (1) foundational principles of UN peacekeeping - namely, consent, impartiality, and the (non-)use of force; (2) protection of civilians; (3) the primacy of politics; (4) early warning; (5) cooperation with regional organizations; and (6) the changing geopolitical landscape in which UN peacekeeping operates.

This article seeks to theorize the transformation of the armed forces in Northern Europe by examining its drivers during previous NATO enlargements in the region. The exploration includes the German reunification in 1990, the Polish entry in 1999, and the joining of the three Baltic States, i.e., Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, in 2004. Based on these experiences, the article identifies some theoretical considerations for transformation in conjunction with the current accession process of Finland and Sweden. Based on a realist logic, we conclude that the ongoing transformation should be underpinned by a new operational design, hence considering the need for flexibility and for managing potential new expeditionary shocks. To this end, we argue that the focus must initially be internally within the Alliance, i.e., to proceed with novel operational planning for northern Europe before turning the attention to the transformation of the armed forces of the new members.

Scholars of Strategic Studies have seldom problematized the concept of military strategy beyond identifying the three elements constituting the phenomenon, that is ends, means and ways. Moreover, we see a need for contextualizing the presumably universal conceptualization of military strategy. This article contributes to previous research by operationalize each of the three elements one-step further, thereby introducing an analytical framework for systematic comparisons of states’ different priorities regarding military strategy. Additionally, in order to explain these different priorities, the proposed analytical framework introduces tools related to both relative power and position in the international system, and to regional systems and unit-level characteristics. The usefulness of the analytical framework is illustrated by a summary of some of our findings from a research project on comparative strategy including more than 30 states.

This book analyses how and to what extent ex-communist states have adjusted their defence strategies since joining the EU and NATO, and how differences and similarities between their strategies can be explained.

Between 1999 and 2013, four phases of enlargement took place when the European Union (EU) and NATO allowed 11 new former communist states to enter both organisations. These states share some common attributes and experiences related to strategic culture and common experiences during the Cold War era that can potentially explain similarities in behaviour and preferences among them. However, the strategic adjustments among these states are far from uniform. In an effort to explain these differences, the book introduces three intervening variables: (1) differences in relative power and position in the international system, (2) national geographical characteristics; and (3) historical experiences related to formative periods of state-building processes as well as wars and armed conflicts. Empirically, the book strives to present and analyse the defence strategies of each of the new allies by conducting a structured focused comparison of official strategic documents from the twenty-first century for each of the 11 cases. Theoretically and methodologically, it introduces an analytical framework enabling us to explain both similarities and differences in the formulation of the strategies of the 11 states, and to shed light on their external and internal efforts to promote their strategic interest by operationalising the dependent variable - defence strategy. The analytical framework combines elements of structural realism with classical realism, and constructivist research on unit-level characteristics related to relative power and perceptions of strategic exposure.

This book will be of much interest to students of strategic studies, European Union policy, NATO and International Relations in general.

The war in Ukraine unleashed in early 2022 may temporarily obscure the long-term trend that the United States is shrinking its military footprint in and around Europe, as the defence posture of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in Central Europe suddenly was bolstered by tens ofthousands of additional US troops. For as long as the war drags on, certainly, these reinforcements will stay in place. But if, and when, the war ends or shifts to attrition warfare stretching out for years, aswas the case after the 2014 annexation of the Crimea, one can easily envisage changes in how European governments manage security and defence issues among themselves and in relation to their North American counterparts. While the debate on transatlantic security so far has played out in two distinct modes, either focusing on the economic side of burdensharing or projecting a vision of European strategic autonomy, there is a need for a more sober understanding of the future division of labour, one that would be grounded in the right blend of economics and deterrence. The main suggestion of this article is that stakeholders on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean ‘split the difference’ and strike a new grand bargain on the basis of their respective strengths. Once key issues of financial equity and militarydeterrence have been adequately addressed, European governments will still have their work cut out forthemselves. They must elaborate solutions to specific challenges at the sub-strategic theatre level and atthe same time navigate the complexities of optimizing defence reforms, aligning regional force designs and rendering foreign policy compatible with the strategic priorities of the European Union (EU) and Europe at large.

This article examines Sweden’s successful 2016 bid to serve at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and shows that the subsequent 2017–18 tenure relied on a formula with three key elements. One was to mobilize the competitive advantages of its Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and a second to systematically highlight Africa-related priorities. A third element was to boost the standing of the E10 category of members in day-to-day diplomatic practice. After securing a plurality of votes in the General Assembly, Swedish diplomats went to work with a unique constellation of concurrently serving likeminded countries, generally receptive to Stockholm’s priorities. The formula appears to have contributed to a solid performance in 2017–2018. That said, the UNSC is not conducive to individual E10 members having a lasting impact on its institutional memory.

More than three decades since the fall of the Soviet Union, several conflicts over territory and political influence in Eastern Europe persist. This volume gathers new empirical and conceptual perspectives on the situation regarding security and human rights in the EU's eastern neighborhood. The first part of this volume consists of five articles, detailing the origins and recent developments in the conflict areas of Donbas (Ukraine), Transnistria (Moldova), Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia), and Nagorno-Karabakh (Armenia and Azerbaijan). The second part provides a comparative perspective, focusing on the implications of protracted conflicts for European security, the OSCE, and international law. The articles analyze the regional context, explain the role of regional powers such as Russia, Turkey, and the EU, and provide clear policy recommendations regarding conflict resolution and accountability.

Research problems are crucial in the sense that they provide new research with purpose and justification. So why, despite the abundance of guidance available from an extensive methods literature, do graduate students often struggle to develop compelling research problems? This article argues that the process of developing research problems epitomises the insecurity of doing research. We focus in particular on the anxiety that graduate students often seek to avoid or alleviate through a range of counterproductive coping strategies. The existing literature on research problems focuses predominantly on the technical aspects of doing research while neglecting how anxiety might affect the research process. This article seeks to rectify this shortcoming by providing advice on how graduate students can face such anxiety, and how professors can assist them in this endeavour. Drawing on theories about identity and anxiety, the article explains the allure of coping strategies such as gap-filling, while arguing that anxiety is not necessarily a negative emotion to be avoided at all costs, but integral to learning and creativity. It concludes by suggesting that compelling research problems can be constructed through the formulation of narratives that try to embrace anxiety, instead of seeking premature resolutions. 

International relations research acknowledges that states can have different security policies but neglects the fact that ‘models’ may exist in the security policy realm. This article suggests that it is useful to think about models, which it argues can become examples for emulation or be undermined through narrative power. It illustrates the argument by analysing Japan’s pacifism—an alternative approach to security policy which failed to become an internationally popular model and, despite serving the country well for many years, has even lost its appeal in Japan. Conventional explanations suggest that Japan’s pacifist policies were ‘abnormal’, and that the Japanese eventually realized this. By contrast, this article argues that narratives undermined Japan’s pacifism by mobilizing deep-seated beliefs about what is realistic and unrealistic in international politics, and launches a counter-narrative that could help make pacifism a more credible model in world politics.

What explains Japan’s security policy change in recent decades? Heeding the ‘emotional turn’ in International Relations, this article applies a resentment-based framework, which defines resentment as a long-lasting form of anger and the product of status dissatisfaction. Leveraging interviews with 18 conservative Japanese lawmakers and senior officials, the article discusses the role, function, and prevalence of resentment in the remaking of Japan’s security policy, premised on constitutional revision. The analysis reveals that conservative elites are acutely status-conscious; and that those who blame a perceived inferior status on Japan’s alleged pacifism are more likely to see revision of Article 9 as an end in itself. For a subset of conservatives, however, the goal is rather to stretch the Constitution to enhance Japan’s means of deterrence vis-à-vis objects of fear or in solidarity with allies. Overall, the article demonstrates that resentment provides a fruitful lens for analyzing status dissatisfaction in international politics. 

This essay takes literature laureate Kenzaburo Oe’s Nobel lecture from 1994, Japan, the Ambiguous, and Myself, as a point of departure for thinking about Japan, the ambiguous and how the already fragile and complex narrator that is I has evolved ambiguously over time in relation to a similarly ambiguous and changing imagination of Japan. Based on aikido practice—the narrator’s gateway to Japan—the essay ends up proposing a different understanding of and approach to ambiguity to Oe’s.

In the final analysis, is the security dilemma inescapable? Or can the protagonists in world politics learn to live with never-ending insecurities and the risk of attack without producing precisely the outcomes that they wish to avoid? This article explores this fundamental problem for International Relations theory by performing a thought experiment, in which it applies lessons from aikido to world politics. A form of Japanese budo, or martial art, aikido provides practitioners with a method for harbouring insecurities, and for dealing with attacks that may or may not occur, by empathically caring for actual and potential attackers. The article builds on practice theory in assuming that any social order is constructed and internalised through practices, but also capable of change through the introduction and dissemination of new practices. Although an unlikely scenario, aikido practice could serve as such a method of fundamental transformation if widely applied in world politics. Empirical examples ranging from international apologies and security cooperation to foreign aid and peacekeeping operations are discussed, suggesting that contemporary world politics is at times already performed in accordance with aikido principles, albeit only imperfectly and partially.

‘Othering’ – the view or treatment of another person or group as intrinsically different from and alien to oneself – is a central concept in the International Relations literature on identity construction. It is often portrayed as a fairly singular and predominantly negative form of self/Other differentiation. During the first months of the COVID-19 pandemic, Sweden at first glance emerged as exactly such a negative Other. This article problematises such a view of Othering. Departing from a narrative analysis of news reporting on Sweden’s management of COVID-19 in the United States, Germany and the Nordic states, the article proposes an ideal type model with four forms of Othering – emotional, strategic, analytic and nuanced – not recognised in previous research. These types differ in their treatment of the Other as more or less significant and in involving a more or less self-reflexive construction of the self. Although narratives in all these settings drew on previously established narratives on Sweden, they followed different logics. This has implications for our understanding of Sweden as an Other in the time of COVID-19, as well as of self/Other relations in International Relations more broadly.

Expert manuals play an increasingly important role on the development of international law into new areas and environments. While not formally a source of law themselves, their influence on those involved in the development and construction of more formal sources of law takes place on multiple levels and in a variety of ways. This contribution explores some of the different elements that effect the influence these manuals wield. The selection of experts, their qualifications, diversity and ability to adapt to new environments and technological domains is a core components of this influence. Likewise the methodology used by the manual, the attempt to separate lex lata from lex ferenda and the method of representing differing views within the group will all have an impact on its subsequent influence. Manuals will continue to play a valuable role in the development of international law, by influencing the decision of policy makers, treaty negotiators and others, particularly in an era characterised by lack of agreement between states and stagnation of formal law making processes in emerging domains.

Seventy-five years after a US tribunal in Nuremberg acquitted Lothar Rendulic of devastating and forcibly evacuating Northern Norway, the Rendulic Rule stands firmly in international law. This concluding chapter summarises the anthology’s main historical, legal, and military-ethical findings. It provides an overview of the historical developments that culminated in the scorched earth tactics applied by the retreating German 20th Mountain Army under Rendulic’s command. It then discusses the preparations and legal peculiarities of the trial, as well as reactions to the judgment. The chapter shows that the case against Rendulic is arguably the wrong foundation for the no second-guessing rule, since he did not consider the complete devastation of Northern Norway and the forcible evacuation of its entire civilian population militarily necessary. Although the Rendulic Rule rests on meagre legal forensics, it has acquired legal significance in primary rules of conduct in the shape of the reasonable commander test in international humanitarian law and the mistake of fact defence in international criminal law. Numerous domestic, regional, and international courts and tribunals have applied the rule that nowadays has a strong legal standing. Yet, despite rapidly evolving military and information technology, reasonableness, empathy, and (institutional) bias in combat remain challenging issues

This book marks the 75th anniversary of the 1948 Hostage Case in which a US military tribunal in Nuremberg acquitted General Lothar Rendulic of devastating Northern Norway on account of his honest factual error. The volume critically reappraises the law and facts underlying his trial, the no second-guessing rule in customary international humanitarian law (IHL) that is named after the general himself, and the assessment of modern battlefield decisions.

Using recently discovered documents, this volume casts major doubts on Rendulic’s claim that he considered the region’s total devastation and the forcible evacuation of all of its inhabitants imperatively demanded by military necessity at the time. This book’s analysis of archival and court records reveals how the tribunal failed to examine relevant facts or explain the Rendulic Rule’s legal origin. This anthology shows that, despite the Hostage Case’s ambiguity and occasional suggestions to the contrary, objective reasonableness forms part of the reasonable commander test under IHL and the mistake of fact defence under international criminal law (ICL) to which the rule has given rise. This collection also identifies modern warfare’s characteristics—human judgment, de-empathetic battlespace, and institutional bias—that may make it problematic to deem some errors both honest and reasonable. The Rendulic Rule embodies an otherwise firmly established admonition against judging contentious battlefield decisions with hindsight. Nevertheless, it was born of a factually ill-suited case and continues to raise significant legal as well as ethical challenges today.

The most comprehensive study of the Rendulic Rule ever to appear in English, this multi-disciplinary anthology will appeal to researchers and practitioners of IHL and ICL, as well as military historians and military ethicists and offers ground-breaking new research.

Seventy-five years have passed since Hostage, a post-World War II case in which Lothar Rendulic was acquitted of Northern Norway’s devastation and forcible evacuation on account of his faulty yet honest judgment. This introductory chapter surveys the current state of our knowledge about honest errors in modern combat decision-making by synthesising the findings of the anthology’s contributing authors. First, contemporaneous sources suggest that Rendulic did not consider it militarily necessary to devastate the region in its entirety or to evacuate all of its residents by force. Second, even though Rendulic’s acquittal was factually contentious, it was arguably on firmer legal ground. His case has led to the emergence of an eponymous rule against second-guessing difficult combat decisions, the reasonable commander test in international humanitarian law and the mistake of fact defence in international criminal law. Third, assessing the reasonableness of battlefield errors remains challenging because of the limitations of modern information technology, the diminishing room for empathy in the soldierly profession, and the salience of institutional bias.

This paper presents a Kelsenian perspective on international pluralism showing that international pluralism is not necessarilythe logical consequence of sovereignty but bestowed upon states by international law through the principle of equality. Thepaper argues that this leads to an improved concept of international pluralism as more than a by-product of sovereignty logic.Flowing from Kelsenian legal logic, international pluralism and legal cosmopolitanism share the same origin in theGrundnorm.Hence, this perspective on international relations appeases the perceived conflict between international pluralism andcosmopolitanism. Moreover, the paper suggests that the approach provides a different framework for analyzing internationalnorms and practices, their normative relationship and evolution

This article contributes to the literature theorizing military social order, embodiment, and resistance in IR. The military institution is known to resist change, and much research have been devoted to challenges to the gendered order of the military. One area that has received little attention, however, is the reluctance of many militaries in the West to facilitate veganism during service in spite of the increasing demand for vegan food options, diversity, and sustainability. Drawing on research on the military social order and gender theory, I conduct an unpacking of conflicting elements and representations of military and vegan bodies, and theorize this reluctance as institutional resistance. Typically, the military does not offer motivations for its stance – which makes it difficult to detect and counter. As a consequence, vegans are silenced and excluded, not facilitated to enter the military. This is a challenge to increasing attempts at governing sustainability and diversity in the military.

Kriget i Ukraina har redan fått många återverkningar, även i samhällen som inte direkt skakas av de fruktansvärda krigshandlingarna. I traditionella och sociala medier funderar människor kring vad som skulle hända om det blev krig i Sverige och hur detta skulle påverka vår vardag och våra relationer. En ofta förbisedd fråga i detta sammanhang är relationen mellan människor och djur. I denna artikel diskuteras hur totalförsvaret som samhällsorganisation och verksamhet kan utmanas av 2020-talets normer om förhållandet mellan människor och djur och djurs status som säkerhetssubjekt. Mot bakgrund av den traditionella totalförsvarstanken presenterar vi ett antal områden där djurens relationer med människor kan tänkas väcka frågor och komma i konflikt med delar av totalförsvaret: synen på säkerhet, juridiken i kris och krig samt utvecklingen av den sociala relationen mellan människor och djur. Artikeln avslutas med tankar kring hur ett totalförsvar som inkluderar djur skulle kunna se ut samt kring hur dagens totalförsvar i så fall skulle behöva förändras.

Although concern about the effects of international audiences consuming Russian state-sponsored media has been expressed, little empirical research examines this. The current study asks how audiences in Latvia respond to narratives projected by Sputnik Latvia – a Kremlin-financed news outlet. We begin a tripartite methodological approach with an analysis of the types of narratives the outlet projects. We then test how ethnic Latvian and Russian-speaking participants in Latvia respond to destruction narratives that portray Latvia as “failing,” the most prominent type in our analysis. We use two survey experiments that test an existing hypothetical mediation model predicting an array of affective and trust responses. We find evidence that exposure to destruction narratives triggered largely similar responses in both groups; however, exploratory analyses and post-survey focus groups are used to show that their motivations may be different. We conclude by discussing potential reasons for these differences, and the ramifications of these results.

Russia utilizes state-sponsored news media outlets, such as RT or Sputnik, to project antagonistic strategic narratives into targeted societies and perturb international audiences. While psychological responses to this conduct are frequently assumed, there is a lack of causal evidence demonstrating this. Using a transdisciplinary perspective, we conducted four survey experiments that tested two path models predicting possible cognitive and emotional responses to two narrative strategies that Russian state-sponsored media employ: destruction, which portrays a state as weak and chaotic, and suppression, which portrays a state as indecent and morally deviant. The experiments had between-participant designs, where participants read either an article demonstrating a strategy or a control text, and then indicated their responses to several trust and emotional variables. Participants were either Swedish or Dutch citizens, to build on previous analyses of Russian narration about Sweden and The Netherlands. Path analyses revealed significant differences between the conditions on several response variables. However, we found no evidence that these effects were mediated by generalized realistic or symbolic threat perceptions. We contribute preliminary insights into potential causal links between Russian antagonistic narrative strategies and specific psychological responses. This study, and its overarching research agenda, should have implications for practitioners seeking to counter Russian information influence.

Traditionally, international humanitarian law (IHL) is conceptualized as a body of mutually binding, horizontal international legal rules that are agreed upon by States and that govern the relationships between parties to armed conflicts. Yet, there is discernible evidence that contemporary IHL – and the broader normative environment that pertains to the regulation of armed conflicts in which it is situated – is incorporating elements of unilateralization, manifested in legal and non-legal norms that regulate armed conflicts taking the form of commitments whose validity is not dependent on being reciprocated. This article examines some of the systemic implications of unilateralization of IHL and considers its pitfalls and potential.

This book proposes a normative framework specifically designed for the complex and legally uncertain time period between armed conflicts and peace. As such, it contributes both to the furthering of a jus post bellum framework, and to enhanced legal clarity in complex and legally uncertain environments. This, in turn, contributes to strengthened protection engagements, and thus to improved prospects of enabling sustainable peace and security in both national and international perspectives.

The book offers a novel but pursuasive argument for a legal framework specific for transitional environments. Such legal framework, it is argued, is warranted in order to enable legal clarity to contemporary and outstanding legal issues, as well as to furthering peace efforts in complex environments. The research draws uniquely on both conteporary legal concerns and issues, and on peace and security research. It does so in order to enable a legal analysis that is both legally sound as well as appropriate and adequate in today's peace and security environments.

The book provides a valuable resource for academics, researchers and policy-makers in the areas of Public International Law, International Humanitarian Law, International Human Rights Law, (the law of) Peace Operations, and Peace and Security Studies.