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  • 1.
    Ekström, Thomas
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Joint Warfare Division, Operational Functions Section.
    There is no "A" in CD&E, Neither for Analysis nor for Anarchy: Ensuring Scientific Rigour and Analytical Structure While Maintaining Military Relevance and Artistic Freedom2019In: Advances in Defence Analysis, Concept Development and Experimentation: Innovation for the Future / [ed] Bianca Barbu, David Martin, Lora Hadzhidimova, Norfolk, Virginia, USA: NATO - Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander Transformation , 2019, p. 22-60Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 2.
    Ekström, Thomas
    et al.
    Swedish Defence Research Agency, Kista, Sweden.
    Skoglund, Per
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Joint Warfare Division, Operational Functions Section.
    Ström, Mats
    Swedish Defence Materiel Administration, Stockholm, Sweden.
    An optimised defence supply system: Defining the principles2017In: NOFOMA 2017 - The 29th NOFOMA Conference: ”Taking on grand challenges” / [ed] Hellström, Daniel; Kembro, Joakim; Bodnar, Hajnalka, Lund: Lund University , 2017, p. 761-763Conference paper (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Purpose

    The purpose of   this paper is to describe the first step in the process of optimising the   Swedish defence supply system. The first step entails defining principles for   distribution and storage.

    Design/methodology/approach

    The research   builds on literature reviews, archival records, Swedish military documents,   participatory observation at FMV and in the Swedish Armed Forces Head   Quarters, study visits to military units, presentations by Subject Matter   Experts (SMEs), and war gaming.

    Principles from   business logistics and Supply Chain Management (SCM) were identified and   analysed in order to assess their applicability in the Swedish military   context. Similarly, military logistics principles from other nations (US and   UK), as well as from multinational organisations (UN, NATO, and EU), were   identified and analysed. Finally, current and past Swedish logistics   principles from guiding documents and military practise were also identified.  

    Findings

    The newly dawned   political attention to operational effect, operational capabilities,   availability and preparedness must lead to a shift of paradigm in defence   logistics. Military logistics must move from the prevailing focus on   effectiveness and efficiency in production logistics to an effect based   operational logistics, supported by an effective and efficient production   logistics. This means that new military logistics principles must be applied.   The conducted research has suggested a set of new principles for distribution   and storage.

    The working group has identified and analysed principles in business logistics and SCM, as well as domestic and international principles in military logistics. The working group has found that there is no established set of principles that in and by itself meets the requirements for designing an optimised system for storage and distribution which satisfies the goal and the constraints. The working group has therefore selected principles from different sources and augmented these with a couple of principles constructed by the working group.

    The working group   proposes that the following principles should be established for distribution   and storage in the Swedish defence supply chain:

    •   Primacy   of operational requirements – It is the requirements of the operational   commander that must be satisfied.
    •   Adapted   protection – The requirements for protection must be considered in the   selection of system for distribution and storage.
    •   Categorisation,   segmentation and differentiation – Supplies should be categorised and   segmented, and the treatment of segments should be differentiated.
      •   Strategic   supplies should always be stored in sufficient quantities and volumes in   order to ensure initial availability and sustainability until external   delivery can be guaranteed.
      •   Risk   supplies should always be stored in sufficient quantities and volumes in   order to ensure initial availability and initial sustainability.
      •   Certain   leverage supplies may require storage to a certain degree in order not to   jeopardise initial availability and initial sustainability.
      •   Generally,   it is not necessary to store routine supplies.
      •   Storage   close to military units – Limiting supplies should be stored close to the   military units in order to ensure initial availability and initial   sustainability for activated and mobilised military units.
      •   Storage   close to the area of operations – Reserve supplies should be stored close to   the envisioned areas of operations in order to ensure operational   sustainability.
      •   The   requirement for redistribution and dispersion in higher levels of   preparedness should be minimised.
      •   Efficient   distribution solutions, which do not restrict operational effect, should be   used up until the area of operations.
      •   Military   units close to the area of operations should have organic distribution   capability to be able to handle all requirements for transportation.
      •   Postponement   – Products should be kept generic as long as possible, and value adding,   customising, activities should be postponed as long as possible.
      •   Modularisation   and bundling of goods and services – Components (goods, services, or   combinations of goods and services) should be grouped (bundled) together into   larger modules or systems, which at a later stage can be combined in order to   create customised end products.
      •   Efficient and lean in peace.
      •   Effective, agile and responsive in higher levels of preparedness.
      • ·           Flexibility to adapt the configuration of the supply chain to   different levels of threat, preparedness and conflict.

    Contrary   to most supply chains in business logistics, but akin to the reality of   supply chains in humanitarian logistics, supply chains in defence logistics   must have two distinct different modes: dormant and action. This means moving from applying the principles of efficiency and   lean in peace, to the application of the principles of effectiveness, agility   and responsiveness in higher levels of preparedness. To have the ability to   move between these two modes is an application of the principle of   flexibility.

    The working group   has found that several of the principles applied in business logistics are   better suited to be components in everyday improvement management within   defence logistics, rather than as principles suited for supply chain design   and supply chain configuration. Consequently, the working group proposes that   improvement management within defence logistics command and control should   always address the following issues:

    •   Eliminate,   reduce and/or redistribute lead-times – Non value adding activities should be   eliminated. Time should be allocated so that activities are executed in   parallel. It must be ensured that activities are not duplicated between   different organisations.
    •   Eliminate,   reduce and/or adapt to variations and uncertainties – Variations and   uncertainties must be identified and analysed, in order to enable elimination   or reduction, alternatively allow for required adaptations.
    •   Simplify   and compress structures and processes – The number of decision elements or   nodes in logistics systems, e.g. the number of different variations of   products, customers, suppliers, storage nodes, number of steps in   distribution channels, levels in product structures, etc. should be reduced.   Components, processes, and interfaces should be standardised.
    •   Simplify   administration and minimise transaction times – Administration should be   simplified and the extra lead time due to administrative processer should be   minimised.

    Several of the   proposed principles have been validated by SMEs within the Swedish Armed   Forces and FMV through war games which have been conducted at the tactical   and operational levels for this purpose. However, the working group   recommends that further validation activities be conducted, prior to any final   implementation and institutionalisation of the proposed principles.

    Original/value

    The presented work   is relevant for any defence organisation contemplating transformation of its   logistics system in the light of recent developments with implications for   the areas of defence and security policy.

  • 3.
    Eriksson, Gunilla
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Joint Warfare Division, Operational Functions Section.
    A theoretical reframing of the intelligence–policy relation2018In: Intelligence and national security, ISSN 0268-4527, E-ISSN 1743-9019, Vol. 33, no 4, p. 553-561Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The intertwined relation between policy and intelligence has long been considered a vital issue for intelligence studies. However, this article argues that the role of the intelligence services as producers of knowledge within policy processes has not yet been thoroughly discussed within academia. One possible overall theoretical framework for studying intelligence in its role as knowledge producer is that of policy analysis, especially if the variance of intelligence’s impact on policy is under scrutiny. More specifically, this article argues that the theoretical approaches within critical policy analysis and policy network analysis constitute productive frameworks for research into the intelligence–policy nexus.

  • 4.
    Eriksson, Gunilla
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Joint Warfare Division, Operational Functions Section.
    Pettersson, UlricaSwedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies.
    Special Operations from a Small State Perspective: Future Security Challenges2017Collection (editor) (Refereed)
  • 5.
    Josefsson, Anders
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Command and Control Section.
    Anderson, Joseph
    United States Army.
    Norlander, Arne
    Marcusson, Björn
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Joint Warfare Division, Operational Functions Section.
    Mission Command when waging cyber operations2019In: 24th International Command and Control Research & Technology Symposium (ICCRTS), International Command and Control Institute , 2019, Vol. Topic 2Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The conditions for military operations have changed due to many things and the cyber-related challenges associated with these conditions require more attention. Many cyber activities are conducted under other circumstances than conventional war that is called the grey zone between peace and war. The objective of this paper is to explore the conditions for mission command when conducting cyber operations. The distinction between war and peace has blurred and adversaries, both state and non-state, threaten the stability in many western countries. Mission command can be seen both as a philosophy and as a method. The fundamental principles for mission command as a philosophy are trust, intent focus, initiative and common ground. This paper discusses if the conditions for Mission Command have changed and are applicable while conducting different types of cyberspace operations and that offensive and defensive cyber operations imply different conditions for Mission Command. The conclusion is that Mission Command as a philosophy is still relevant, but it has to be supported by a comprehensive Command and Control (C2)-Method that is flexible and able to vary between Direct Control and Mission type Control. The C2 Method should be complemented with a dynamic and adaptive control policy for different types of cyber actions. The paper also suggests a holistic model for Dynamic Command that considers both the situations need for action and the Mission Systems C2-needs.

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  • 6.
    Klein, Robert M.
    et al.
    (Ret.) Center for Strategic Research (CSR), Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, USA .
    Lundqvist, Stefan
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Joint Warfare Division, Joint Operations Section.
    Sumangil, Ed
    Center for Strategic Research (CSR), Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, USA .
    Pettersson, Ulrica
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Joint Warfare Division, Operational Functions Section.
    Baltics Left of Bang: the Role of NATO with Partners in Denial-Based Deterrence2019Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s military contribution to deter Russian aggression in the Baltic region should begin with an overall strategic concept that seamlessly transitions from deterrence through countering Russia’s gray zone activities and onto conventional war, only if necessary. NATO should augment its ongoing program to enhance the denial-based deterrence for the region with threats of punishment that demonstrate to Russian leaders they cannot achieve their aims at acceptable costs. Rather than forward-position military forces in the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), NATO should consider keeping forces further back to take advantage of strategic depth to limit vulnerability to Russian attack and increase operational flexibility. To support the overall denial-based deterrence concept, the Baltics must commit wholeheartedly to the concept of total defense including significant increases to their active and reserves forces.

  • 7.
    Listou, Tore
    et al.
    Norweigian Defence University College, Norway.
    Skoglund, Per
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Joint Warfare Division, Operational Functions Section.
    Ekström, Thomas
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Joint Warfare Division, Operational Functions Section.
    Performance Based Logistics: Lessons from the Nordic countries2019In: The 31st Annual NOFOMA Conference: Supply Chain Designs and Sustainable Development of Societies - Extended abstracts, Oslo: BI Norwegian Business School; Norwegian Defence University College , 2019, p. 32-Conference paper (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Purpose

    PBL is thought of as a novel way of designing defence supply chains, advocating long-term relations in which a 1st tier supplier assumes responsibility for the upstream supply chain, and is awarded or punished based on pre-set performance standards. Activities and resources could be lifted out of the defence hierarchy. PBL should lead to adjusted inter-organisational relations and intra-organisational activity structures. The purpose of this research is to explore a) what barriers and enablers to PBL are perceived as the most important in a Nordic perspective, b) how relations between the Defence and PBL suppliers are handled, and c) whether PBL leads to organisational change within the defence.

    Design/methodology/approach

    Because few PBL contracts exist within the Nordic countries a qualitative approach was chosen, based on document studies and semi-structured interviews. Primary data were collected from four units of analysis, each chosen to shed light to all one or more of the research questions.

    Findings

    Our study supports some of, but not all barriers and enablers found in previous research. Lack of supply chain orientation is the main barrier. Relationships seem to depend on trust developed over time, also prior to the PBL contract. Although PBL alters interorganisational activity structures, this only to a minor degree results in organisational change.

    Research limitations/implications

    Qualitative study of a few Nordic PBL contracts. Findings validated in a Nordic context, not necessarily for other small nations.

    Practical implications

    Our findings have implications when planning and implementing PBL contracts.

    Original/value

    This is the first reported study of PBL contracts in the Nordic countries.

  • 8.
    Skoglund, Per
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Joint Warfare Division, Operational Functions Section.
    Listou, Tore
    Norwegian Defence University College, Oslo, Norway.
    Host Nation Support: an evolving concept for military and humanitarian logistics2017In: NOFOMA 2017 - The 29th NOFOMA Conference: ”Taking on grand challenges” / [ed] Hellström, Daniel; Kembro, Joakim; Bodnar, Hajnalka, Lund: Lund Univeristy , 2017, p. 815-816Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Purpose

    Today Host Nation Support (HNS) is applied in most multinational military exercises and in multinational operations such as the Iraqi Wars, in Afghanistan and Mali. Processes and activities are tailored and adjusted according to the knowledge and capacity of the different Host Nations, although often at an ad-hoc basis (Tilson, 1997). On the civilian side, the concept became known at the turn of the century, when for example Croatia used HNS principles in the IDASSA exercise in 2007 (DUZS, 2007). HNS as an idea has evolved both in the military and the civilian sector. Academic research on HNS is limited, except from doctrines and principles developed by NATO, EU, and individual nations, few academic studies can be found. There exist a few papers discussing national capabilities (Rzadkowska & Ziółkowski, 2016; Škvařil, 2013). To our best knowledge, there are no previous studies concerning the needs of the Sending Organisations and the effects HNS will have on the logistics footprint of those organisations. Based on an open systems perspective, the purpose of this paper is therefor to explore and describe general principles of HNS, and to apply a theoretical framework for analysing logistics implications for the sending organisations receiving support.

    Design/methodology/approach

    Based on existing available strategy documents and research literature, an understanding for the basic concepts of HNS is developed, followed by a discussion on HNS as a preparedness strategy. Then a theoretical framework is developed to analyse the perspectives: permanent or temporary, central or de-central dimension, and vertical and horizontal coordination. The plan is to analyse the theoretical findings on two cases, one military and one humanitarian. Important aspects to look for is if HNS really makes responses more rapid or if HNS is one way to create binding commitments between sending organisation and receiving nation, when a need for rapid response exists.

    Findings

    Based on theory we conclude that HNS deals with employing resources available in a Host Nation in such a manner that a Sending Organisation can perform its tasks without having to bring own resources along. Such resources would encompass both infrastructure, means of transportation, subsistence, maintenance capacities, access to, and knowledge of local markets, and the ability to coordinate and deconflict needs of all relevant actors. HNS will be activated when a Host Nation requests assistance from other nations or from foreign based organisations. In this respect, it seems that the focus of HNS today has evolved from being mainly a question of minimising costs for deployed forces to also include the ability to add agility or responsiveness to Sending Organisations’ supply chains. Hence, HNS could be regarded a preparedness strategy serving both a Host Nation and Sending Organisations. The Host Nation controls resources and actors that the Sending Organisations, which could be classified as preparedness and emergency response organisations, depends on in order to perform their tasks efficiently.

    Research limitations/implications

    We delimit our study to HNS as a preparedness measure. That is, not the old fashioned, stable efficiency aim, instead primarily being able to conduct a rapid response or possibly the creation of commitment between sending organisations and Host Nations when a response is required.The study will have limitations since the concept only rarely has been used, except for military exercises. This limits the practical experiences and empirical data to validate conclusions from strategy documents, but even with limited amount of data where the concept is used, it is evident that there exists a political commitment to the concept in many nations.

    Practical implications

    The Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection has developed guideline (DSB, 2014). Belgium state that they have developed a HNS system, according to the EU guidelines, if a need emergency assistance occurs (UNISDR, 2015). Today the HNS concept also has reached the Classrooms, e.g. UNDP held a training course in Beirut in 2015 (UNDP, 2015).This means that there is a growing awareness both in civil and military organisations, that HNS is an important concept both for receiving nations and sending organisations to give a rapid response to an emergency.

    Social implications 

    HNS can develop dormant relationships between organisations and nations. This means that the capability to react rapidly can be improved and developed during crises, which will reduce time to assist vulnerable populations.

    Original/value

    In this paper is the concept of HNS is analysed. The paper shows in what way HNS plays an important role to create preparedness for disaster relief or military assistance. The study discusses several aspects of HNS which creates the fundaments to theoretically understandand practically use the concept.

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