Logo: to the web site of the Swedish Defence University

For many years, we have noticed that different courses of action (COA) developed by Joint Operational Planning Groups (JOPG) for solving the same mission seldom rarely differ more than marginally. This can lead to plans that are predictable for an opponent. If we want to be able to expose an opponent to surprise and complex problems, predictable plans are not good.Planning doctrine only based on the past experience is most often not the best when preparing for missions in future operations, therefore more creative and divergent thinking is needed.In this paper we discuss conditions for COA development that stimulate creative and divergent thinking. We also discuss how planners continually alternate between divergent and convergent thinking before and during execution of operations.

This report, Conflict Prevention and Security Cooperation in the Arctic Region: Frameworks for the Future, captures consensus of the Newport Arctic Scholars Initiative 2020 scholars. Building upon the 2018-2019 NASI work on the limitations of the current cooperative security fora in the Arctic region, this cohort explored existing international frameworks and assessed their abilities to ensure freedom and security in the Arctic through political-military means. NASI 2020 also examined existing frameworks to determine whether they enabled increased dialogue and maritime security cooperation in the region. The frameworks were further evaluated for their abilities to prevent and manage conflict and enhance cooperation on areas of common security and defense interests in the region. Scholars were tasked to identify new frameworks that could be useful in establishing – and maintaining – open channels of communication, preventing conflict, and enhancing cooperation on areas of common security and defense interests among nations and navies in the Arctic region. Finally, the group sought to identify practical arrangements for a future meeting or summit that could bring together states to enhance dialogue on security and cooperation in the Arctic region.

Background In Sweden the surgical surge capacity for mass casualty incidents (MCI) is managed by county councils within their dedicated budget. It is unclear whether healthcare budget constraints have affected the regional MCI preparedness. This study was designed to investigate the current surgical MCI preparedness at Swedish emergency hospitals. Methods Surveys were distributed in 2015 to department heads of intensive care units (ICU) and surgery at 54 Swedish emergency hospitals. The survey contained quantitative measures as the number of (1) surgical trauma teams in hospital and available after activating the disaster plan, (2) surgical theatres suitable for multi-trauma care, and (3) surgical ICU beds. The survey was also distributed to the Armed Forces Centre for Defence Medicine. Results 53 hospitals responded to the survey (98%). Included were 10 university hospitals (19%), 42 county hospitals (79%), and 1 private hospital (2%). Within 8 h the surgical capacity could be increased from 105 to 399 surgical teams, while 433 surgical theatres and 480 ICU beds were made available. The surgical surge capacity differed between university hospitals and county hospitals, and regional differences were identified regarding the availability of surgical theatres and ICU beds. Conclusions The MCI preparedness of Swedish emergency care hospitals needs further attention. To improve Swedish surgical MCI preparedness a national strategy for trauma care in disaster management is necessary.

The Second World War was the most devastating conflict in human history and one which provides innumerable lessons - military, political, and moral. Across the globe, both soldier and civilian endured suffering on a scale previously unknown to humanity as nations grappled with the demands of total war.

This article analyses the recent military ‘turn to reflexivity’ in relation to current reflexive commitments in critical studies of the military. With reflexivity, military organizations have begun to inquire into its own role as a producer and user of knowledge, and into the constitutive effects of knowledge in and on the world. A reflexive concern with the conditions and effects of knowledge has thus made militaries sensitive to the epistemic dimensions of military force. The broader socio-political implications of the military’s attention to epistemics, in terms of how knowledge may constitute and bring into being novel socio-political orderings, make it an urgent task to explore this development in relation to the reflexive state of critical research on the military. The first argument that I make in the article is that existing reflexive commitments in critical military studies are conceptually able to target scholarly-military epistemic interactions and the constitutive effects thereof, but less able to address epistemic distinctions in terms of how knowledge is produced and how different conditions shape the content of knowledge. This, however, is what is needed to critically address the military reflexive development. Based on this, I argue secondly that a fruitful broadening and enriching of the reflexive gaze may be achieved by further taking reflexivity in a Bourdieusian direction – a move that ultimately works complementary to existing reflexive commitments in critical military studies.

Peacebuilding debates increasingly revolve around questions about knowledge and expertise. Of particular interest is what (and whose) knowledge(s) ends up authoritative in interventions. This article addresses a problem in the literature on the epistemics and epistemic authority of peacebuilding interventions: the acknowledgement of but lacking attention to plural knowledges, the transgressive character of expertise, and knowledge struggles. It does this by discussing recent suggestions that peacebuilding epistemic authority can be fruitfully analysed as a Bourdieusian field. The article identifies a tension in Bourdieu’s own thinking about fields, which has shaped some of these recent proposals. This tension, nevertheless, also enables a reconsideration of fields and struggles, and thereby an analysis that takes plurality and transgressiveness into account. By developing such an alternative conceptual position, the article sees peacebuilding epistemic authority as object- and struggle-bound; conditioned and dependent on dynamics that go beyond peacebuilding as a distinct field of practice. This position is illustrated in an analysis of the emergence and (temporary) establishment of epistemic authority in peacebuilding interventions on informal economies.

This article diagnoses a representational bias in current scholarshipon the materiality and spatiality of urban peacebuilding. The biasreduces peacebuilding knowledge production to situatedprocesses that unfold in urban environments but that are notconstituted by them. To counter this, the article draws on ‘morethan-representational’ thinking to develop a research agendathat reframes the study of urban peacebuilding epistemics. Theagenda reconceptualises post-/conflict urban environments as‘governance objects’ that need to be made known and made‘governable’. Further, the agenda approaches the peacebuildingproduction of such objects as a process in itself situated in and(co-)constituted by urban environments.

In light of the recent turn to ‘inclusivity’ in peacebuilding practice, this article problematises established ways of ‘doing critique’ in peacebuilding scholarship. Inclusivity refers to the building of peace as a situated and co-constituted process. This entails what can be termed a new epistemic commitment: the acknowledgement that peacebuilding as a dynamic and emergent phenomenon is also an epistemically co-constituted process. In the article, I make two arguments. First, the move towards inclusivity places currently dominant modes of scholarly critique at an impasse. Persistent ontological and epistemological binaries preclude a productive investigation and challenging of inclusivity projects and their epistemic commitment. Second, I argue that, by returning to historical conditions that were formative in the very emergence of the category of ‘the local’, the conceptual basis of an alternative mode of critique (re)appears. This alternative critical project allows for an analytical sensibility to peacebuilding as emergent and adaptive. It makes it possible to disentangle power relations as these emerge between different and possibly unexpected configurations of actors and knowledge claims in inclusivity projects.

Purpose

The dual purpose of this paper is to analyse the implications on research rigour of using two panels in a Delphi study, and to take a first step towards investigating how researchers in logistics and SCM establish rigour in Delphi studies.

Design/methodology/approach

Based on a literature review on research rigour in Delphi studies, this paper analyses how a modified design, with two panels, effected research rigour in a Delphi study that produced unexpected results. The paper also conducts a pilot literature review on Delphi-studies in logistics and SCM research, and investigates how these authors establish research rigour.

Findings

This paper finds that with two panels, researchers may enhance rigour in a Delphi study, but also that such a design may lead to results that would be less likely with a conventional design, especially if combined with concluding workshops. The pilot literature review indicates that Delphi-studies in logistics and SCM research establish rigour through the provision of an audit trail, rather than by explicitly discussing the quality criteria of correspondence and/or trustworthiness.

Research limitations/implications (if applicable)

The research indicates limitations with a conventional Delphi design, with one expert panel, and opportunities with a modified design, with two panels. Further research is required to explore these indicative findings.

Original/value

The paper demonstrates how a modified design of the Delphi technique, in combination with concluding workshops, can produce results and insights that would be more difficult to achieve with only one expert panel.

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to develop guidance, including tactical levers, for the application of a dynamic purchasing portfolio model (PPM) for defence procurement.

Design/methodology/approach: The study uses a workshop and a literature review to identify suitable tactical levers for the application of a dynamic PPM for defence procurement. Based on application rules proposed in previous research (Ekström et al., 2021), the study then formulates guidance for application and validates the methodology in two desktop exercises.

Findings: The study identifies tactical levers and proposes guidance for the application of a dynamic PPM for defence procurement.

Research limitations/implications: The proposed guidance includes tactical levers, which will enable defence authorities to dynamically reposition in the segmentation model proposed by Ekström et al. (2021) and find an enhanced position to optimise. The presented results build on a study in the Swedish defence context. To determine generalisability, additional studies are required.

Originality/value: The paper develops guidance, including tactical levers, for the application of a dynamic PPM for defence procurement, which is original in several aspects. The guidance addresses public procurement, which is a novelty. In contrast to most extant PPMs, the model is dynamic, which enables practitioners to reposition in the model. 

Purpose – Defence supply chains (SCs) aim at operational outcomes, and armed forces depend on them to provide availability and preparedness in peace and sustainability in war. Previous research has focussed on strategies for SCs aiming at financial outcomes. This raises the question of how suitable commercial supply chain strategies (SCSs) are for supply chain design (SCD) in defence. The purpose of this paper is to explain the constructs of SCSs that satisfy military operational requirements and to propose SCSs that are appropriate in defence. 

Design/methodology/approach – This paper reports on a Delphi study with 20 experts from Swedish defence authorities. Through three Delphi rounds, two workshops and a validation round, these experts contributed to the reported findings. 

Findings – The findings demonstrate that commercial SC constructs are acceptable and applicable in defence but not sufficient. An additional strategy is required to satisfy requirements on availability, preparedness and sustainability. The paper shows that different requirements in peace and war make it challenging to design suitable defence SCs and proposes eight SCSs that satisfy these requirements. 

Research limitations/implications – The results emanate from the Swedish defence context and further research is required for generalisation.

Originality/value – This paper extends theory by investigating SCs aiming at operational outcomes. For managers in companies and defence authorities, it explicates how the unique issues in defence must influence SCD to satisfy operational requirements.

This study explains the constructs of a purchasing portfolio model (PPM) that defence authorities can use in practice in defence procurement and designs a segmentation model. We identify open PPM design and application questions in the literature and conduct a Delphi study with twenty experts from Swedish defence authorities to design a segmentation model that is fit-for-purpose. The paper addresses the open design and application questions discussed in the literature and satisfies the operational requirements of the Swedish Armed Forces (SwAF). The proposed segmentation model builds on three dimensions: the operational requirements of the SwAF, the market's ability to deliver supplies on time, and limitations in the SwAF operational capability if the market does not deliver supplies on time. To reduce complexity, we propose a two-stage model in which we use one dimension as a precursor to a two-dimensional model. In the latter, we merge sixteen elements into one square along with three other segments which users should treat differently. The paper contributes to extant academic knowledge on PPMs by eliciting practitioners' views on open design and application questions. We develop the proposed segmentation model in cooperation with practitioners and believe that it will be of value in defence procurement practice.

Purpose

The purpose of   this paper is to describe the first step in the process of optimising the   Swedish defence supply system. The first step entails defining principles for   distribution and storage.

Design/methodology/approach

The research   builds on literature reviews, archival records, Swedish military documents,   participatory observation at FMV and in the Swedish Armed Forces Head   Quarters, study visits to military units, presentations by Subject Matter   Experts (SMEs), and war gaming.

Principles from   business logistics and Supply Chain Management (SCM) were identified and   analysed in order to assess their applicability in the Swedish military   context. Similarly, military logistics principles from other nations (US and   UK), as well as from multinational organisations (UN, NATO, and EU), were   identified and analysed. Finally, current and past Swedish logistics   principles from guiding documents and military practise were also identified.  

Findings

The newly dawned   political attention to operational effect, operational capabilities,   availability and preparedness must lead to a shift of paradigm in defence   logistics. Military logistics must move from the prevailing focus on   effectiveness and efficiency in production logistics to an effect based   operational logistics, supported by an effective and efficient production   logistics. This means that new military logistics principles must be applied.   The conducted research has suggested a set of new principles for distribution   and storage.

The working group has identified and analysed principles in business logistics and SCM, as well as domestic and international principles in military logistics. The working group has found that there is no established set of principles that in and by itself meets the requirements for designing an optimised system for storage and distribution which satisfies the goal and the constraints. The working group has therefore selected principles from different sources and augmented these with a couple of principles constructed by the working group.

The working group   proposes that the following principles should be established for distribution   and storage in the Swedish defence supply chain:

•   Primacy   of operational requirements – It is the requirements of the operational   commander that must be satisfied.
•   Adapted   protection – The requirements for protection must be considered in the   selection of system for distribution and storage.
•   Categorisation,   segmentation and differentiation – Supplies should be categorised and   segmented, and the treatment of segments should be differentiated.
  •   Strategic   supplies should always be stored in sufficient quantities and volumes in   order to ensure initial availability and sustainability until external   delivery can be guaranteed.
  •   Risk   supplies should always be stored in sufficient quantities and volumes in   order to ensure initial availability and initial sustainability.
  •   Certain   leverage supplies may require storage to a certain degree in order not to   jeopardise initial availability and initial sustainability.
  •   Generally,   it is not necessary to store routine supplies.
  •   Storage   close to military units – Limiting supplies should be stored close to the   military units in order to ensure initial availability and initial   sustainability for activated and mobilised military units.
  •   Storage   close to the area of operations – Reserve supplies should be stored close to   the envisioned areas of operations in order to ensure operational   sustainability.
  •   The   requirement for redistribution and dispersion in higher levels of   preparedness should be minimised.
  •   Efficient   distribution solutions, which do not restrict operational effect, should be   used up until the area of operations.
  •   Military   units close to the area of operations should have organic distribution   capability to be able to handle all requirements for transportation.
  •   Postponement   – Products should be kept generic as long as possible, and value adding,   customising, activities should be postponed as long as possible.
  •   Modularisation   and bundling of goods and services – Components (goods, services, or   combinations of goods and services) should be grouped (bundled) together into   larger modules or systems, which at a later stage can be combined in order to   create customised end products.
  •   Efficient and lean in peace.
  •   Effective, agile and responsive in higher levels of preparedness.
  • ·           Flexibility to adapt the configuration of the supply chain to   different levels of threat, preparedness and conflict.

Contrary   to most supply chains in business logistics, but akin to the reality of   supply chains in humanitarian logistics, supply chains in defence logistics   must have two distinct different modes: dormant and action. This means moving from applying the principles of efficiency and   lean in peace, to the application of the principles of effectiveness, agility   and responsiveness in higher levels of preparedness. To have the ability to   move between these two modes is an application of the principle of   flexibility.

The working group   has found that several of the principles applied in business logistics are   better suited to be components in everyday improvement management within   defence logistics, rather than as principles suited for supply chain design   and supply chain configuration. Consequently, the working group proposes that   improvement management within defence logistics command and control should   always address the following issues:

•   Eliminate,   reduce and/or redistribute lead-times – Non value adding activities should be   eliminated. Time should be allocated so that activities are executed in   parallel. It must be ensured that activities are not duplicated between   different organisations.
•   Eliminate,   reduce and/or adapt to variations and uncertainties – Variations and   uncertainties must be identified and analysed, in order to enable elimination   or reduction, alternatively allow for required adaptations.
•   Simplify   and compress structures and processes – The number of decision elements or   nodes in logistics systems, e.g. the number of different variations of   products, customers, suppliers, storage nodes, number of steps in   distribution channels, levels in product structures, etc. should be reduced.   Components, processes, and interfaces should be standardised.
•   Simplify   administration and minimise transaction times – Administration should be   simplified and the extra lead time due to administrative processer should be   minimised.

Several of the   proposed principles have been validated by SMEs within the Swedish Armed   Forces and FMV through war games which have been conducted at the tactical   and operational levels for this purpose. However, the working group   recommends that further validation activities be conducted, prior to any final   implementation and institutionalisation of the proposed principles.

Original/value

The presented work   is relevant for any defence organisation contemplating transformation of its   logistics system in the light of recent developments with implications for   the areas of defence and security policy.

For almost a century Sweden has participated with military units in international peace operations. Most of these operations have taken place since 1956, under the command of the United Nations (UN), but the prehistory during the League of Nations is of importance for a deeper understanding of Sweden’s participation in international peace operations. For a long time, peace operations took place under a mandate of the UN and were also organised by the UN. But step by step both EU and NATO have come to command many of these operations.

From 1934 until today, more than 100 000 Swedes have taken part in different kinds of international operations. By means of a chronological and comparative approach, this article studies the development of these operations. The focus is the concrete development of the military operations, not the political decision-making processes behind them.

Six different definitions of peace operations are used: Preventive operations, where the international forces are deployed before a conflict has broken out. Traditional peacekeeping operations, where the international troops are deployed between the two hostile parties, with their approval. Enlarged peacekeeping, where there are several breaches of a formal armistice. Peace-enforcing operation, where the international forces use armed force against one or several of the parties. Support of a transition, where the military, the police and civilians are used to implement a peace agreement. Administration of a transition, where the international society assumes responsibility to achieve a deeper political change.

Very few Swedish peace operations were of a traditional peace keeping sort, while more peace enforcing efforts took place or were prepared for already in the 1960s. However, the big shift towards participations in peaceenforcing operations under the command of EU and NATO came in the 1990s. For many years this development was not in step with the official Swedish self-image as a neutral and peace-loving country.

The intertwined relation between policy and intelligence has long been considered a vital issue for intelligence studies. However, this article argues that the role of the intelligence services as producers of knowledge within policy processes has not yet been thoroughly discussed within academia. One possible overall theoretical framework for studying intelligence in its role as knowledge producer is that of policy analysis, especially if the variance of intelligence’s impact on policy is under scrutiny. More specifically, this article argues that the theoretical approaches within critical policy analysis and policy network analysis constitute productive frameworks for research into the intelligence–policy nexus.

This paper aims to compare militia organizations in two peripheral late medieval kingdoms: Portugaland Sweden. In the Portuguese case, the «besteiros do conto» (crossbowmen) militia is the object of study,whereas in Sweden, the rural «uppbåd» peasant militia is analyzed. In this study, these two objects are comparedin terms of origins, organization, leadership, relation to state or royal power, forms of service reimbursement,strategies of recruitment and training, campaign performance, estimated professionalism and impact on martialsociety. The aim is further to assess on what points we find similar developments, but also how they differ andthe possible reasons for it.

This article explores what is considered by some to be a dangerous pathway:the development of a theory of special forces. The world is now inthe third age of special forces and these secret military units are atthe forefront of the use of force in international relations. This research identifies a large theory-knowledge gap concerning these military “first responders” for modern nation-states and offers a tentative theory of special forces that goes beyond traditional annihilation/attrition models of wartoward a new anaphylaxis model. It makes the case that the theory pathwayis not dangerous, but emancipatory.

This paper addresses the research question of what kind of leadership, processes, and work climate best support employee-driven/bottom-up innovation in SOF. It starts with the suggestion that the term, Special Operations Forces (SOF), needs to be intellectually unpacked and its diverse elements (of which Special Forces are just one part) disaggregated in order to elicit definitional clarity. From this conceptual starting point, it becomes immediately clear that Special Forces represent the ‘special’ component in the SOF designation. This research contends they are a new type of soldier (and a product of modern warfare) that is defined by differentness in relation to conventional forces and activities within a battlespace, working in traditionally restricted areas. David Stirling, one of the founders of the famed British Special Air Service (SAS), is highlighted as an exemplar of the sort of leadership that provoked rare operational level effects. The paper also suggests that unorthodox forces operating in a unique operational environment demand unusual personality types and atypical command/control processes encapsulated by the so-called ‘Chinese Parliament’ that emerged in the SAS.

This study suggests that the world is now in a third age of Special Forces and one that in all likelihood will witness an increasing utility of these unusual military units in orthodox and unorthodox warfare in international relations.

This research explores the shape of warfare to come over the next twenty-five years from a Swedish perspective. It is evident that change in the practice of warfare is apparent in international relations today due to the use of innovative new technologies. These developments raise profound practical and conceptual questions for armed forces as to what do these new systems mean for the prosecution of warfare and the intellectual ideas/knowledge base that underpin the contemporary application of force. This research offers a tentative exploration of three aspects (artificial intelligence, autonomous platforms and the future battlefield: the soldier level) framed in the context of the traditional environments of air, land and sea to interrogate their meaning for Sweden and future warfare.