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For many years, we have noticed that different courses of action (COA) developed by Joint Operational Planning Groups (JOPG) for solving the same mission seldom rarely differ more than marginally. This can lead to plans that are predictable for an opponent. If we want to be able to expose an opponent to surprise and complex problems, predictable plans are not good.Planning doctrine only based on the past experience is most often not the best when preparing for missions in future operations, therefore more creative and divergent thinking is needed.In this paper we discuss conditions for COA development that stimulate creative and divergent thinking. We also discuss how planners continually alternate between divergent and convergent thinking before and during execution of operations.

Quantitative evaluations are valuable in the strive for improvements and asserting quality. However, the field of Command & Control (C2) evaluations are hard to navigate, and it is difficult to find the correct measurement for a specific situation. A comprehensive Scoping Study was made concerning measurements of C2 performance and effectiveness. A lack of an existing appropriate framework for discussing C2 evaluations led to the development of the Crisis Response Management (CRM) Matrix. This is an analysis tool that assigns measurements into categories, and each category display unique strengths, weaknesses and trends. The analysis yielded results proving to be too rich for a single article, thusly, this is the first of two articles covering the results. In this article, the Practitioners Guide focus on results valuable for someone interested in evaluating C2. Each evaluation has specific requirements that, for best result, ought to be reflected in the chosen measurement.

The development of ballistic missiles, more effective cruise missiles, and increased sensor capabilities imply both new capabilities and challenges in a future operational environment. One effect this has is that the time from detection of a threat, to being able to respond, and to act on it will be significantly reduced. This article illuminates some current and future threats that are emerging and will be part of an increasingly complex battle space. The purpose of the research is to test and evaluate different C2 solutions for future ISR. The benefit of the proposed research is that it can provide design propositions for future ISR systems and its C2 function. In addition, the research may support design and acquisition of future automated systems and AI. Framing a conceivable development of a future battlefield and its character is important to obtain sufficient realism under the conditions that the proposed experimental series is intended to test. For the experimental series, the microworld C3Fire is currently under consideration as a platform for the trials. This, among other things, for its good configuration possibilities and being able to create reliable experimental conditions.

In a future and data-intensive operating environment, threats can be assumed to vary considerably. One example of such threats is missiles that can achieve speeds of Mach 5 and above. To handle this type of threat alone, it implies at least two things. First, that a suitable operational picture is provided that take account for future long distance threats. Second, it is likely that it will be even more important to be able to collect, filter, process and understand relevant data to make priorities and make proper decisions under short time conditions. Third, when considering threats by cyberwarfare, these threats can be considered as conducted in the speed of light. This, in summary, will probably suppose an efficient and dynamic command and control (C2) of available and different types of sensors, from directly controlled to sensors guided by artificial intelligence (AI), on a future battlefield. In this paper, we propose an experimental study to investigate from which levels of sensor C2 that can be centralised, decentralised, or a combination thereof, and which seems to be sufficient to be able to in time respond to threats in a geographically and by information enlarged operating environment.

Future Command and Control (C2) need to be both agile and resilient to cope with unpredictable operational environments and to make use of the technological advances. The Swedish Armed Forces develops a concept for future C2 of military operations. The objective of this paper is to explore the utilization of mission command in a future C2 concept. Sweden has a solid tradition of mission command, promoted by the Swedish culture of participation and empowerment. However, the future operational environment demands a need for organizational agility, thus changing the prerequisites for mission command. The future C2 concept, which is under development, encompasses centralized and decentralized command in fixed and temporary organizations. Centralized approaches may be preferred when it comes to prioritization of technologically advanced exclusive resources. On the other hand, dynamic situations demand rapid decision making and seizing the opportunity given in the moment. The future operational environment includes hybrid warfare and gray zone issues, demanding thorough analysis in order to foresee the political consequences of decisions. Sensor and communication technologies enable enhanced situation awareness; however, the infrastructure is vulnerable. The current paper analyses the application of mission command in the future operational environment, and further mission command in relation to organizational agility. The conclusion is that mission command is still relevant in the complex future operational environment. However, the increasingly complex operational environment demands continuous development of the C2 function.

The conditions for military operations have changed due to, e.g., globalization, climate change, and nations' ambitions and actions. This has resulted in new demands on command and control (C2) capability. Further, the rapid evolution of information technology has provided vigorous opportunities to enhance the C2 capability, e.g., through advanced communication, information management, and decision support. However, the need to rely on modern technology also causes increased vulnerabilities. The sociotechnical nature of C2 systems means that the development of C2 systems is complex and challenging. Developing C2 concepts requires collaboration between people from different knowledge disciplines, traditions, and perspectives. Therefore, there is a need for elaborated concept development approaches and structures that promote collaborative efforts. The objective of this paper is a framework for the development of C2 concepts that enhance the collaboration of people from different traditions. The study was carried out as case study performed in two steps: theoretical development and formative evaluation. The case study targets the development of C2 concepts for future military operations of the Swedish Armed Forces. The framework includes terminology models, a development process, and system representations. The case study shows that in diverse teams, it is essential to agree upon terminology, development process, and systems representations used for the development to avoid misunderstandings and unnecessary rework. The framework explored in this paper is only in its first version. However, the development and the application of the framework was found to facilitate and focus the work of the multi-disciplinary team.

Föreliggande bok har ambitionen att sätta samman tre års forskningsresultat (2016-2018) inom ramen för det av Försvarsmakten (FM) finansierade forskningsprojektet Ledarskap och ledning i en förändrad organisatorisk kontext och omsätta kunskaper till ett pedagogiskt och lättillgängligt material som kan användas i såväl Försvarshögskolans ordinarie kurs- och utbildningsprogram, som enskild läsning eller som utgångspunkt för gruppdiskussioner, seminarier och förberedelser inför något av de teman som tas upp i boken. Bokens innehåll speglar forskningsprojektets sammansättning som består av forskare från Ledarskapsavdelningen i Stockholm, Försvarshögskolans Ledarskapscentrum i Karlstad, och Ledningsvetenskap i Stockholm. Att bokens empiri kommer från militär kontext hindrar inte att bokens innehåll även kan vara av stort intresse för civila läsare, särskilt inom ramen för dem med intresse för civil-militär samverkan i såväl nationella som internationella insatser.

The purpose of this paper is to propose a set of dimensions for the “Endeavour Space” and provide a set of examples of endeavours that can be utilized for future studies that seek to determine the appropriate of different C2 approaches for different locations (regions) of this Endeavour Space.

The conditions for military operations have changed due to many things and the cyber-related challenges associated with these conditions require more attention. Many cyber activities are conducted under other circumstances than conventional war that is called the grey zone between peace and war. The objective of this paper is to explore the conditions for mission command when conducting cyber operations. The distinction between war and peace has blurred and adversaries, both state and non-state, threaten the stability in many western countries. Mission command can be seen both as a philosophy and as a method. The fundamental principles for mission command as a philosophy are trust, intent focus, initiative and common ground. This paper discusses if the conditions for Mission Command have changed and are applicable while conducting different types of cyberspace operations and that offensive and defensive cyber operations imply different conditions for Mission Command. The conclusion is that Mission Command as a philosophy is still relevant, but it has to be supported by a comprehensive Command and Control (C2)-Method that is flexible and able to vary between Direct Control and Mission type Control. The C2 Method should be complemented with a dynamic and adaptive control policy for different types of cyber actions. The paper also suggests a holistic model for Dynamic Command that considers both the situations need for action and the Mission Systems C2-needs.

The rationale behind this paper is to explore and conceptualize the dynamics taking place when bottom-up influenced management meets top-down influenced management in spontaneous reactive first response operations. We employ an interdisciplinary approach based on theoretical perspectives from Systems science, Command & Control science, and Disaster sociology.

In order to stimulate a discussion on theoretical gaps and practical challenges, a model illustrating what we call Command & Control dynamics in spontaneous reactive operations is suggested. The model is applied as a conceptual tool for analyzing the response of the Swedish Police to a terror attack in Stockholm 2017. Both primary data from interviews and secondary data from official investigations are utilized as a basis for the analysis.

We then continue the analytical discussion regarding Command and Control dynamics, and suggest that spontaneous reactive operations give rise to quite different prerequisites for Command & Control compared to planned operations. There is a risk that both academic and practical discussions on how to improve capability do not acknowledge these differences.

Spontaneous reactive operations are likely to initially generate strong bottom-up influences in the Command & Control arrangement of a single organization. Initial decision makers will make rapid decisions and generate a direction that the superior commanders, who are not present from the beginning of the operation, must adapt to. We argue that the intent of the subordinates “restrict” the solution space for commanders on higher levels. Furthermore, we argue that in a spontaneous reactive response there is no specific Commander’s Intent from the start, only a doctrine. This leads us to suggest that the idea on mission tactics in civil operations must be problematized.

Effective C2 requires the ability to cope with uncertainty and to make timely decisions in situations often characterised by risk. This experimental study, with 56 participants, investigated how decision-makers handled these problems in a fictive time critical situation. More specifically, the study examined the effects of presenting two different degrees of uncertainty (low/high) on the choice to make a direct decision or to wait for additional information, in order to test if increased degrees of uncertainty lead to more people waiting for information and to longer waiting times. The overall purpose was to contribute to the debate regarding how uncertainty should be communicated to decision-makers, and to our knowledge concerning the practical consequences of presenting uncertainty to decision-makers in time critical situations. The study could not demonstrate any effect of increased degrees of uncertainty on the choice to make a direct decision or to wait for additional information. Neither could the study demonstrate any effect on the waiting time. However, the results show that almost all of the participants in both the experimental and the control group decided to wait for additional information, and that most of them showed little restraint regarding their waiting time. These results strengthen the conclusion from a previous study by Rydmark, Kuylenstierna, and Tehler (2020) - that presenting uncertainty in risk descriptions can be a practical problem in time critical decision-making situations, and that educating decision-makers in handing these problems may be required if uncertainty is to be presented in these kinds of situations.

Framgångsrik insatsledning vid kriser och i krigssituationer kräver förmåga att fatta beslut i rätt tid i siutationer som präglas av både osäkerhet, komplexitet samt olika former av risker. Syftet med forskningen i detta delprojekt har varit att öka kunskapen om hur osäkerhet påverkar riskrelaterat beslutsfattande i tidskritiska beslutssituationer. I följande kapitel redogörs för tre empiriska studier som undersöker om metoden att presentera osäkerhet i riskbeskrivningar, genom att använda så kallade sannolikhetsintervaller, kan leda till fördröjningar i beslutsprocessen och därmed utgöra ett problem för ledningsprocessens kvalitet i tidskritiska beslutssituationer.

One important question concerning a risk description is to what extentit should contain information about the uncertainty surrounding an estimatedprobability for an event, for example, by using some form ofprobability range. Presenting a point estimate together with a rangecan inform the decision-maker about both the best judgement as wellas the strength of knowledge regarding the probability in question, sothat the decision-maker can take this information into considerationwhen making decisions. However, communicating uncertainty in riskdescriptions may lead to delays in the decision-making process, due topeople’s general aversion to ambiguity and other forms of uncertainty.This can be devastating in time critical decision-making situations,where delaying decisions leads to substantial costs or losses - as in thecase of a military command and control (C2) situation or in crisisresponse management (CRM). This study investigated how 106 universitystudents handled a fictive time critical military decision-making situationwith imprecise probabilities presented in the form of ranges. Thepurpose was to make a first estimation regarding if presenting uncertaintyin risk descriptions could be a problem in these kinds of situations.The results show that almost half of the participants delayed theirdecisions and that many participants showed little restraint regardingtheir waiting time. These results indicate that communicating uncertaintyin risk descriptions can be a problem in time critical decisionmakingsituations, and that presenting uncertainty in risk descriptionsmay require decision-makers to be educated in the specific problemsassociated with decision-making in these types of situations.

Preventing accidents within a complex environment like a force on force military exercise ischallenging for the organization. The aim of this study is to investigate safety behavior by usingactivity theory in combination with critical incident technique in order to identify conditions effectingthe health and safety of individuals employed by the Swedish armed forces (SwAF) participating inmilitary exercises. The empirical data was collected from two separate events final planningconference of Northern Wind 2019 (FPC-NW19) and the exercise Northern Wind 2019 (NW19). Datawas collected using observations and conversations with military, medical and safety professionals.One researcher followed the FPC-NW19 and the observed the exercise NW19 by shadowing staffmembers and safety personnel.Data was analyzed, thematized and coded using the third generation of activity theory and its areas:tools, rules, community, division of labor, subject and object as a guide for identifying contradictions.Results indicate that the methods used for planning and the use of safety equipment whenconducting military tasks during the exercise is influenced by the desire of winning the exercise.The results also indicate that activity theory can be a useful tool to identify contradictions affectingsafety performance. However, the study is only limited to two events with a narrow scope from theArmy. Further refinement is needed to develop a functioning method for analyzing safety behavior.

The article argues for a changed perspective on military tactics and safety. By seeing militarytactics as safety knowledge, a wider perspective can be applied to a military problem. Safety isin fact a military core capability impossible to exclude from any military operation. By ignoringsafety, one becomes susceptible to embedded safety flaws, increasing organizational hazards.This could cause mission failure and exposing military personnel to occupational safety risks.

In this article the author identifies an educational problem. Officers lack the education toperform normal everyday work and to learn from large field exercises. By using previouslycollected quantitative data from a different study a mean value of seven days of educationis currently allocated to handle the normal work routines. Qualitative data have also beencollected from observations from military exercises. The article presents a brief presentationof the history of activity theory as a theoretical framework. Yrjö Engeströms third generationactivity theory is then used to analyze and design a new system for the military educationfor Swedish officer. The design focuses on four documents officers create in their profession:battle plans, risk analysis, educational plans and directives. The proposed new design for theeducation ties the military academic education together with work experience and militaryinhouse courses seeing the military education as a whole.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the conception of speed in command and control (C2) systems’ impact on human thought and to introduce the notion of “Combat Integrated Learning” (CIL). In a context of increased complexity, unpredictability and ambiguity, adaptation not only concerns agility in terms of speed, but through resilience, self- healing and – in lack of calculable consequence ethics – an Aristotelian notion of virtue as a stable equilibrium of the soul as a basis for choice of action “knowingly and for its own sake”. As humans we have many cognitive functions which impact how we perceive information i.e., sensemaking and situation awareness. But the essence of thinking is a philosophical issue where philosophers like Arendt previously explained the emergence of banal evil as ordinary men having lost their ability to think. C2 systems that make us reactive to a piece of information, inciting speed to act, minimize human reflection and learning. Developing time effective C2 systems could in fact lead to the creation of military stupidity. Authority, organizational and administrative procedures may lead to normalization of risk, morally questionable attitudes and actions, routinized humiliation and behavior that ultimately break down sensemaking and the sense of “self” in degraded environments. C2 systems and their uses may hamper intelligent action through the loss of an active agency of the individual, thus impede understanding and management of the battlespace, especially in the light of deception and disinformation, and unclear causal relations of events in constrained environments.This paper points at potential good practices in the face of ambiguity.

The aim of this study was to investigate critical incidents in a large medical exercise (mass casualty incident) including the Swedish Armed Forces (SwAF) and a regional hospital using activity theory. A total of 96 individuals played injured patients with a variety of injuries from simple cuts and bruises to severe head injuries. Patients were evacuated by different means of transportation i.e. minivan, ambulance, military as well as civilian ambulance helicopter.We participated in the final planning of the exercise in order to obtain access for the research team. Data was collected through observations, shadowing technique and 20 semi structured interviews. Professionals from the regional hospital and SwAF as well as evaluating personnel were interviewed. The interviewees were asked to describe significant events experienced during the exercise. Two researchers observed the triage and registration process in the ambulance intake and the emergency room of the hospital. One researcher observed the command and control (C2) function within the mass casualty management (MCM).Two students from the Swedish Defense University and three from University West collected data by playing injured patients according to the determined injure play card provided by SwAF. The students were instructed to observe what they themselves would classify as critical incidents based on their own subject i.e. education, economics and command and control studies. Five questions guided the observations: What happened? Who were involved? What consequences did the incident have? How were these consequences handled by the organization? Did the incident affect other areas?Data was analyzed, thematized and coded using the third generation of activity theory and its areas: tools, rules, community, division of labor, subject and object as a guide for identifying contradictions within the regional hospital and the emergency medical plan developed for handling large casualty events.Preliminary results indicated that participating personnel were not faced with conditions mimicking real life but learned to deal with a corrected version of reality i.e. preparations before the start of the exercise created shortcuts affecting the veracity of the exercise. This was manifested through contradictions within and between the activity systems and the conflicting motives carried by the objects.The results might impact the future designs of large exercises, influencing the conditions that the participants will face in exercises and thereby increasing preparedness for authentic situations.

The aim of this pilot study is to adjust the NOSACQ-50 to the work environment of military organizations.NOSACQ-50 is a validated tool successfully used in several organizational domains to measure occupationalsafety climate (OSC). In general, few studies have been published investigating OSC in militaryorganizations. NOSACQ-50 consists of 50 items across 7 OSC dimensions, i.e. group members’ sharedperceptions of: 1) management safety priority, commitment and competence; 2) management safetyempowerment; 3) management safety justice; 4) workers’ safety commitment; 5) workers’ safety priority andrisk non-acceptance; 6) safety communication, learning, and trust in co-workers’ safety competence; 7)workers’ trust in the efficacy of safety systems. To assess the relevance of the NOSACQ-50 items, a revisedversion of the instrument was sent to 11 military safety experts. In addition, 19 items pertaining to areas notcovered by NOSACQ-50 were validated by the same experts. After contents validation, data from 517participants from 4 garrisons were collected. The results showed that NOSACQ-50 had acceptable reliabilityscores (.70-.89.), and the factor structure was confirmed by confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). Principalcomponent analyses (PCA) of the supplementary 19 items showed that 12 items grouped into threedimensions (alpha .74-.91): Management enabling safety performance, personnel’s knowledge of andcompetence in national laws regulating safety and Unit ethics. In conclusion, preliminary results showed theadjusted NOSACQ-50 instrument could be used to measure OSC in military organizations. However,additional studies must be performed to improve and develop military specific dimensions not covered byNOSACQ-50.

During the Covid-19 pandemic social media have become an important tool for spreading information from government agencies regarding restrictions. Government accounts and public health care organizations have used different social media platforms such as Twitter to communicate with the Swedish public. The Swedish public have interacted with the information, arguing for a stricter or a more relaxed approach to Covid-19 recommendations. This social network analysis aims at exploring statistical methods to investigate patterns made by twitter accounts commenting the Swedish Armed Forces field hospital activities and the national Covid-19 strategy during the Covid-19 pandemic. Data was collected using the twitter platform and the Ncapture add-on with Google Chrome. The interactions stored in the tweets and replies section (TRS) from 227 twitter accounts were collected and coded with the NVivo auto code function. Twitter usernames that occurred in less than 35 % of the 227 TRS were deleted. The 227 extracted TRS were treated as scale items and occurring twitter-names which interacted with the TRS as respondents n=761. Analysis of the factor structure with PCA and CFA indicated four factors: 1) Military policy, 2) Right wing politics, 3) Law enforcement, 4) Politics and strategy. Structural Equation Modelling revealed interrelationships between the factors. Thus, Military policy, Law enforcement and Politics and strategy had a direct effect on Right wing politics. Politics and strategy had a direct effect on Military policy and Law enforcement. This study revealed that PCA, CFA and SEM have the potential to discover the core of a thought collective. Despite the obvious dangers with misinformation and political extremism on social media, policymakers need to tackle misinformation and disinformation, protecting electoral processes and facilitating public discussion, built on the three fundamental democratic principles of equality, representation and participation.

What is effective and efficient command and control (C2)? One way of answering this question is to measure the quality of products generated within the C2-process. The main product from the C2-system, in purpose of directing and coordinating the execution system, is undoubtedly the order. One might think that the quality of orders directly correlates to effects generated in the operational environment. However, because of the unforeseeable and unavoidable events in the operational environment, such a causal relation is not necessary true. This paper presents a concept method for experimentally testing relations between order quality and outcomes, by using a simulated microworld in which such events are controlled.

One particular aspect of order quality is the representation of the actual tasks and goals. This work propose an approach that connects to earlier work on operational pictures as a requisite for situation awareness in general and mission understanding in particular. Further, this paper suggests that orders could be adapted to the situation at hand by complementing the textual order with visualizations of military tasks and goals. This line of investigation owns its specific timeliness to the escalating focus on, and need for, mission command in multi-domain C2 in a context of both military and civil defence.

The representation of the operational environment is crucial in all military operations because it is a necessity for the command and control (C2) function that provides the operation with direction and coordination. The representation, typically in the form of a common operational picture (COP), is considered the key element for establishing situation awareness and understanding for the commander and his/her staff. This article begins by presenting a theoretical overview of the COP concept. Thereafter, empirical support is given that officers conceptualize the COP differently, relating it to different stages of the C2 process and referring to the COP as sometimes an artifact and sometimes a mental state or a product in the human mind. For example, some officers may focus on the representation of the current operational environment; others may focus on representations of courses of actions whereas others may focus on future planned events. This may cause severe misunderstanding when officers use the COP concept in communication.

This article provides a proposition to make the COP concept more specific – connecting the different stages in the C2 process to specific instantiations of the COP. Moreover, regardless of which stage in the C2 process the instantiations of the COP relate to, it has to be adapted to that specific stage in order to be a powerful enabler. This article concludes by introducing a new concept, the Prepared Common Operational Picture (PCOP).

The command and control (C2) research community mainly agree upon the overall purpose of C2 – to generate desired effects in an operational environment thereby fulfilling stated goals. This purpose indicates an action oriented approach that focuses on the C2 process and its constituent activities. This paper inquires the persistently elusive question of when the C2 process starts and ends. This question has a strong linkage to whether the C2 process begins by a top-down and beforehand need or if it is commonly initiated as a reaction to a, more or less sudden and unforeseen, situation or event. These two different approaches have significant impact on C2 theory, for instance how much effort should be dedicated to preparation before an operation/mission, and indeed if these approaches are compatible within the same theoretical framework at all. Further, this paper surveys the often mentioned need for speed in regard to the C2 process – to get inside the enemy´s decision cycle. This line of thought is in turn related to the choice between an analytical or intuitive decision making approach in the C2 process. This paper applies a literature review method that compares a national C2 process standard with an international equivalent.

The world we live in is a complex system tinged with constant change. In order to cope with this fact, a defense mission system needs to adapt to these challenges. The command and control (C2) system is the component of the defense mission system that is our system of interest, our unit of analysis, in this paper. We present a first attempt to use a method based on design logic complemented with scenario driven exercises, to extract requirements and more fine-grained design criteria to enhance design of future C2 systems.

As a starting point, three scenarios were developed that intended to reflect key features of future potential conflicts. A number of subject matter experts (SMEs) participated representing strategic, operational and tactical levels of command. The SMEs were asked to state their C2 requirements in each of the scenarios. The resulting set of C2 requirements were analyzed to find design criteria pertaining to the general C2 functions (Data Providing, Orientation, Planning, Influence, and Communication) in Brehmer´s design-logic hierarchy (Purpose, Function and Form). The results indicate that the method can be usefull to find requirements and design criteria for future C2-systems.

This paper presents an introduction to why it is difficult, and still desirable, to integrate the perspectives of structure and behaviour when modelling command and control (C2). We use basic systems theory in combination with theories from the field of C2 as underpinning for our arguments. The structural perspective is necessary to describe the organization of, and relation between, entities relevant for C2. The behavioural viewpoint is necessaryto put focus on the purpose of C2, which is to enable an adequate response to a problemor a situation at hand. The various problems are typically of a complex character, which includes dynamic changes and therefore has to be handled with feedback, or cybernetic, approaches. However, structure and behaviour are not easy to integrate, as will be evident in this paper.

Artikeln beskriver ’Military’ Design Thinking från det perspektiv som lärs ut vid USSpecial Operations Command’s Joint Special Operations University (USSOCOM JSOU). Ambitionen är att besvara följande frågor: Vad är Design Thinking och vad är ursprunget till metodiken? Varför är Design Thinking aktuellt idag, och hur kan beslutsfattare nyttja metoden för att påverka komplexa problem? Vidare ger författarna förslag på hur Design Thinking kan nyttjas i ett svenskt sammanhang för att påverka de komplexa säkerhetsutmaningar som Sverige står inför. Sammanfattningsvis beskrivs Design Thinking dels som ett förhållningssätt, men också som en metodik vilken ökar en militär beslutsfattares möjlighet att förstå sig på (appreciate) komplexa problem. Denna fördjupade förståelse ligger sedan till grund för chefens inriktning av verksamhet. Design Thinking ersätter inte dagens metoder men möjliggör att "rätt" problem identifieras och löses.