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  • 1.
    Andersson, Emmelie
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CRISMART (National Center for Crisis Management Research and Training).
    Asp, Viktoria
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CRISMART (National Center for Crisis Management Research and Training).
    Arnevall, Linnéa
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CRISMART (National Center for Crisis Management Research and Training).
    Blomstrand, Rickard
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CRISMART (National Center for Crisis Management Research and Training).
    Deschamps-Berger, Jenny
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CRISMART (National Center for Crisis Management Research and Training).
    Ericson, Marika
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Palmgren, Anders
    Swedish Defence University, Directorate for Officer's Academic Education.
    Sandberg, Daniel
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CRISMART (National Center for Crisis Management Research and Training).
    Förutsättningar för krisberedskap och totalförsvar i Sverige2017Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Denna rapport beskriver utvecklingen av totalförsvaret och framväxten av området samhällsskydd och beredskap. Den ska ge en övergripande bild av hur det ser ut idag på lokal, regional och nationell nivå inom krisberedskap och totalförsvar. Det bör nämnas att rapporten främst fokuserar på utvecklingen av och förändringar i den civila delen i totalförsvaret samt på samhällsskydd och beredskap.

    Syftet är att ge läsaren en förståelse för dagens krisberedskap och totalförsvar. För att få en uppfattning för varför vi befinner oss där vi är idag, är det av vikt att ha med sig en bild av historiska händelser, förändrade hotbilder och av de beslut (och ickebeslut) som fattats.

    Författarna vill betona att rapporten ingalunda ger en komplett bild av krisberedskap eller totalförsvar, utan är tänkt att skapa intresse, kunskap och förståelse på ett övergripande plan.

    Rapporten ska främst ses som ett stöd för högskolestudenter, beslutsfattare och handläggare genom att ge en översiktlig beskrivning över de system och funktioner som utgör svensk krisberedskap och totalförsvar. Rapporten kan läsas i sin helhet, men kan också användas som ett slags uppslagsverk för den läsare som är intresserad av en särskild tidsperiod, händelse eller ett beslut.

  • 2. Andersson, Jonas
    et al.
    Astell, Magnus
    Axberg, Stefan
    Brehmer, Berndt
    Brynielsson, Joel
    Hagstedt, Daniel S
    Nylander, Martin
    Reberg, Michael
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Sivertun, Åke
    Lärobok i Militärteknik, vol. 3: Teknik till stöd för ledning: reviderad 20212021 (ed. 2: rev. uppl.)Book (Other academic)
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  • 3.
    Andersson, Kent
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    A Case study report on signature engineering: The SEP multipurpose armored vehicle and the Visby class corvette2017Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The aim of this report is to present consolidated results from case studies of the development processes of the SEP multipurpose armored vehicle and the Visby class corvette respectively.

    The report is intended as an annex to a journal article named “Key requirements in the procurement of future Low Observable combat vehicles: A European perspective” published in the journal of Systems Engineering in 2017.

    Results filtered from interviews and document reviews are presented based on the structure of the Friedman-Sage framework (Friedman & Sage, 2004) for case studies on systems engineering. Firstly, data collected from the two case studies are presented and then the lessons identified consistent with both cases. The sources, an overview of the two cases studied and the application of the framework are described in the journal article.

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  • 4.
    Andersson, Kent
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Key requirements in the procurement of future low observablecombat vehicles: a European perspective2018In: Systems Engineering, ISSN 1098-1241, E-ISSN 1520-6858, Vol. 21, no 1, p. 3-15Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The aim of this study is to propose guidelines for the systems engineering of future stealth combat vehicles using Low Observable Technology (LOT). A case study approach, based on interviews and document reviews, was used to analyze the systems engineering processes of the SEP multirole armored vehicle and the Visby class corvette respectively. The result is a thorough investigation of what worked in the cases studied, butwith lessons extrapolated into recommendations for future development programs. These will have to deal with an increasingly complex sensor threat and a transformed, multilateral, European procurement environment. The main conclusion is that coherence and traceability between military needs on the battlefield and signature requirements is expected to be particularly challenging. A workflow tailored for requirements analysis in LO combat vehicle programs has, therefore, been derived and is presented here. In addition, themost important enablers for future multilateral development programs involving LOT have been identified as: establishing common best practices, demonstrator programs, an integrated product team approach, and, in line with similar work on combat aircraft, establishing stealth as a key architectural  principle.

  • 5.
    Andersson, Kent
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Notes on military capability concepts and their relevance for analysis of system characteristics2020Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    A plethora of views, definitions and concepts concerning military capability can cause misunderstandings among scholars and professionals in the defence and security sector, as well as they can confuse the public on important issues. This study captures and describes a few in an effort to increase awareness; Combat Power, Fighting Power, Joint functions, Warfighting functions, Elements of combat power, Warfighting Capability, DOTMLPF(I), TEPIDOIL, Fundamental inputs to capability, Defence lines of Development, and Military Power. The study also highlights their systemic character and guides the reader briefly in matching issues with suitable concepts.

    Appendix 1 matches Swedish concepts to those listed in the study.

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  • 6.
    Andersson, Kent
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    On the Military Utility of Spectral Design in Signature Management: a Systems Approach2018Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    There is an ongoing duel between military sensor development and developments in signature management. The last decade, with warfare characterized by joint expeditionary operations and asymmetry, has favored sensors. However, on account of the worsening security situation in Europe, there is now also an increasing interest in efforts to increase survivability of own military platforms. Spectral design is one of several promising technologies with extensive research potentially suitable for Low Observable platforms. It involves creating desired spectral optical responses from surfaces, in this case reducing contrast to background, by choosing suitable materials and structures. The challenge to a military decision-maker, faced with inherent uncertainties concerning the future and with limited resources, is how to choose among alternative capabilities, technologies or equipment. Correspondingly, on account of the system character of the signature attribute, researchers in technologies for signature management has difficulties communicating relevant basis for these decisions. The scope of this thesis is therefore to find and analyze patterns in decision situations involving technology or technical systems for military use, and the purpose is to propose conceptual and methodological contributions to support future decisionmaking. The technology focus is on spectral design and the application in focus is signature management of Low Observable military platforms. The research objective is addressed from a military system and capability centric perspective using methods from several disciplines in the military sciences domain. The result is synthesized from four separate studies: 1) on spectral design using systematic review of literature, 2) on military utility using a concept formation method, 3) on modeling for how to operationalize a link between spectral design and measures of military utility using methods of military operations research, and, 4) on cases of systems engineering of military Low Observable platform designs. In summary, the result of the work presented in this thesis is a compilation of related work in military sciences, systems engineering and material optics into a framework to support effective decision-making in relevant contexts. The major contribution to theory is a proposed concept called Military Utility, capturing how to communicate the utility of technical systems, or technology, in a military context. It is a compound measure of Military Effectiveness, Military Suitability and Affordability. Other contributions can be expected to support decision-making in practice; - the so-called Ladder-model is a template for how to quantitatively operationalize the military effectiveness dimension of Military Utility regarding the use of spectral design; - an applied Ladder-model is demonstrated, useful for analyzing the military utility of spectral designs in Low Observable attack aircraft; - a probabilistic framework for survivability assessments is adopted into a methodology for doing the analysis, and lastly; - a generic workflow is identified, from relevant development programs, including decision-situations that can benefit from the adopted methodology.

  • 7.
    Andersson, Kent
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Lundmark, Martin
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Silfverskiöld, Stefan
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Military-Technology Division. Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    The Military Utility Assessment Method for Future Technologies2019Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The purpose of this report is to describe the Swedish Defence University (SEDU) Military Utility Assessment Method for Future Technologies (MUAFT). The report describes the actions taken in each step of the process and ends with references and a template for the technology memos used as basis for assessment.

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  • 8.
    Axelson, Mattias
    et al.
    FOI.
    Lundmark, Martin
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Olsson, Per
    FOI.
    Öhrn-Lundin, Josefin
    FOI.
    Förutsättningar för undervattensförmåga - dagens resurser och morgondagens effekter2018Report (Other academic)
  • 9.
    Belin, Jean
    et al.
    Chaire Economie de défense.
    Hartley, Keith
    University of York.
    Lefeez, Sophie
    IRIS.
    Linnenkamp, Hilmar
    SWP.
    Lundmark, Martin
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Masson, Hélène
    FRS.
    Maulny, Jean-Pierre
    IRIS.
    Ungaro, Alessandro
    IAI.
    Defence industrial links between EU and US2017Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The European Commission’s initiatives in the field of armament should lead to a deeper integration of European DTIBs in the coming years. In parallel, the links between European and American DTIBs take the form of technological and armament cooperation, and of capital links between European or American companies. This report aims at analysing the links between the US DTIB and the EU DTIB, and the consequences these links carry on cooperation between European DTIBs.

    These links vary by country. France has strived to preserve its strategic autonomy when developing its DTIB. Its technological and capability-related reliance on the United States has thus remained limited. Nonetheless, cooperation is sought when it is mutually beneficial while French companies seek to invest in the US market, as do other European DTIBs.

    The German DTIB was rebuilt belatedly after World War II, partly on the basis of French-German cooperation. German industry is now privatised and the scope of the German DTIB’s partnerships has widened to other European countries and to the US. The German supply chain is now well established in American armament programmes.

    The Italian DTIB has consistently pursued a policy of active cooperation, whether with the US or with EU member states. Links with the US have notably been built in the context of NATO and through bilateral agreements. In parallel, Italy has developed partnerships with European countries. Rome’s cooperation policy is thus inclusive, and has considered diverse factors such as political links, capability requirements, the need to develop certain technologies and to preserve industrial capabilities and jobs in Italy.

    The British DTIB has historically enjoyed deeper links with US industry, as a result of the cultural closeness between the UK and the US, and of the strategic proximity that dates back to the end of World War II. The links between US and UK DTIBs thus follow a model of strategic partnership. Nevertheless, the UK’s industrial and defence policy is also pursued within a European framework. The missile manufacturer MBDA is nowadays considered as the deepest model of transnational industrial and defence integration in Europe.

    While Sweden seeks to preserve its industrial capabilities in two sectors – submarines and military aircraft – it appears to be most technologically reliant on the US among the surveyed countries. It is worth noting also that these links are long-standing, dating back to the cold war and the Soviet threat, despite Sweden not being a NATO member state.

    The links with the US are thus very different from one country to another, and carry varying implications. While the costs of acquiring American equipment can be low despite their high technological grade, there are often constraints on their use and restrictions on technologies that will not be transferred, or that will be unusable for other partnerships.

    These links are also formalised through bilateral agreements promoting armament cooperation, as is the case for UK-Italian cooperation. For its part, Sweden has signed interstate agreements with the US in the field of technological cooperation.

    DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL LINKS BETWEEN EU AND US / September 2017

    3

    Since the European Council meeting in December 2013 and in its 2016 Global Strategy, the EU has set itself the task of developing "a certain degree of strategic autonomy" supposed to encourage greater competitiveness of European DTIBs.

    In order to promote the development of this European defence industrial policy, we must seek to ensure that the links between US and EU DTIB are mutually beneficial. To do this, two conditions must be met:

    -That the rules governing relations between US and EU DTIB be based on the principle of reciprocity and on equal rules of regulation of respective DTIBs.

    -That the rules governing relations between US and EU DTIB be defined in the context of a dialogue between the European Union and the United States and not bilaterally between each European country and the United States.

    Today the multiplication of bilateral agreements between the United States and European Union member states are potential obstacles to the establishment of a level playing field governing the relations between European DTIBs;

    There is also a lack of reciprocity and equal regulation of EU and US DTIB. This concerns different areas: access to advanced capabilities, unrestricted use of exported armament, access to cooperated technologies, rules governing investment in US and European companies, rules governing property rights over technologies, rules governing export controls.

    Organizing the transatlantic relationship in the field of armaments in order to have a more balanced and profitable relationship, can be achieved in two complementary ways.

    At the European level, the European Defence Research Program (EDRP) will have strong implications for the relations between the companies of the US DTIB and the EDTIB. The rules governing access to finance and the ownership of intellectual property rights (IPR), which will be adopted for collaborative R&T projects involving European defence companies, will result in a common framework governing the relationship between these companies and the US EDTIB: the more Europeans will collaborate among themselves in the field of defence research, the more they will be able to set common and mutually beneficial rules in their relationship with the United States.

    It may also be considered that some EU States will decide to engage in enhanced cooperation in the industrial defence field which could include the following rules:

    -Obligation to achieve a level of 30% R&T in common among the members of the enhanced cooperation, which means 10% more than the target that was defined 10 years ago by the European Defence Agency and that is regularly reminded in the objectives of the European Union;

    -Obligation to inform members of enhanced cooperation of agreements on defence R&T cooperation concluded with the United States so as to ensure compatibility of these agreements with existing agreements between members of enhanced cooperation. The objective is to prevent agreements with the United States from subsequently restricting the scope of existing agreements between European countries;

    DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL LINKS BETWEEN EU AND US / September 2017

    4

     

    -Obligation to systematically consider the acquisition of military equipment manufactured by one of the member countries of enhanced cooperation. This should be accompanied by reinforced security of supply rules;

    -The need to bring the export policies of the member states of the enhanced cooperation closer together.

    These rules, complementary with, and not contradictory to, those which are being defined at European Union level, would accelerate industrial defence consolidation in Europe and make it possible to consider on a more balanced, mutually equally beneficial, basis relations between the United States and the European Union in the field of armaments. These rules would also be inspired by political principles: to strengthen the strategic autonomy of the European Union when necessary. Far from forbidding cooperation between the US and the EU DTIB, such enhanced cooperation would be facilitated because cooperation between US EDTIB and EU DTIB would not be a brake on European cooperation, as it is currently still too often the case.

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  • 10.
    Bengtsson, Johnny
    et al.
    Swedish National Forensic Centre, Swedish Police Authority and Department of Electrical Engineering, Linköping University, (SWE).
    Huskaj, Gazmend
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section. School of Informatics, University of Skövde.
    The Manifestation of Chinese Strategies Into Offensive Cyberspace Operations Targeting Sweden2021In: Proceedings of the 20th European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security / [ed] Dr. Thaddeus Eze, Dr. Lee Speakman and Dr. Cyril Onwubiko, Reading, UK, 2021, p. 35-43Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The aim of this article is to present how Chinese strategies are manifested into offensive cyberspace operations targeting Sweden. It is commonly known that People’s Republic of China (PRC, and in this definition the meaning of thegovernment and its military), uses five-year plans (FYP) for social and economic steering strategy of their country. This has been going on since 1953 until today. In 2015, the national strategic plan Made in China 2025 (中国制造2025) was launched by Le Keqiang, the Premier of the State Council of PRC. The main goal with this plan is to strengthen the economic development. In addition, Chinese military strategists noted the importance of information warfare and intelligence during military operations. This article is based on open sources: the official English translated version of the 13th Five-year plan (FYP) and other reporting on cyberspace operations linked to the PRC. A number of cases are presented to highlight the link between the PRC FYP and their targets. Next, the current situation in Sweden is presented and how the country is targeted by PRC-linked activities, both in and through cyberspace, but also military infiltration on academia. The results show that Sweden has been, and is continuously the target of offensive cyberspace operations. In parallel, the country is also the target of military infiltration on the academia, and direct investment strategies such as Huawei attempting to compete for the 5G frequency actions arranged by the Swedish Post and Telecom Authority. In conclusion, Sweden will continue to experience cyberespionage from PRC on all levels and on all domains; science, technology, IP and privacy information theft. Previously unveiled cyberspace operations cases in this article have proven to be a convenient strategy for the PRC to reduce its research and development gap in several ways; innovatively, financially and to shortening the time-to-market (TTM).

  • 11.
    Granåsen, Magdalena
    et al.
    Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), (SWE).
    Huskaj, Gazmend
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section. School of Informatics, University of Skövde, Sweden.
    Varga, Stefan
    KTH Royal Institute of Technology, (SWE).
    Data Collection and Research in CDXs: Command and Control, Cyber Situational Awareness and Intelligence Perspectives on Cyber Defense2019In: 24th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium (ICCRTS): Cyber Risk to Mission / [ed] Alberts, David, International Command and Control Institute , 2019, Vol. Topic 9, article id 24Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The annual cyber defense exercise Locked Shields is the world’s largest unclassified defensive exercise. The exercise participants form “blue teams” that are tasked to defend their critical infrastructure against an attacking “red team.” The blue teams are scored based on how well they keep their essential system functions running and the extent to which they manage to assess and report what they are exposed to. During Locked Shields 2019, 24 blue teams from 30 countries participated in a two-day exercise. The case study presented in this paper focuses on one of the blue teams. The team consisted of around 60 people from governmental institutions as well as private companies. The objective of this paper is to explore the possibilities to collect meaningful data for research on Command and Control, C2, Cyber Situational Awareness, CSA, and Intelligence in conjunction with an inter-organizational cyber defense team during a cyber defense exercise. During preparations preceding the exercise, the research team observed the development of strategy, coordination structures and organization in the temporarily formed team as it prepared to solve the highly challenging exercise tasks. During the exercise, data collection included questionnaires, observations, team communication logs, reporting from the blue to the white team and performance scores. The data collection sought to satisfy needs within three research themes - 1) command and control, C2, 2) cyber situational awareness, and 3) intelligence. A review of the dataset showed that the data is well suited for further analysis. The paper presents initial results as well as an outline of how the different types of data collected contribute to research within the three research themes.

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    24th_ICCRTS_paper_62
  • 12.
    Hult, Gunnar
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Almbladh, Therese
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Andersson, Kent
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Bull, Peter
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Applications Section.
    Dansarie, Marcus
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Applications Section.
    Granholm, Johan
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Applications Section.
    Lagg, Eva
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Technology Forecast 2021 – Military Utility of Future Technologies2021Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    For the purpose of Technology Forecast 2021 five reports from the German Fraunhofer Institute were chosen by FMV (and SwAF) and given to Systems Science for Defence and Security Division to analyse and assess within the timeframe up to 2040.

    The following research reports were reviewed by the working group at SEDU:

    ·       Adversarial Machine Learning 

    ·       High Entropy Ceramics

    ·       Large Unmanned Underwater Vehicles

    ·       Living Sensors

    ·       Machine Learning in Materials Development

    The aim of the Technology Forecast seminars and the finished product, this report, is to assess the potential military utility of the reviewed technologies and how they may contribute to the Swedish Armed Forces’ operational capabilities based on the presented concept(s) and scenario(s). 

    The military utility is categorised by one of four assessments: Significant, Moderate, Negligible or Uncertain.

    The following technologies were assessed to potentially have significant military utility:

    ·       High Entropy Ceramics

    ·       Machine Learning in Materials Development

    ·       Adversarial Machine Learning

    The following technology was assessed to potentially have moderate military utility:

    ·       Large Unmanned Underwater Vehicles 

    The following technology was assessed to have uncertain military utility:

    ·       Living Sensors

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  • 13.
    Huskaj, Gazmend
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section. School of Informatics, University of Skövde, Sweden.
    The Current State of Research in Offensive Cyberspace Operations2019In: Proceedings of the 18th European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security, Academic Conferences and Publishing International Limited, 2019, p. 660-667Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Cyber-attacks have increased since the 1988-Morris worm and can target any connected device from any place in the world. In 2010, Stuxnet received a lot of attention as the first cyber-weapon. Its targets were the Iranian nuclear enrichment centrifuges. Nation states are developing cyberspace capabilities to conduct offensive cyberspace operations. Academic researchers have been calling for a more transparent discussion on offensive capabilities and have pointed out the positive impact researchers had during the development of nuclear capabilities. Shrouded in secrecy, the development of offensive capabilities used for operations makes it difficult to conduct research. Therefore, one way to mitigate this is to conduct a systematic review of the current state of research in offensive cyberspace operations. The systematic review method makes it possible to establish certain inclusion and exclusion criteria and systematically go through academic articles to identify the contents, thoughts and research focus of academic researchers. Six scientific databases were queried and 87 articles were read and clustered. The first insight is that, based on the results of the queried databases, research about offensive cyberspace operations is limited. The resulting clusters are a general cluster about cyberspace operations, followed by research in policy, decision-making, governance, capabilities, levels, models, training, deterrence and international affairs. These are then further grouped into: a) general cyberspace operations; b) deterrence; c) international affairs; d) modelling, simulation and training. The article concludes that research into offensive cyberspace operations is maturing as more information is becoming public. Secondly, current research lists some good basic ideas regarding effects which can be achieved through offensive cyberspace operations, how they should be conducted, and related tools, techniques and procedures. However, discrepancies in research efforts exist, with the majority of research coming primarily from the western world. In addition, secrecy and the resulting limited access to information, coupled with research being either too technically focused or too qualitatively focused, show that there still remains room for research in this field. Finally, some directions for future research are examined.

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    The Current State of Research in Offensive Cyberspace Operations
  • 14.
    Huskaj, Gazmend
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section. School of Informatics, University of Skövde, Sweden.
    What is a Substantial Contribution to a Research Project in Offensive Cyberspace Operations that Merits Co-Authorship?2022In: Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security: State University of New York at Albany Albany, New York, USA 17-18 March 2022 / [ed] Dean Robert P. Griffin, Dr. Unal Tatar and Dr. Benjamin Yankson, Reading, UK: ACI Academic Conferences International, 2022, p. 385-394Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article reviews the question what is a substantial contribution to a research project in offensive cyberspace operations that merits co-authorship? Frustrations and conflicts may develop during research projects when researchers with different backgrounds, cultures, research fields and expertise decide to conduct research and produce and publish those results. The focus of this paper is a research project in cyberspace operations while taking into account the power-dynamics inherent in the academic system and how these can affect the co-authorship of research products. First, the purpose with doing research is presented. Next, three models of the research process are reviewed, describing their differences and similarities. Then, linguistic analysis is applied on a set of terms in guidelines for co-authorship described in some different universities in Sweden. The results present a model for a research project in offensive cyberspace operations and based on the output of the linguistic analysis, the model is used to quantify and describe what a substantial contribution is in three scenarios that merits co-authorship. 

  • 15.
    Huskaj, Gazmend
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section. School of Informatics, University of Skövde, Sweden.
    Iftimie, Ion A.
    Eisenhower Defence Fellow, NATO Defense College, Rome, Italy (ITA); European Union Research Center, George Washington School of Business, Washington D.C., (USA); Central European University, Vienna, Austria (AUT).
    Toward an Ambidextrous Framework for Offensive Cyberspace Operations: a Theory, Policy and Practice Perspective2020In: Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security / [ed] Payne, Brian K.; Wu, Hongyi, Reading, UK: Academic Conferences and Publishing International Limited, 2020, p. 243-253Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article addresses the rise in state-sponsored cyber attacks over the past three decades and proposes a new ambidextrous framework for offensive cyberspace operations. Since 1982, nation states have embarked in a fierce race to develop both clandestine and covert offensive cyber capabilities. Their intended targets range from foreign militaries and terrorist organizations to civilian populations and the critical infrastructures that they rely upon. Advancements in cyber security have, however, contributed to the discovery and attribution of offensive cyber operations, such as state-sponsored ransomware attacks, where state-built cyber capabilities have been used to attack governments, industries, academia and citizens of adversary nations. The financial and psychological costs of these ransomware attacks are today a threat to any state’s national security. This article draws from academic research, the cyber military doctrines of four countries—a total of eight models from the Netherlands, Sweden, the U.S., and the U.K.—and the authors’ operational experience to propose a new ambidextrous framework for offensive cyberspace operations. This ambidextrous framework for offensive cyberspace operations and the associated Cyberspace Operations Canvas are needed today in order to increase the resilience of national critical infrastructures against attacks from state-developed tools. We use the WannaCry-case to illustrate how the implementation of the ambidextrous framework for offensive cyberspace operations would result in increased awareness and understanding of the prospective cyber threats, their intended target(s), the likelihood of cascading effects and the options available by nation states to minimize them.

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    Toward an Ambidextrous Framework for Offensive Cyberspace Operations - A Theory Policy and Practice Perspective
  • 16.
    Huskaj, Gazmend
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section. University of Skövde, (SWE).
    Iftimie, Ion A.
    NATO Defense College, (ITA); European Union Research Center, George Washington School of Business, (USA).
    Wilson, Richard L.
    Towson University, (USA); Hoffberger Center for Professional Ethics, University of Baltimore, (USA).
    Designing attack infrastructure for offensive cyberspace operations2020In: Proceedings of the 19th European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security: A Virtual Conference hosted by University of Chester UK / [ed] Thaddeus Eze, Lee Speakman, Cyril Onwubiko, Reading, UK: Academic Conferences and Publishing International Limited, 2020, p. 473-482Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article addresses the question ‘what considerations should be taken by cyber commands when designing attack infrastructure for offensive operations?’. Nation-states are investing in equipping units tasked to conduct offensive cyberspace operations. Generating ‘deny, degrade, disrupt, destroy or deceive’ effects on adversary targets requires to move from own (‘green’), through neutral (‘grey’), to adversary (‘red’) cyberspace. The movement is supported by attack infrastructure for offensive cyberspace operations. In this paper, we review the professional and scientific literature identifying the requirements for designing an attack infrastructure. Next, we develop and define the concepts for attack infrastructure. Finally, we explain and describe the considerations for designing attack infrastructure. The research question is answered by proposing a framework for designing attack infrastructure. This framework is vital for military and civilian commands designing attack infrastructure for offensive cyberspace operations. 

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    Designing attack infrastructure for offensive cyberspace operations
  • 17.
    Huskaj, Gazmend
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section. School of Informatics, University of Skövde, Sweden.
    Moradian, Esmiralda
    Department of Computer and Systems Sciences, Stockholm University, Sweden.
    Cyber Deterrence: An Illustration of Implementation2018In: 13th International Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security (ICCWS 2018) / [ed] John S. Hurley & Jim Q. Chen, Sonning: Academic Conferences and Publishing International Limited, 2018, p. 304-311Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Cyber deterrence is a strategy to deter attackers from conducting cyber-attacks in the first place. However, several issues exist when implementing cyber deterrence, which are identified in this paper. The findings show (1) non-existence of the deterrence strategy  (2) no doctrine or decision competence to retaliate to an adversary, (3) the armed forces have no authority to retaliate when Swedish sovereignty in Cyberspace is threatened, (4) no norms or regulations exist concerning retaliation, (5) no clear governance on using offensive cyber capabilities, and finally, (6) no credibility in its cyber deterrence posture regarding how much Sweden is willing to sacrifice to protect its electoral system, which is a Swedish national interest. Therefore, this research investigates how cyber deterrence can practically be implemented in Swedish cyber security policy. So far, researchers generally focused on the human aspect of cyber deterrence. By using the case study research strategy and utilizing the Swedish electoral system as a case, this paper examines possibilities to merge the human dimensions of cyber security with the technological dimensions. Data collection is performed through documents studies and semi-structured interviews with experts in the area to identify cyber deterrence components. Further, a mathematical approach is discussed in the paper to express the relationship between an adversary and a deterrent depicting each of the actor’s risk calculus. A result of the research work performed in this paper, the deterrence components for Swedish cyber deterrence are proposed and risk calculus is performed. Moreover, measures to increase Swedish cyber deterrence posture are proposed the practical implementation of cyber deterrence in Swedish cyber security policy in order to deter attacks on the Swedish electoral system is demonstrated.

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    Cyber Deterrence - An Illustration of Implementation
  • 18.
    Huskaj, Gazmend
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section. Swedish Defence University, Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Sallinen, Margarita
    Swedish Defence University. Statsvetenskap.
    Staters outtalade normer i cyberrymden2021Report (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
    Abstract [sv]

    Den här rapporten presenterar vilka nationella outtalade normer som kan utläsas hos nio stater som bryter mot internationella överenskommelser i cyberrymden. Det finns olika sorters normer och många definitioner på vad det är, där uttalade normer ofta associeras till skrivna regler, medan outtalade normer associeras till underliggande värderingar som exempelvis styr diplomati. Diplomati är en praktik i hur stater ska interagera med varandra. Den Ryska Federationen använde sig exempelvis av diplomati 1998 under det första utskottet av FN:s generalförsamling då de lyfte frågan om hur informations- och telekommunikationsteknologier kan påverka internationell säkerhet. FN antog då en resolution och 2014/2015 presenterade de elva uttalade normer som ska gälla för ansvarsfullt statligt beteende i cyberrymden. Resultatet i denna rapport visar att alla nio stater har brutit mot FN:s uttalade normer men i olika grad/utsträckning. Resultatet visar därför på att de nationella outtalade normerna som kan utläsas hos de nio staterna under granskning i cyberrymden följer den geopolitiska och geoekonomiska situationen i den internationella miljön.

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  • 19.
    Huskaj, Gazmend
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section. School of Informatics, University of Skövde, Skövde, Sweden.
    Wilson, R L
    Department of Philosophy and Computer and Information Sciences Towson University, Towson, Maryland, (USA), and Hoffberger Center for Professional Ethics, University of Baltimore, Baltimore, Maryland, (USA).
    Offensive Cyberspace Operations and Zero-days: Anticipatory Ethics and Policy Implications for Vulnerability Disclosure2021In: Journal of Information Warfare, ISSN 1445-3312, Vol. 20, no 1, p. 96-109Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article addresses the question under which circumstances zero-day vulnerabilities should be disclosed or used for offensive cyberspace operations. Vulnerabilities exist in hardware and software and can be seen as a consequence of programming errors or design flaws. The most highly sought are so-called zero-day-vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities exist but are unknown and, when exploited, enable one way of entry into a system that is otherwise not thought possible. Therefore, from an anticipatory ethics perspective, it is important to understand in what cases zero-days should be disclosed or not.

  • 20.
    Huskaj, Gazmend
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section. School of Informatics, University of Skövde, Skövde, Sweden.
    Wilson, Richard L.
    Towson University (USA), Hoffberger Center for Professional Ethics, University of Baltimore (USA).
    An Anticipatory Ethical Analysis of Offensive Cyberspace Operations2020In: 15th International Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security / [ed] Payne, Brian K.; Wu, Hongyi, Reading, UK: Academic Conferences and Publishing International Limited, 2020, p. 512-520Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article presents the ethical issues using offensive cyberspace operations. Previously enshrouded in secrecy, and now becoming the new norm, countries are using them to achieve their strategic interests. Russia has conducted offensive operations targeting Estonia, Georgia and the Ukraine; Hamas was targeting Israeli targets; and Iran has been targeting U.S. targets. The response has varied; Estonia and Georgia struggled with the attacks and were unable to respond while Ukraine tried to respond but it was inefficient. Israel’s response on Hamas offensive operations was an air strike on a building with Hamas Cyber-operatives. Iran shot down a U.S. Drone over the Strait of Hormuz, and the U.S. initially intended to respond with kinetic capabilities in the form of missile strikes. However, in the last minute, the U.S. chose to respond with offensive cyberspace operations targeting the Iranian missile systems. This last-minute change of response choosing between kinetic or cyber capabilities shows a need to further investigate how offensive cyberspace operations can be used against which targets from an ethical perspective. This article applies anticipatory ethical analysis on U.S. offensive operations in the “Global Hawk”-case when Iran shot down a U.S. drone over the Strait of Hormuz. Anticipatory ethical analysis looks at emerging technologies and their potential consequences. Offensive cyberspace operations present a range of possibilities, which include lowering the risk of harm to cyber operatives’ lives belonging to the responding nation. However, a response can also be kinetic. Therefore, the analysis of the “Global Hawk”-case is compared with the Israeli-air strike of the building of Hamas Cyber-operatives. The authors argue that applying anticipatory ethical analysis on offensive operations and kinetic operations assist decision makers in choosing response actions to re-establish deterrence.

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    An Anticipatory Ethical Analysis of Offensive Cyberspace Operations
  • 21.
    Huskaj, Gazmend
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section. School of Informatics, University of Skövde, Skövde, Sweden.
    Wilson, Richard L.
    Towson University, USA), Hoffberger Center for Professional Ethics, University of Baltimore (USA).
    Anticipatory Ethics for Vulnerability Disclosure2020In: Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security / [ed] Payne, Brian K.; Wu, Hongyi, Reading, UK: Academic Conferences and Publishing International Limited, 2020, p. 254-261Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article presents the ethical dilemma related to under what circumstances vulnerabilities should be disclosed. Vulnerabilities exist in hardware and software, and can be as a consequence of programming errors or design flaws. Threat actors can exploit these vulnerabilities to gain otherwise unintended access to information systems, resources and/or stored information. In other words, they can be used to impact the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information in information systems. As a result, various types of vulnerabilities are highly sought after since they enable this type of access. The most highly sought are so-called “zero-day”-vulnerabilities. These are vulnerabilities that exist but are unknown, and when exploited, enable one way of entry into a system that is not thought possible. This is also why zero-day vulnerabilities are very popular among criminal organizations, states and state-sponsored advanced persistent threats. The other side of the coin is when a state identifies a zero-day, and ends up in the ethical dilemma of whether to release the news and inform the vendor to patch it, i.e. close the vulnerability, or to use it for offensive or intelligence purposes. This article employs these distinctions to apply anticipatory ethics in the Stuxnet-case. Stuxnet was a computer software that was allegedly developed by the U.S. together with Israel to disrupt Iran’s development of uranium for their nuclear program. More exactly, it was developed to disable the uranium centrifuges used to enrich uranium. To achieve this, Stuxnet exploited four zero-day vulnerabilities and, according to some experts, managed to delay Iran’s nuclear program by one to two-years, forcing them to the negotiation table. Using vulnerabilities like zero-days presents opportunities but also risks. The results of the application of anticipatory ethics to the Stuxnet case are then compared with the “Osirak”-case and the “al-Kibar”-case. Osirak was the nuclear reactor in Iraq and was bombed in 1981; al-Kibar was the nuclear reactor being built up in Syria, also bombed in 2007.

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    Anticipatory Ethics for Vulnerability Disclosure
  • 22.
    Iftimie, Ion A.
    et al.
    NATO Defense College, Rome, (ITA) / European Union Research Center, George Washington School of Business, Washington, D.C., (USA) / Central European University, Vienna, (AUT).
    Huskaj, Gazmend
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Strengthening the cybersecurity of smart grids: The role of artificial intelligence in resiliency of substation intelligent electronic devices2020In: Proceedings of the 19th European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security: a virtual conference hosted by University of Chester UK 25-26 June 202 / [ed] Thaddeus Eze, Lee Speakman, Cyril Onwubiko, Reading: Academic Conferences and Publishing International Limited, 2020, p. 143-150Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The Executive Order 13800—Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure—issued by the President of the United States, calls for an evaluation of the “readiness and gaps in the United States’ ability to manage and mitigate consequences of a cyber incident against the electricity subsector.” In May of 2018, the Office of Management and Budget finished evaluating the 96 risk assessments conducted by various agencies and published Federal Cybersecurity Risk Determination Report and Action Plan (Risk Report). While the report embraced a broad defending forward strategy, it made no reference to smart grids or their vulnerable intelligent substations and did not address how federal agencies plan to respond to emerging threats to these systems. While the paper does not discuss how to attack the smart grids in the cyber domain, the contribution to the academic debate lies in validating some of the vulnerabilities of the grid’s substations in order for government, private industry, academia, and civil society to better collaborate in disrupting or halting malicious cyber activities before they disrupt the power supply of the United States and its Transatlantic allies. We also discuss how Artificial Intelligence and related techniques can mitigate security risks to cyber-physical systems. Until this technology becomes available, however, standardization of cyber security efforts must be enforced through regulatory means, such as the enforcement of security-by-design Intelligent Electronic Devices and protocols for the smart grid. 

  • 23.
    Kindström Andersson, Karl
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section. Saab Aeronautics AB och Linköpings universitet, (SWE).
    Andersson, Kent
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Jouannet, Christopher
    Conceptual Aircraft Design division, Saab Aeronautics, Linköping, (SWE).
    Amadori, Kristian
    Conceptual Aircraft Design division, Saab Aeronautics, Linköping, (SWE).
    Krus, Petter
    Department of Management and Engineering, Linköping University, Linköping, (SWE).
    System of systems lessons to be learned in the development of air power for the future: a small state’s perspective2022Conference paper (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Sweden, as a small alliance free state with powerful neighbors, has a military history of what we nowadays call systems of systems thinking. Since the beginning of the Cold War thishas been expressed in an air force on the forefront of exploiting military innovations, not least with regard to sensor networks, datalinks, information sharing and distributed decision making. How can this history and the lessons learned come to use when future systems and technologies are to be developed to meet the uncertain future and changing threats? How does this fit with current trends such as capability-based approach and system of systemsengineering methodology? What could this mean for the development of the next generation fighter aircraft - after the Gripen E and contemporary aircraft? These questions have been studied from both a government and industry perspective, following the trend in the defense sector of a more intertwined relationship between the two, necessitated by adopting acapability view on aircraft development. This paper presents preliminary lessons identified from a case study on the project Flygvapnet 2000 (FV2000), which preceded the Net Centric Warfare era at the turn of the millennium. The analysis was based on characteristics of best practice systems of systems engineering derived from a review of literature presenting the methodology theory on capability-based approaches for analyzing, acquiring, developing, and managing military capabilities. The findings from this project will contribute to the development of systems of systems engineering methods and will spur proposals for future research.

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  • 24.
    Kävrestad, Joakim
    et al.
    School of Informatics, University of Skövde, (SWE).
    Huskaj, Gazmend
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section. University of Skövde, Sweden.
    How the Civilian Sector in Sweden Perceive Threats From Offensive Cyberspace Operations2021In: 20th European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security / [ed] Dr. Thaddeus Eze, Dr. Lee Speakman and Dr. Cyril Onwubiko, Chester: Academic Conferences and Publishing International Limited, 2021, p. 499-506Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The presence of state-sponsored actors executing offensive cyberspace operations (OCO) has been made evident in recent years. The term offensive cyberspace operations encompass a range of different actions, including cyberespionage, disinformation campaigns, spread of malware and more. Based on an analysis of past events, it is evident that state- sponsored actors are causing harm to the civilian sector using OCO. However, the degree to which civilian organizations understand the threat from state-sponsored actors is currently unknown. This research seeks to provide new a better understanding of OCO and their impact on civilian organizations. To highlight this domain, the case of the threat actor Advanced Persistent Threat 1 (APT1) is presented, and its impact on three civilian organizations discussed. Semi-structured interviews were used to research how the threats from OCO and state-sponsored actors are perceived by civilian organizations. First, a computational literature review was used to get an overview of related work and establish question themes. Next, the question themes were used to develop questions for the interview guide, followed by separate interviews with five security professionals working in civilian organizations. The interviews were analysed using thematic coding and the identified themes summarized as the result of this research. The results show that all respondents are aware of the threat from OCO, but they perceive it in different ways. While all respondents acknowledge state-sponsored actors at a threat agentexecuting OCO, some respondent’s argue that state-sponsored actors are actively seeking footholds in systems for future use while others state that the main goal of state-sponsored actors is to steal information. This suggests that the understanding of the threat imposed by OCO is limited, or at least inconsistent, among civilian security experts. As an interview study, the generalisability of this research is limited. However, it does demonstrate that the civilian society does not share a common view of the threat from state-sponsored actors and OCO. As such, it demonstrates a need for future research in this domain and can serve as a starting point for such projects.

  • 25.
    Laestadius, Nils
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Påverkansfaktorer i pansarduellen: människans roll i bekämpningskedjan2018Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [en]

    This paper examines the technical and human factors that affect the time a gunner detects, identifies and destroy a target. The paper submits suggestions on technical and educational measures that can be rectified to save time in a combat process.

    Many battles between combat vehicles take place in swiftly situations, duel fighting. The combat distance is derived from simulated battles from all over Sweden and is set to as short distance as 300 m. The gunner can, under good weather conditions, identify a 2.3 m high target at a distance of 1520 m, but under difficult conditions like in fog, it may be hard to identify at the given distance of 300 m. This, together with, the hit probability of hitting the target due to system scattering and selection of aim point at the target, makes it difficult to determine the effect of the given fire. There is a risk that the gunner will overcompensate that with firing to many rounds at the target, which in turn leads to time losses.

    The purpose of the paper is to study the Kill chain process to build up knowledge of the processes, in order to understand where it is possible to optimize. This optimization should then reduce the time from detection until the target is destroyed.

    The results of the analysis show that the proven experience contained in the Armed Forces manuals and regulations is well balanced but lacks references so that traceability is inadequate. The result also shows that if rules of firing are followed, the opponent will be destroyed with sufficient effect. However, it depends on where the target is hit. In the front, it will be difficult to observe the effect, but a hit in the side of the target the effect will be fairly easy to observe as it leads to fire in a high number of extent. The gunner may have to fire up to eight rounds to be sure to destroy a combat vehicle depending on the distance to the target and where the round hit the target.

    With this result, it is recommended that a further examination be carried out on which algorithms can support image enhancing electro optics.  Fusion of sensors plus fire and control systems ought to be examined to find solutions that enable predictive automatically sets of fire to speed up the kill chain.

     

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  • 26.
    Lindh, Jens
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Applications Section.
    Laestadius, Nils
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Martinsson, Lars
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Vatsel, Soames
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Lärobok i militärteknik - exempelsamling: Problem- och övningsbok med ledningar, Version 3.02020Book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
    Abstract [en]

    Course material with examples for basic course in military technology.

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  • 27.
    Lundmark, Martin
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    1.4 Sweden2017In: Defence-industrial links between the EU and the US, Paris: IRIS (The French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs) , 2017, p. 19-24Chapter in book (Other academic)
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  • 28.
    Lundmark, Martin
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Conditions and success factors for companies in international arms collaboration2017Conference paper (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This report discusses what factors and conditions that support a successful implementation of international defence materiel collaboration. It is based on the analysis of a eight multilateral collaborations, with Sweden as a partner in six of them.

    Since the mid-1990s, international defence materiel collaboration has represented an increasingly large share of European nations’ defence procurement. This development is likely to continue. As a framework for future decisions concerning international defence materiel collaboration, an analysis is needed regarding how such collaboration between defence companies actually is implemented. The specific purpose of the report is therefore:

    • To identify factors that influence the accomplishment of international defence materiel collaboration between companies

    The report is based on eight case studies of international defence materiel collaboration: Iris-T, Joint Strike Fighter, Meteor, MidCas, Neuron, NFR-90, Taurus, and Viking.

    Based on the analysis, the findings are:

    -          The main conclusions are that international collaboration between companies has a greater probability of a successful outcome if: companies view the collaboration as being strategic; companies have experience of previous collaboration between them; and one single company has the lead in the collaboration.

    -          Factors that shape the conditions, but do not have a direct influence on operations, are for example: the products’ degree of innovation, the number of participating companies and the number of participating states.

    Based on these results we recommend decision makers in the concerned ministries and authorities to analyse before engaging in international defence materiel collaboration:

    -          the concerned companies’ incentives for collaborating;

    -          if companies have shared strategic goals for the collaboration;

    -          if the companies are on a similar level of technology, and;

    -          to demand that one single company has the lead in the collaboration.

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    Conditions and success factors for companies in international arms collaboration
  • 29.
    Lundmark, Martin
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    The development of the Swedish defence technology complex2013In: Export Voorusheny, Vol. 102, no 1, p. 20-29Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 30.
    Lundmark, Martin
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    The Evolution Towards the Partial Strategic Autonomy of Sweden’s Essential Security Interests2022In: Defence and Peace Economics, ISSN 1024-2694, E-ISSN 1476-8267, Vol. 33, no 4, p. 399-420Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article describes how Sweden developed a hybrid defence-industrial infrastructure with three prioritized ‘essential strategic interests’ pointing to parts of the domestic defence industry: ‘a partial strategic autonomy’. The article focuses on Sweden’s declared three essential security interests – combat aircraft; underwater capabilities; and integrity-critical parts of the command and control. The article finds that the possibilities and ways forward for the essential security interests vary, with a general trend towards more shared and increasingly partial autonomy. Six change factors are formulated as drivers towards Sweden’s partial strategic autonomy of today: Autonomy as a result of failed internationalization; Techno-nationalist perception of Sweden leading to industrial protectionism; Strategic choice; Corporate lobbying; Export incentives leading to political support of technologies; and Europeanization of the EU defence industry. Techno-nationalism and strategic choice are the factors with the most evident impact. The overall governance of the defence industry is clear on the priority of ensuring security of supply and a high degree of autonomy regarding the three essential security interests. Other parts of the defence industry operate under globalized and more competitive conditions.  In order to apply increased economic rationality and strive for shared autonomy, Sweden must increase its engagement in multilateral arms collaboration. 

  • 31.
    Lundmark, Martin
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    The Gripen Fighter: Present and Future Flight2019Other (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
    Abstract [en]

    The article describes the present development and status regarding the Swedish fighter aircraft Gripen.

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  • 32.
    Lundmark, Martin
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    The Swedish defence industry: drawn between globalization and the domestic pendulum of doctrine and governance2019In: The Economics of the Global Defence Industry / [ed] Hartley, Keith & Belin, Jean, New York: Routledge, 2019, 1, p. 290-311Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 33.
    Lundmark, Martin
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Amann, Daniel
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Applications Section.
    Dansarie, Marcus
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Applications Section.
    Löfgren, Lars
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Sturesson, Peter
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Technology Forecast 2018: Military Utility of Future Technologies2018Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Summary

    Four technology forecast reports from the Fraunhofer Institute and two reports from the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) have been reviewed by staff at the Military Technology Division at the Swedish Defence University (SEDU). The task given by the Defence Materiel Administration (FMV) was to assess the military utility of the given technologies in a timeframe up to the year 2040, from a Swedish Armed Forces (SwAF) perspective.

    In the review, we assess the military utility of certain technologies as possible contributions to the operational capabilities of the SwAF, based on identified and relevant scenarios.

    The technologies are grouped into four classes of military utility: potentially significant, moderate, negligible or uncertain.

    The following technologies were assessed to have the potential for significant military utility:

    • Rapid field      identification of harmful microorganisms
    • Hypersonic      propulsion

     

    The following technologies were assessed to have a potential for moderate military utility:

    • Non-line-of-sight      imaging
    • Artificial      intelligence for military decision support

     

    The following technologies were assessed to have uncertain military utility:

    • Structural      energy storage
    • Triboelectric      nanogenerators

     

    No technology was found to have negligible military utility.

    The method used in this technology forecast report was to assign each report to one reviewer in the working group. Firstly, each forecast report was summarized. A new methodological step this year was for each reviewer to discuss the assigned technologies with researchers from FOI. This proved to be a valuable enhancement for understanding the technologies’ present state and likely future development.

    The chosen definition of military utility clearly affects the result of the study. The definition used here, ‘the military utility of a certain technology is its contribution to the operational capabilities of the SwAF, within identified relevant scenarios’ has been used in our Technology Forecasts since 2013.

    Our evaluation of the method used shows that there is a risk that assessments can be biased by the participating experts’ presumptions and experience from their own field of research. It should also be stressed that the six technologies’ potential military utility was assessed within the specific presented scenarios and their possible contribution to operational capabilities within those specific scenarios, not in general. When additional results have been found in the analysis, this is mentioned.

    The greatest value of the method used is its simplicity, cost effectiveness and that it promotes learning within the working group. The composition of the working group and the methodology used are believed to provide a broad and balanced coverage of the technologies being studied. This report should be seen as an executive summary of the research reports and the intention is to help the SwAF Headquarters to evaluate the military utility of emerging technologies within identified relevant scenarios.

    Overall, the research reports are considered to be balanced and of high quality in terms of their level of critical analysis regarding technology development. These reports are in line with our task to evaluate the military utility of the emerging technologies.

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  • 34.
    Lundmark, Martin
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Andersson, Kent
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Bull, Peter
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Applications Section.
    Dansarie, Marcus
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Applications Section.
    Technology Forecast 2019 – Military Utility of Future Technologies: A report from seminars at the Swedish Defence University’s (SEDU) Military Technology Division2019Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Four technology forecast reports from the Fraunhofer Institute and two reports from the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) have been reviewed by staff at the Military Technology Division at the Swedish Defence University (SEDU). The task given by the Defence Materiel Administration (FMV) was to assess the military utility of the given technologies in a timeframe up to the year 2040, from a Swedish Armed Forces (SwAF) perspective. The assessment centred on 5G has the perspective 2030, due to the rapid development of telecommunication standards.

    In the review, we assess the military utility of certain technologies as possible contributions to the operational capabilities of the SwAF, based on identified and relevant scenarios.

    The technologies are grouped into four classes of military utility potential: significant, moderate, negligible or uncertain.

    The following technology was assessed to have a potential for significant military utility:

    • Cognitive Radar

    The following technology was assessed to have a potential for moderate military utility:

    • 5G technologies in military applications

    The following technology was assessed to have an uncertain potential military utility:

    • Multi-Domain UxS

    The following technologies were assessed to have negligible military utility.

    • Blockchains
    • Optical Atomic Clocks

    The method used in this technology forecast report was to assign each report to one reviewer in the working group. Firstly, each forecast report was summarized. A new methodological step this year was for each reviewer to discuss the assigned technologies with researchers from FOI. This proved to be a valuable enhancement for understanding the technologies’ present state and likely future development.

    The chosen definition of military utility clearly affects the result of the study. The definition used here, ‘the military utility of a certain technology is its contribution to the operational capabilities of the SwAF, within identified relevant scenarios’ has been used in our Technology Forecasts since 2013.

    Our evaluation of the method used shows that there is a risk that assessments can be biased by the participating experts’ presumptions and experience from their own field of research. It should also be stressed that the six technologies’ potential military utility was assessed within the specific presented scenarios and their possible contribution to operational capabilities within those specific scenarios, not in general. When additional results have been found in the analysis, this is mentioned.

    The greatest value of the method used is its simplicity, cost effectiveness and that it promotes learning within the working group. The composition of the working group and the methodology used are believed to provide a broad and balanced coverage of the technologies being studied. This report should be seen as an executive summary of the research reports and the intention is to help the SwAF Headquarters to evaluate the military utility of emerging technologies within identified relevant scenarios.

    Overall, the research reports are considered to be balanced and of high quality in terms of their level of critical analysis regarding technology development. These reports are in line with our task to evaluate the military utility of the emerging technologies.

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    Technology Forecast 2019
  • 35.
    Löfgren, Lars
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    A Comparison of two Books on Systems of Systems2014In: Le Libellio, E-ISSN 2268-1167, Vol. 10, no 3, p. 59-60Article, book review (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The objective of this text is to carry out a comparative analysis of the general features regarding System of Systems (SoS) in the books System of Systems Engineering: Innovations for the Twenty-First Century (Jamshidi, 2009) and Systems of Systems (Luzeaux & Ruault, 2010).

  • 36.
    Löfgren, Lars
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    A Review of the Book Systems of Systems 2014In: Le Libellio, E-ISSN 2268-1167, Vol. 0, no 3, p. 55-57Article, book review (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This review consists first of a brief description of the general features of Systems of Systems (SoS) through the book Systems of Systems by Luzeaux & Ruault (2010). The review then continues to address Chapter 4, written by Ruault (2010) on Human Factors within the context of SoS.

  • 37.
    Löfgren, Lars
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Are Systems of Systems a New Reality?2014In: Le Libellio, E-ISSN 2268-1167, Vol. 10, no 3, p. 47-54Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 38.
    Malmio, Irja
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Styrning i samverkan: Översikt2019Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Samverkan är ett svårfångat fenomen med många olika definitioner där det övergripandemålet är ”att arbeta tillsammans mot ett gemensamt mål eller för ett gemensamt syfte”(Svedin, 2015 s. 101). Termen beskrivs ofta som ett idealt tillstånd (Carlström & Berlin,2009) men innebär i realiteten inneboende intressekonflikter där strävan efter att skapa engemensam målbild kan innebära en konkurrenssituation (Uhr, 2011). Den modernakrishanteringen utgår i grunden från de beroendeförhållanden, kontakter och densamverkan som redan existerar mellan civila och militära organisationer under normalaförhållanden, och är därför beroende på hur pass väl utvecklade kontakter de olika aktörernahar med varandra före en kris uppstår (Bharosa, 2009; MSB 2014; Veibäck et. al, 2017).Denna text syftar till att ge läsaren en överskådlig bild av ett mycket komplext och brettämne, med olika möjliga teoretiska infallsvinklar. Texten inleder med en kortare redogörelseför olika relevanta teoretiska begrepp som kopplas ihop med styrning i samverkan i aktuellforskning som skett i anslutning till civil-militära relationer i internationella insatser,forskning som belyser social-psykologiska faktorer, samt forskning som har gjorts påoffentlig förvaltning (Svedin, 2009). Det övergripande temat för texten är styrning isamverkan där områden som behandlas är; ledarskap vilket fokuserar på styrning isamverkan, ledarskapsparadoxen samt ledarskapets kritiska faser. Därefter följerinformationsdelning i samverkan som ett rent funktionellt perspektiv påsamverkansstyrning. Sedan följer ett avsnitt som tittar på samverkansituationen utifrån ettsocial-psykologiskt perspektiv. Övergripande handlar dessa studier om den mänskligatendensen att kategorisera människor genom social stereotypisering (Allport, 1954.Fördomar uppstår genom social identifikation (Ashforth & Mael, 1989 ) som uppstår i olikakulturella miljöer. Avsnittet tittar även på förtroende och kontroll som är komplimenterandefaktorer (Costa & Bijlsma-Frankema, 2007), ju mer förtroende organisationer har förvarandra desto mindre kontroll behöver de utöva och vice versa. Texten avslutas med attlyfta tillit och socialt kapital som nödvändiga komponenter för en lyckadsamverkansstyrning.

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  • 39.
    Marcus, Carina
    et al.
    Saab AB, Linköping, Sweden; Linköpings Universitet, Sweden.
    Andersson, Kent
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section. National Defence University, Helsinki, Finland.
    Åkerlind, Christina
    Försvarets Forskningsinstitut, FOI, Sweden; Linköping University, Linköping, Sweden.
    Balancing the radar and long wavelength infrared signature properties in concept analysis of combat aircraft – A proof of concept2017In: Aerospace Science and Technology, ISSN 1270-9638, E-ISSN 1626-3219, Vol. 71, p. 733-741Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Designing combat aircraft with high military effectiveness, affordability and military suitability requires balancing the efforts of many engineering disciplines during all phases of the development. One particular challenge is aircraft survivability, the aircraft's ability to avoid or withstand hostile actions. Signature management is one way of increasing the survivability by improving the ability to avoid detection. Here, the long-wave infrared and radar signatures are studied simultaneously in a mission context. By establishing a system of systems approach at mission system level, the risk of sub optimization at a technical level is greatly reduced. A relevant scenario is presented where the aim is to incapacitate an air-defense system using three different tactics: A low-altitude cruise missile option, a low and medium altitude combat aircraft option. The technical sub-models, i.e. the properties of the signatures, the weapons and the sensors are modeled to a level suitable for early concept development. The results from the scenario simulations are useful for a relative comparison of properties. Depending on the situation, first detection is made by either radar or infrared sensors. Although the modeling is basic, the complexity of the infrared signature and detection chain is demonstrated and possible pivot points for the balancing of radar and IR signature requirements are identified. The evaluation methodology can be used for qualitative evaluation of aircraft concepts at different design phases, provided that the technical models are adapted to a suitable level of detail.

  • 40.
    Pede, Elena
    et al.
    Politecnico di Torino, Italy.
    Sivertun, Åke
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Alvinius, Aida
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Ledarskapscentrum.
    The Potential of Proactive Role of Citizens: Geo-information and communication technology in crisis management2016Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 41.
    Persson, Anders
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Division of Microsystems Technology, Uppsala, Sweden; Uppsala University, Ångström Space Technology Centre, Uppsala, Sweden.
    Berglund, Martin
    Uppsala University, Division of Microsystems Technology, Uppsala, Sweden; Uppsala University, Ångström Space Technology Centre, Uppsala, Sweden.
    Khaji, Zahra
    Uppsala University, Division of Microsystems Technology, Uppsala, Sweden.
    Sturesson, Peter
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section. Uppsala University, Division of Microsystems Technology, Uppsala, Sweden; Uppsala University, Ångström Space Technology Centre, Uppsala, Sweden.
    Söderberg, Johan
    Uppsala University, Division of Microsystems Technology, Uppsala, Sweden; Uppsala University, Ångström Space Technology Centre, Uppsala, Sweden.
    Thornell, Greger
    Uppsala University, Division of Microsystems Technology, Uppsala, Sweden; Uppsala University, Ångström Space Technology Centre, Uppsala, Sweden.
    Optogalvanic spectroscopy with microplasma sources: Current status and development towards a lab on a chip2016In: Journal of Micromechanics and Microengineering, ISSN 0960-1317, E-ISSN 1361-6439, Vol. 26, no 10, article id 104003Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Miniaturized optogalvanic spectroscopy (OGS) shows excellent prospects for becoming a highly sensitive method for gas analysis in micro total analysis systems. Here, a status report on the current development of microwave-induced microplasma sources for OGS is presented, together with the first comparison of the sensitivity of the method to conventional single-pass absorption spectroscopy. The studied microplasma sources are stripline split-ring resonators, with typical ring radii between 3.5 and 6mm and operation frequencies around 2.6 GHz. A linear response (R2 = 0.9999), and a stability of more than 100 s are demonstrated when using the microplasma source as an optogalvanic detector. Additionally, saturation effects at laser powers higher than 100 mW are observed, and the temporal response of the plasma to periodic laser perturbation with repletion rates between 20 Hz and 200 Hz are studied. Finally, the potential of integrating additional functionality with the detector is discussed, with the particular focus on a pressure sensor and a miniaturized combustor to allow for studies of solid samples.

  • 42.
    Sigholm, Johan
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section. Sloan School, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA.
    Falco, Gregory
    CSAIL, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, (USA) / FSI, Stanford University, (USA).
    Viswanathan, Arun
    NASA Jet Proplusion Laboratory, Caltech, (USA).
    Enhancing Cybersecurity Education through High-Fidelity Live Exercises (HiFLiX)2019In: Proceedings of the 52nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, IEEE conference proceedings, 2019, p. 7553-7562Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The people responsible for building the IT products and infrastructure of tomorrow – today’s students of the computing disciplines – oftentimes do not have the opportunity or proper motivation to develop cybersecurity skills meeting the needs of the job market. This paper introduces High Fidelity Live eXercises (HiFLiX) a teaching/learning activity designed to expose students to cybersecurity challenges resembling those they could face in a future work environment. We describe a HiFLiX prototype study, conducted as a collaboration between the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s CyberSecurity@CSAIL research group and NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Our analysis indicates that the proposed delivery method met the stipulated cybersecurity educational outcomes and increased the motivation for future cybersecurity studies in the majority of participants. Two previously unknown software flaws were also discovered.

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  • 43.
    Sigholm, Johan
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Larsson, Emil
    Assemblin, (SWE).
    Cyber Vulnerability Implantation Revisited2021In: 2021 IEEE Military Communications Conference (MILCOM), San Diego, November 29-December 2, 2021., Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 2021, p. 464-469Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper we revisit a study presented at MILCOM 2014. Our goal then was to determine the utility of implanting a vulnerability into a cybersecurity software protocol to an actor planning to execute an offensive cyber operation. Based on a case study describing the then recently discovered Heartbleed bug as an offensive cyber operation, a model was devised to estimate the adoption rate of an implanted flaw in OpenSSL. Using the adoption rate of the cryptographic protocol Transport Layer Security version 1.2 as a proxy, we predicted that the global adoption of the vulnerability of at least 50% would take approximately three years, while surpassing 75% adoption would take four years. Compared to subsequently collected real-world data, these forecasts turned out to be surprisingly accurate. An evaluation of our proposed model shows that it yields results with a root-mean-square error of only 1.2% over the forecasting period. Thus, it has a significant degree of predictive power. Although the model may not be generalizable to describe the adoption of any software protocol, the finding helps validate our previously drawn conclusion that exploiting implanted cyber vulnerabilities, in a scenario like the one presented, requires a planning horizon of multiple years. However, as society becomes further dependent on the cyber domain, the utility of intentional vulnerability implantation is likely an exercise in diminishing returns. For a defender, however, our model development process could be useful to forecast the time required for flawed protocols to be phased out.

  • 44.
    Silfverskiöld, Stefan
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Andersson, Kent
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Lundmark, Martin
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Does the method for Military Utility Assessment of Future Technologies provide utility?2021In: Technology in society, ISSN 0160-791X, E-ISSN 1879-3274, Vol. 67, p. 1-10, article id 101736Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The Military Utility Assessment of Future Technologies (MUAFT) method was developed as a cost-efficientalternative to methods such as NATO’s Disruptive Technology Assessment Games, to be used as a part of theSwedish Armed Forces’ long-term capability development process. The question addressed in this study iswhether MUAFT can be considered to have validity in its context and thus if it has potential to be useful to othersmall to medium size states. The analysis was based on an operationalization of Clark’s framework for scienceand technology intelligence analysis, combined with a military capability centric view of military utility. MUAFTreports from 2012 to 2018 were reviewed in terms of how they satisfy five key criteria. The study shows thatMUAFT provides utility, if used by a suitably composed group of experts, who are aware of the method’s limitations.The limitations mainly originate from a lack of explicit support for assessing the impact of forces forchange, other than technological forces, on military capability development. The expert group serves as thesynthesizing bridge between technology forecasts and military utility assessments. Therefore, comprehensiveexpertise is needed in various military technology specialisations, in the sponsor’s military capabilities and insubjects necessary to master in order to assess other influential societal forces for change.

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  • 45.
    Silfverskiöld, Stefan
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Liwång, Hans
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Applications Section.
    Hult, Gunnar
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division.
    Sivertun, Åke
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Bull, Peter
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Applications Section.
    Sigholm, Johan
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Lundmark, Martin
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    von Gerber, Carl
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Applications Section.
    Andersson, Kent
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Sturesson, Peter
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Technology Forecast 2017 - Military Utility of Future Technologies: A Report from Seminars at the Swedish Defence University’s (SEDU) Military-Technology Division2017Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Two technology forecast reports from the Fraunhofer Institute, three reports from the Swedish Defence Research Institute (FOI) and two publications from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) have been reviewed by staff at the Military-Technology Division at the Swedish Defence University (SEDU). The task given by the Defence Material Administration (FMV) was to assess the military utility of the given technologies in a time frame to up 2040, from a Swedish Armed Forces (SwAF) perspective.

    In the review we assessed the military utility of certain technologies as possible contributions to the operational capabilities of the SwAF, based on identified and relevant scenarios. Because a new capability catalogue is under development at the SwAF Headquarters, this report only presents general assessments of the capability impact of the technologies studied.

    The technologies were grouped into four classes: potentially significant, moderate, negligible, or uncertain military utility.

    The classification uncertain military utility was given to technologies that are difficult to put in the other three classes, it was not because the technology readiness level (TRL) will not bereached by 2040.

    The following technologies were assessed to have the potential for significant military utility:

    - Nanocarbons for photonic applications

    The following technologies were assessed to have a potential for moderate military utility;

    - Internet of things (IoT)

    - Materials and technologies for protection against chemical agents

    The following technologies were assessed to have uncertain military utility;

    - Post-quantum cryptography

    - New applications for hyperspectral image analysis for chemical and biological agents

    No technology was found to have negligible military utility.

    The method used in this technology forecast report was to assign each report to one reviewer in the working group. Firstly, each forecast report was summarized. The Fraunhofer assessment of technical readiness level (TRL) in the time period was held to be correct. Each technology was then put into one or more scenarios that were assessed to be suitable for assessing the military utility as well as indicating any possibilities and drawbacks. Based on a SWOTanalysis, the assessed contributions to the fundamental capabilities, and to the factors DOTMPLFI (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Interoperability), were listed. Furthermore, the expected SwAF R&D requirements, to facilitate the introduction of the technology are given. The Military utility was assessed using a model developed by the Military-Technology Division. Finally, conclusions and an overall rating of the potential military utility of each technology were presented.

    The chosen definition of military utility clearly affects the result of the study. The definition used here (“the military utility of a certain technology is its contribution to the operational capabilities of the SwAF, within identified relevant scenarios”) has been used in our Technology Forecasts since 2013.

    Our evaluation of the method used shows that there is a risk that assessments can be biased by the participating experts’ presumptions and experience from their own field of research. It should also be stressed that the seven technologies’ potential military utility was assessed within the specific presented scenarios and their possible contribution to operational capabilities within those specific scenarios, not in general. When additional results have been found in the analysis, this is mentioned.

    The greatest value of the method used is its simplicity, cost effectiveness and that it promotes learning within the working group. The composition of the working group and the methodology used are believed to provide a broad and balanced coverage of the technologies being studied. This report should be seen as an executive summary of the research reports and the intention is to help the SwAF Headquarters to evaluate the military utility of emerging technologies within identified relevant scenarios.

    Overall, the research reports are considered to be balanced and of high quality in terms of their level of critical analysis regarding technology development. These reports are in line with our task to evaluate the military utility of the emerging technologies.

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  • 46.
    Sturesson, Peter
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section. Ångström Space Technology Centre (ÅSTC), Uppsala University, Sweden.
    Sense, Actuate and Survive: Ceramic Microsystems for High-Temperature Aerospace Applications2018Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In aerospace applications, but also in manufacturing, mining, energy industry and natural hazards, high temperature, corrosion, erosion and radiation, challenge the performance and being of hardware.

    In this work, high-temperature co-fired ceramic (HTCC) alumina and platinum have been used for a range of devices intended for aerospace applications at up to 1000°C.

    The thermomechanics of a pressure sensor was investigated, and the interfacing was attained by wireless powering and reading. However, read range was limited and sensitivity decreased with temperature. Silver, electroplated after sintering, was found to remedy this until it eventually alloyed with platinum.

    Copper was electroplated and oxidized for oxygen storage in a microcombustor, intended for sample preparation for optogalvanic spectroscopy (OGS) to indicate extraterrestrial life. Despite delamination, caused by residual stresses, the device operated successfully.

    Conversely, pre-firing metallization by integration of platinum wires was studied. Freely suspended, and despite heat-induced shape irregularities, these were found advantageous over screen printed elements for gas heating, and temperature and pressure sensing. By fusing off the wires, spherical tips, allowing for impedance monitoring of microplasma sources in, e.g., OGS, were formed.

    Microplasma sources can also be used for gas heating. This, together with screen printed and suspended resistive heaters, was evaluated in a microthruster, showing that plasma heating is the most effective, implying fuel consumption reduction in satellite propulsion.

    In conclusion, HTCC alumina microdevices are thermally stable and could benefit several aerospace applications, especially with the complementary metallization schemes devised here.

    Future developments are expected to include both processing and design, all with the intention of sensing, actuating and surviving in high-temperature environments.

  • 47.
    Sturesson, Peter
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Bull, Peter
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Applications Section.
    On the Applicability and Military Utility of Microsystems in Military Jet EnginesManuscript (preprint) (Other academic)
  • 48.
    Sturesson, Peter
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section. Ångström Space Technology Centre, Dept. of Engineering Sciences, Uppsala University, Sweden, Division of Microsystems Technology, Dept. of Engineering Sciences, Uppsala University, Sweden.
    Klintberg, Lena
    Division of Microsystems, Dept. of Engineering Sciences, Uppsala University (SWE).
    Thornell, Greger
    Ångström Space Technology Centre, Dept. of Engineering Sciences, Uppsala University, (SWE); Division of Microsystems Technology, Dept. of Engineering Sciences, Uppsala University, (SWE).
    Pirani Microgauge Fabricated of High-Temperature Co-fired Ceramics with Integrated Platinum Wires2019In: Sensors and Actuators A-Physical, ISSN 0924-4247, E-ISSN 1873-3069, Vol. 285, p. 8-16Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper presents the integration and pressure sensor operation of platinum bond wires in High- Temperature Co-fired alumina (HTCC). Devices were fabricated with a 50 μm diameter wire suspended across a 500 μm wide cavity in green-body state HTCC, electrically connected to screen printed alumina conductors. The substrate shrinkage during sintering to a cavity width of 400 μm causes the wire element to elevate from the cavity ́s bottom surface. Resulting devices were compared with reference devices, containing screen-printed sensor elements, as Pirani gauges operated at 100 °C in constant-resistance mode, and in dynamic mode with a feeding current of 1 A in a pressure range from 10-4 Torr to atmospheric pressure. Also, devices with wire lengths between 500 and 3500 μm were operated and studied in constant-resistance and dynamic mode. Lastly, a device is demonstrated in operation at a mean temperature of 830 °C. The results include wire elements with a consistent elevation from their substrate surfaces, with irregularities along the wires. The wire devices exhibit a faster pressure response in dynamic mode than the reference devices do but operate similarly in constant-resistance mode. Increasing the wire element length shows an increasing dynamic pressure range but a decreasing maximum sensitivity. The sensitivity is retained in high temperature mode, but the dynamic range is extended from about 10 Torr to about 700 Torr.

  • 49.
    Sturesson, Peter
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Seton, Ragnar
    Uppsala Universitet (SWE).
    Klintberg, Lena
    Uppsala University (SWE).
    Thornell, Greger
    Uppsala University (SWE).
    Persson, Anders
    Uppsala Universitet (SWE).
    Effect of Resistive and Plasma Heating on the Specific Impulse of a Ceramic Cold Gas Thruster2019In: Journal of microelectromechanical systems, ISSN 1057-7157, E-ISSN 1941-0158, Vol. 28, no 2, p. 235-244Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Research and development of small satellites has continued to expand over the last decades. However, propulsion systems with adequate performance have persisted to be a great challenge. In this paper, the effects of three different heaters on the specific impulse and overall thrust efficiency of a cold gas microthruster are presented. They consisted of a conventional, printed resistive thick-film element, a freely suspended wire, and a stripline split-ring resonator microplasma source and were integrated in a single device made from high-temperature co-fired ceramics (HTCC). The devices were evaluated in two setups, where the first measured thrust and the other shock cell geometry. In addition, the resistive elements were evaluated as gas temperature sensors. The microplasma source was found to provide the greatest improvement in both specific impulse and thrust efficiency, increasing the former from an un- heated level of 44 s to 55 s when heating with a power of 1.1 W. This corresponded to a thrust efficiency of 53 %. This could be compared to the results from the wire and printed heaters which were 50 s and 18 %, and 45 s and 14 %, respectively. The combined results also showed that imaging the shock cells of a plasma heated thruster was a simple and effective way to determine its performance compared to the traditional thrust balance method.

  • 50.
    Sturesson, Peter
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section. Uppsala Univ, Dept Engn Sci, Angstrom Space Technol Ctr, Sweden; Uppsala Univ, Dept Engn Sci, Div Microsyst Technol, Sweden.
    Zahra, Khaji
    Uppsala Univ, Dept Engn Sci, Div Microsyst Technol, Sweden.
    Lena, Klintberg
    Uppsala Univ, Dept Engn Sci, Div Microsyst Technol, Sweden.
    Greger, Thornell
    Uppsala Univ, Dept Engn Sci, Angstrom Space Technol Ctr, Sweden; Uppsala Univ, Dept Engn Sci, Div Microsyst Technol, Sweden.
    Ceramic Pressure Sensor for High Temperatures: Investigation of the Effect of Metallization on Read Range2017In: IEEE Sensors Journal, ISSN 1530-437X, E-ISSN 1558-1748, Vol. 17, no 8, p. 2411-2421Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A first realization of membranes by draping a graphite insert with ceramic green body sheets, and a study on the relationship between circuit metallization, made by double- layer screen-printing of platinum and electroplating of silver on top of platinum, and the practical read range of ceramic LC resonators for high-temperature pressure measurements, are presented. As a quality factor reference, two-port microstrip meander devices were positively evaluated. To study interdiffusion between silver and platinum, test samples were annealed at 500, 700, and 900 °C for 4, 36, 72, and 96 hours. The LC resonators were fabricated with both metallization methods, and the practical read range at room temperature was evaluated. Pressure sensitive membranes were characterized for pressures up to 2.5 bar at room temperature, 500 and up to 900°C. Samples electroplated with silver exhibited performance equal to or better than double-layer platinum samples for up to 60 hours at 500°C, 20 hours at 700°C, and for 1 hour at 900°C, which was correlated with the degree of interdiffusion as determined from cross- sectional analysis. The LC resonator samples with double-layer platinum exhibited a read range of 61 mm, and the samples with platinum and silver exhibited a read range of 59 mm. The lowest sheet resistance, and, thereby, the highest read range of 86 mm, was obtained with a silver electroplated LC resonator sample after 36 hours of annealing at 500°C. 

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