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US strategic approaches in the African Great Lakes region are primarily based on security assistance for training and equipping African forces for operations in East, North, and West Africa. This assistance risks causing more incidents of violence. A new strategy, based on a comprehensive approach to the security challenges in the region, as well as the deployment of international "boots on the ground" - American or others - is needed to reduce violence and to minimze the risk of new terrorist safe havens appearing in central Africa.

Defence reform has been a major component of Bosnia’s stabilisation and nation-building. Though true for many cases of post-conflict transition, it is especially so for Bosnia, which arguably has the most complex state structure in Europe. Ten years on from the start of Bosnia’s defence-reform process, Destination NATO records and reviews the Bosnian experience of defence reform. The monograph offers policy-makers, practitioners and academics knowledge of the specific case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and makes these insights relevant to defence-reform efforts in other contexts.

The research is based on original sources and an extensive set of interviews and talks with key individuals including ambassadors, ministers and civil servants, and other senior national and international actors, in addition to discussions with several hundred politicians at local levels, students and NGO representatives. The authors also use their first-hand knowledge and insights to complement the documentation, interviews and discussions.

Against a surprising level of agreement between Clausewitz, contemporary military doctrines and critical war studies on an ontology of war as fighting, we suggest that the study of contemporary warfare needs to focus more on war as processing. Through Jean Baudrillard we argue that at least some of what is referred to as ‘war’ is no longer characterised by encounters through fighting. We exemplify our argument by how the repetitive battle-rhythm of military targeting strives for perfect war. What remains is not war as an object in itself, but a reified ‘war’ that obscures the disappearance of that very object. The debate on war contributes to the reification of such a war, as an imperative telling us: ‘we have a concept, you must learn to think through it’.

Air Commanders combines short military biographies and operational analyses to reveal how the personalities, attitudes, and life experiences of twelve outstanding U.S. airmen shaped the central air campaigns in American history. From Gen. Carl “Tooey” Spaatz, who began his career in World War I, to the recently retired Gen. T. Michael “Buzz” Moseley, the case studies illuminate the character of these airmen, the challenges they confronted in widely disparate armed conflicts, and the solutions that they crafted and implemented. Their achievements proved decisive not only in the campaigns they led, but also in shaping the U.S. Air Force and the dominant role of airpower in modern warfare. Air Commanders will be of interest to both general readers and students of military history—particularly those who wish to explore the use and development of airpower as a national instrument of force. With contributions from leading military experts and historians, this book demonstrates how personal qualities and leadership styles translate into battlespace outcomes.

What influences have shaped air power since human flight became a reality more than a hundred years ago? Global Air Power provides insight into the evolution of air power theory and practice by examining the experience of six of the world’s largest air forces—those of the United Kingdom, the United States, Israel, Russia, India, and China—and of representative smaller air forces in Pacific Asia, Latin America, and continental Europe. The chapters, written by highly regarded scholars and military leaders, explore how various nations have integrated air power into their armed forces and how they have applied air power in both regular and irregular warfare and in peacetime operations. They cover the organizational, professional, and doctrinal issues that air forces confronted in the past, the lessons learned from victory and defeat, and emerging challenges and opportunities. Further, Global Air Powersupplements the traditional military perspective with examinations of the ideological, economic, and cultural factors that give air forces their distinctive characters. Chapters show how the interplay among these internal factors, together with external challenges, determines the structure, role, and effectiveness of air forces. Together, these chapters illuminate universal trends as well as similarities and differences among the world’s air forces. Its combination of military history and sociopolitical analysis makes Global Air Power especially valuable to a broad range of historians, air power specialists, and general readers interested in national defense and international relations.

The Practice of Strategy focuses on grand strategy and military strategy as practiced over an extended period of time and under very different circumstances, from the campaigns of Alexander the Great to insurgencies and counter-insurgencies in present-day Afghanistan and Iraq. It presents strategy as it pertained not only to wars, campaigns, and battles, but also to times of peace that were over-shadowed by the threat of war. The book is intended to deepen understanding of the phenomena and logic of strategy by reconstructing the considerations and factors that shaped imperial and nation-state policies.

Through historical case studies, the book sheds light on a fundamental question: is there a unity to all strategic experience? Adopting the working definition of strategy as 'the art of winning by purposely matching ends, ways and means,' these chapters deal with the intrinsic nature of war and strategy and the characteristics of a particular strategy in a given conflict. They show that a specific convergence of political objectives, operational schemes of manoeuvre, tactical moves and countermoves, technological innovations and limitations, geographic settings, transient emotions and more made each conflict studied unique. Yet, despite the extraordinary variety of the people, circumstances, and motives discussed in this book, there is a strong case for continuity in the application of strategy from the olden days to the present. 

Together, these chapters reveal that grand strategy and military strategy have elements of continuity and change, art and science. They further suggest that the element of continuity lies in the essential nature of strategy and war, while the element of change lies in the character of individual strategies and wars.

Israels erfarenheter efter det andra Libanonkriget år 2006 ledde omedelbart till ett beslut om att reformera hela den israeliska försvarsmakten, IDF. Tidigare vald väg, där lågintensiv krigföring var tydligt framträdande inom utbildning och materielanskaffning, visade sig under nämnda krig vara felaktig[1]. Förbanden saknade förmåga att strida mot en organiserad fiende med avancerad taktik och effektiva kort- och långräckviddiga vapen. Försvarsmakten inledde direkt efter kriget en omfattande reform som initialt genomfördes under två år, men som är under fortsatt utveckling.

I inledningen förklaras att det inte finns en egentlig forskningsfråga. I det valda konstaterandet framkommer dock svar på frågor som sträcker sig från bakgrunden till nödvändigheten av en reform, genom reformen och resultatet av den.

Bakgrunden fokuseras på operativ miljö och dess styrande ramfaktorer. Som grund för att skapa förståelse för valda faktorer beskriv avgörande sentida historiska händelser, som Winogradkommissionens utlåtande, Israels beslut att lämna södra Libanon, Intifadan och Hezbollahs utveckling i området.

Andra Libanonkriget är den enskilda händelse som bekräftar att Israel och IDF inte var på rätt väg med sin säkerhetspolitiska utveckling. Kriget beskriv ur perspektivet processer eller ledarskap. Hur påverkades operationen under de 34 dagar den pågick och vad hände efter kriget?

Rapportens tyngdpunkt, reformeringen, inleds med att förklara naturen av IDF och dess funktion i samhället, som en förklaring till de beslut om vad reformen skulle omfatta. Då transformeringen beskrivs hamnar resonemanget med nödvändighet i doktrinutvecklingens nödvändighet. Israel och IDF anser att doktrinen är en spegel av identiteten av ett lands försvarsmakt, dess förankring i samhället och de uppgifter man är ställd att lösa.

Ideologi och basen av ”lessons learned” som instrument bildar fundament för nästa generations försvar. Resultatet av en två år lång process blir en nödvändighet då ”Cast Lead” utbryter. IDF strider i Gazakriget 2008 mot Hamas enligt de nya principer som reformen lett fram till.

Sista delen av rapporten utvecklar de väsentliga delarna av reformen och eventuella konsekvenser av denna. Resonemanget återknyter här till forskningsuppgiften: reguljär krigföring. Doktrinerna och doktrinutveckling är centrala begrepp för att lyckas med en omfattande reform. Förmågeutveckling är en av de övervägda faktorer som ansågs nödvändig efter kriget i södra Libanon 2006. Avslutningsvis utvecklas tankar och kommenterar om dessa faktorer.

I inledningen förklaras att det inte finns en egentlig forskningsfråga. I det valda konstaterandet framkommer dock svar på frågor som sträcker sig från bakgrunden till nödvändigheten av en reform, genom reformen och resultatet av den.

Bakgrunden fokuseras på operativ miljö och dess styrande ramfaktorer. Som grund för att skapa förståelse för valda faktorer beskriv avgörande sentida historiska händelser, som Winogradkommissionens utlåtande, Israels beslut att lämna södra Libanon, Intifadan och Hezbollahs utveckling i området.

Andra Libanonkriget är den enskilda händelse som bekräftar att Israel och IDF inte var på rätt väg med sin säkerhetspolitiska utveckling. Kriget beskriv ur perspektivet processer eller ledarskap. Hur påverkades operationen under de 34 dagar den pågick och vad hände efter kriget?

Rapportens tyngdpunkt, reformeringen, inleds med att förklara naturen av IDF och dess funktion i samhället, som en förklaring till de beslut om vad reformen skulle omfatta. Då transformeringen beskrivs hamnar resonemanget med nödvändighet i doktrinutvecklingens nödvändighet. Israel och IDF anser att doktrinen är en spegel av identiteten av ett lands försvarsmakt, dess förankring i samhället och de uppgifter man är ställd att lösa.

Ideologi och basen av ”lessons learned” som instrument bildar fundament för nästa generations försvar. Resultatet av en två år lång process blir en nödvändighet då ”Cast Lead” utbryter. IDF strider i Gazakriget 2008 mot Hamas enligt de nya principer som reformen lett fram till.

Sista delen av rapporten utvecklar de väsentliga delarna av reformen och eventuella konsekvenser av denna. Resonemanget återknyter här till forskningsuppgiften: reguljär krigföring. Doktrinerna och doktrinutveckling är centrala begrepp för att lyckas med en omfattande reform. Förmågeutveckling är en av de övervägda faktorer som ansågs nödvändig efter kriget i södra Libanon 2006. Avslutningsvis utvecklas tankar och kommenterar om dessa faktorer.

War memorials are a common and often controversial part of the commemoration of past wars. In order to better grasp their importance for the way war endures below the surface of peace, this article stages an ethnographic encounter with a Namibian monument: Heroes’ Acre. The memorial embodies the official Namibian narrative on past wars by emphasizing a nationalist and quasi-religious symbolism, a framing that has been challenged by a number of writers pointing to the need for going beyond the state discourse. This article complements and complicates the way Heroes’ Acre appears in discourse by focusing on the interstices and absences at the site. By drawing upon my own visit to the monument as well as theoretical engagements, most notably Georgio Agamben’s discussion of ‘the empty throne’, I read Heroes’ Acre as a place where political power functions through emptiness, as it allows the future of war to endure in the present. Engaging particularly with the empty graveyard at the site, I argue that its emptiness needs to be understood as a guarantee for war – not in case it occurs – but as a ready-made symbol of glory, always virtually there, waiting to be fulfilled.

The modern study of war originates in many ways in Carl von Clausewitz classic On War. One of Clausewitz most influential positions is the idea that war is political, summed up in the statement that ‘war is the continuation of politics by other means.’ Traditional approaches to war often draw on this idea to outline how tactics and operations work as means to strategic and political ends. Critical approaches on the other hand, have instead invoked Michel Foucault’s idea that ‘politics is the continuation of war by other means,’ enabling an understanding for how politics relate to a struggle of life and death. This paper outlines a critique of both ideas by drawing on Jean Baudrillard’s discussion of the Gulf-war. It argues that taking the link between war and politics for granted produces a reality which in many ways reflects and reifies war as a mode of politics, or politics as a mode of war. The text ends by arguing that if we are to think war seriously and critically we need to think it beyond politics, and a starting point to do so is to forget Clausewitz.