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Taking its departure in the concept of strategic culture, this book answers the question of why European countries decide either to participate or not in international military operations. This volume examines strategic culture and its relation to justifications of decisions made by France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland and the United Kingdom with regard to four different operations: Operation Enduring Freedom ISAF in Afghanistan, Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq, Operation Unified Protector in Libya, and EU Navfor/Atalanta outside Somalia. In this work the authors closely analyse the role of civil-military relations with regard to decisions about participation.

Sexual violence is a well-known phenomenon in armed conflicts. The international attention from scholars and policymakers has substantially expanded during the last decades, but until today a comprehensive understanding of the circumstances that generate this violence is absent. This causes difficulties in the policy rhetoric of the issue, as well as in the development of effective measures to prevent and combat conflict-related sexual violence in current conflicts.

This study aims to explore and identify circumstances related to the use of sexual violence by armed groups, and by state forces in particular. The overall purpose is to contribute to an understanding of why state forces commit sexual violence in some armed conflicts and not in others. An analytical framework is created based on existing theoretical concepts and explanations to the varying frequency of sexual violence. Based on this, five hypotheses of possible correlated conditions are created. These conditional factors are: 1) Rule of Law, 2) Other Violence, 3) Ethnic Conflict, 4) Gender Equality, and 5) International Support. The hypotheses are translated into macro-level variables that are systematically applied and compared between ten cases of armed conflicts, five of which have high levels of sexual violence committed by state forces, respectively five with no reports of sexual violence committed by state forces. This is done by a cross-national comparison using descriptive statistics. Four hypotheses are to a varying degree strengthened by this study and the result suggests that sexual violence committed by state forces is more likely to occur; in conflicts with low levels of rule of law; in ethnic conflicts; in conflicts with high levels of other violence, and; in absence of international support. The anticipation is that the results of this study will provide a platform for further conclusive research of casual factors to conflict-related sexual violence. 

Covid-19-pandemin har påverkat hela Sverige, inte minst genom dess stora effekter på liv och hälsa. Den utgör en så kallad ”gränsöverskridande kris” som har pågått under lång tid och där kunskapen kring viruset och dess effekter fortlöpande utvecklats. Krisen har förutsatt omfattande samverkan mellan aktörer på samtliga samhällsnivåer. Covid-19-pandemin är därför intressant att dra lärdomar ifrån.

Syftet med utvärderingen har varit att analysera och utvärdera Länsstyrelsens i Stockholms län (länsstyrelsen) krishantering under covid-19 samt att identifiera möjliga utvecklingsområden i länsstyrelsens arbete med krisberedskap. Målet med utvärderingen är att bidra till länsstyrelsens arbete med krisberedskap samt till kunskapsuppbyggnad och forskning om svensk krisberedskap och den samlade svenska hanteringen av covid-19 och dess konsekvenser. Förhoppningen är att utvärderingen ska gynna svensk krisberedskap i stort.

Länsstyrelsen har, framförallt genom det regionala geografiska områdesansvaret, viktiga uppgifter i svensk krisberedskap. Länsstyrelsen ska, bland annat, verka för gemensam inriktning, prioritering och samordning av åtgärder och aktörer i länet. På ett övergripande plan har länsstyrelsens hantering och hur den utvecklats över tid gynnats av länsstyrelsens krislednings (landshövding, länsöverdirektör, Chef i beredskap corona) engagemang och ändamålsenliga agerande, av en flexibel samverkan mellan länsstyrelsen och Samverkan Stockholmsregionens (SSR) samverkansstab samt av en effektiv användning av samarbetet mellan aktörerna inom SSR. Länsstyrelsens krisledning har, på ett ändamålsenligt och positivt sätt, agerat självständigt för att bevaka Stockholms läns intressen både inom ramen för det länsstyrelsegemensamma samordningskansliet och bilateralt med nationella myndigheter. Länsstyrelsens arbete med inriktning och samordning inom länet (både inom ramen för samarbetet med SSR och i bilaterala konstellationer) bedöms sammantaget ha bidragit på ett positivt sätt till arbetet med att uppnå de mål som finns formulerade för länsstyrelsernas krisberedskap.

Flera lärdomar kan dras av länsstyrelsens krishantering utifrån utvärderingen, framförallt gällande samverkan, organisation och kommunikation.

Länsstyrelsen har en central roll att spela i svensk krisberedskap vid komplexa och gränsöverskridande kriser och rollen i dessa händelser blir mer omfattande än att verka för samordning inom länet. Snarare befinner sig länsstyrelserna i en skärningspunkt där nationella, regionala och lokala perspektiv kan samlas, vilket innebär att förmågan till samlad analys och situationsförståelse blir viktig. Rollen kan emellertid inte nödvändigtvis lösas av länsstyrelserna gemensamt då detta skapar ett filter i den vertikala samverkan, utan varje länsstyrelse har här en viktig funktion att fylla. Därtill kan inte heller länsstyrelserna förlita sig på att behoven identifieras underifrån eftersom att hanteringen då riskerar att bli reaktiv.

SSR har visat sig vara en effektiv plattform för att uppnå gemensam inriktning, samordning och enhetlig kommunikation i länet. Samarbetet inom ramen för SSR har gynnat hanteringen och medförde att de relevanta aktörerna i Stockholms län kunde börja samverka i ett tidigt skede då de inte behövde bygga upp en struktur och kontaktvägar. SSR:s former för informationsinhämtning har gjort det möjligt för länsstyrelsen att agera buffert mellan nationella myndigheter och kommunerna genom att begränsa och effektivisera förfrågningar om information. Länsstyrelsens krisledning har också haft förmågan att identifiera behov av samordning som inte låtit sig lösas genom SSR och har hanterat dessa i andra forum. Tillsammans med SSR:s RSIB har länsstyrelsens krisledning också haft förmågan att anpassa strukturerna efter de krav som händelsen har ställt. Förmågan till anpassning och flexibilitet är viktig att slå vakt om.

Det är sannolikt att Stockholm som län behöver en struktur som SSR för att utföra uppgifterna inom ramen för det geografiska områdesansvaret. Det finns anledning att dra lärdom av erfarenheterna av samarbetet under pandemin för att utveckla SSR och integrering av länsstyrelsens och SSR:s respektive krisorganisationer. Det kan också finnas behov av att tydliggöra och ytterligare förankra ansvarsfördelningen mellan länsstyrelsens krisorganisation och SSR:s kansli/samverkansstab och då särskilt gentemot SSR aktörerna. Det är inte helt entydigt för SSR-aktörerna eller på länsstyrelsen var ansvarsfördelningen går mellan länsstyrelsen stab och SSR:s samverkansstab. I förlängningen innebär en sådan otydlighet en viss risk vid ansvarsutkrävande.

Länsstyrelsens samverkan med och inom det länsstyrelsegemensamma samordningskansliet har varit gynnsam. Det har till exempel inneburit att kontakter med nationella myndigheter kunnat samordnas. Det hade samtidigt underlättat ytterligare för länsstyrelsen om man kunnat rapportera lägesbilder enligt en gemensam mall till samtliga mottagande aktörer. Det gemensamma arbetet kan dock hämmas på grund av ”rättviseperspektivet” och att länsstyrelserna tillsammans blir mer av en nationell aktör än en regional. Länsledningen har utöver engagemanget i det länsstyrelsegemensamma arbetet också behövt ha förmåga att samverka enskilt med nationella myndigheter.

Sammantaget kan inte länsstyrelsens roll i svensk krisberedskap, och särskilt inte vid gränsöverskridande kriser, fullt lösas genom arbetet inom ramen för SSR respektive det nationella samarbetet mellan länsstyrelserna. Erfarenheterna från hanteringen av pandemin visar på centrala uppgifter för och förmågor hos länsstyrelsen vid kriser. Dessa erfarenheter bör omhändertas i länsstyrelsens krisplanering men det är samtidigt av särskild vikt att inte bygga organisationen för att kunna hantera pandemier, utan att ta hänsyn till bredden i länsstyrelsens uppdrag. Vidare utveckling av länsstyrelsens krisorganisation bör beakta samarbetet med SSR då detta visat sig centralt i hanteringen. Utvecklingsarbetet bör också ta hänsyn till integreringen mellan krisorganisation och linjeorganisation och se till att staben kan stödja länsstyrelsens beslutsprocesser. I alla utvecklingsprocesser är övning och träning av medarbetare av central betydelse.

Några aspekter i hanteringen framstår som särskilt viktiga lärdomar som kan användas för att utveckla länsstyrelsens krisorganisation. Anpassningen av länsstyrelsens stabsstruktur, integreringen med SSR:s samverkansstab, tillsättningen av rollen som insatschef/Chef i beredskap corona och att länsstyrelsen utnyttjade befintlig delegationsordning framstår ha gynnat hanteringen och bör således inarbetas i krisplaneringen.

Några ytterligare utvecklingsområden har identifierats. Rutiner för hur överlämningen mellan stabschefer sker kan förbättras och bör fortsatt diskuteras för att skapa mer kontinuitet för respektive stabschef. Erfarenheter från utvärderingen visar också att länsstyrelsens krisorganisation endast i begränsad utsträckning har bidragit till målet att verka för att samordna information i länet. Länsstyrelsen behöver även stärka sin kriskommunikationsförmåga som del av sitt samordningsansvar under en kris. Länsstyrelsens TiB har aktiverat ledningsorganisationen och tagit initiativ till samverkan och aktiverat SSR. Aktiveringen av SSR initierade också beslutet att aktivera länsstyrelsens stab. Underlaget till aktiveringen togs dock inte fram på beslut av länsstyrelsen. Länsstyrelsen bör försäkra sig om att det finns en egen förmåga till omvärldsbevakning för att kunna initiera samverkan utan att förlita sig på SSR.

Slutligen är länsstyrelsens analysförmåga i behov av utveckling. Utvärderingen indikeraratt länsstyrelsens krisorganisation bör innefatta en starkare analysförmåga med en övad analysgrupp som arbetar utifrån tydliga, systematiska och strukturerade processer och metoder. Analysprocessen bör också tydligare sättas in i länsstyrelsens övriga processer (särskilt processer för beslutsfattande) och tillgodose en förmåga att initiera och driva samverkan även i situationer där behoven inte identifierats av SSR:s aktörer. Även detta arbete bör ske i samverkan med SSR.

Sammantaget visar utvärderingen av Länsstyrelsen i Stockholms läns krishantering i samband med covid-19-pandemin på relevanta lärdomar för länsstyrelsens krisorganisation. Slutligen indikerar erfarenheterna och analysen i projektet att forskningen om hanteringen av gränsöverskridande kriser behöver inriktas mot regionala och ämnesövergripande aktörer och mot organisation för samverkan och ledning.

Authoritarian states and democracies have long used propaganda and disinformation to manipulate target audiences. Recently interest in this issue has increased, especially as active pro-Kremlin disinformation measures have targeted the Nordic countries. So far, research on disinformation measures in a Nordic context is limited and focuses mainly on how individual countries have been exposed, or how disinformation in regard to a particular and debated issue have affected the debate in individual countries, while research is lacking on how Nordic countries organize themselves and work to identify and counter such threats ina comparative perspective. This comparative case study uses qualitative analysis of literature, policy documents and interviews with expert practitioners to show that Sweden and Finland have established and tested organizations and networks to identify and counter disinformation campaigns. Similar institutionalization is now underway in Denmark and Norway. The states inspire each other and participate in international collaboration. But how the countries participate in such collaboration varies and, moreover, has bearing on their vulnerability in facing the threat.

Crisis management research is a young academic field, and organisational crisisinduced learning has been relatively neglected in the literature. Based on previous research and Moynihan’s conceptualization of inter- and intracrisis learning, this essay aims to discuss factors that affect public sector organisations’ ability to learn from crises in general, and the Swedish government’s lesson drawing from the COVID-19 pandemic in particular. Internal disagreements regarding the objectives of the response strategy and polarisation on how to handle the crisis has limited Swedish public sector organisations’ ability to learn from past experiences (intercrisis learning). Although instances of organisational learning during the crisis (intracrisis learning) have been observed, interorganisational cooperation difficulties and politicisation of the crisis management initiative as a whole seem to be affecting the learning process. There is a risk that both inter- and intracrisis learning processes in the wake of COVID-19 are impacted negatively due to the national and international politicisation of Sweden’s management of the pandemic.

Crises shake societies and organizations to their foundation. Public authorities, private companies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and members of the general public all have a role to play in managing crises. From a public administration perspective, however, responsibility clearly falls on politicians and strategic decision makers in public authorities. The task to manage crises is getting increasingly challenging, with more actors and sectors involved, unclear lines of accountability, and close connections between risks, organizations, networks, and interests. This means that the fundamental opportunity to improve structures for crisis management and preparedness, which requires learning from previous experiences, is increasing in salience. Previous research into the political dimensions of crisis management holds that learning is a key part of crisis management and a fundamental challenge to crisis leadership. The criteria that set crises apart from day-to-day work—that is, core values at stake, time pressure, and substantial uncertainty—also challenge the learning parts of crisis management. Learning in relation to crisis is essential for earnest investigation into what went wrong and why the crisis occurred, and, moreover, to make sure that it does not happen again. As organizations play a key role in crisis management, organizational learning is a useful concept to explore learning in relation to crises. Furthermore, the concept of crisis-induced learning has proven salient in bridging the literatures of crisis management and learning. Crisis-induced learning is understood as purposeful efforts, triggered by a perceived crisis and carried out by members of an organization working within a community of inquiry. These efforts, in turn, lead to new understanding and behavior on the basis of that understanding. The concept of crisis-induced learning can help add clarity to what learning is in relation to crises and who the learning agents are in these processes. Other important theorizing efforts in bridging crisis and learning include categorizing learning into its cognitive and behavioral aspects as well as its temporal aspects including inter- and intra-crisis learning. Finally, relating to issues of methodology, it is useful to distil ways to measure and analyze learning and to explain how crisis-induced learning is distinguished from other types of experiential learning.

This study applies an institutional profession perspective on a significant crisis management actor in an aim to deepen the understanding of collaborative crisis management work and practices. The study argues that a professions perspective holds a key to approaching interagency gaps in status and influence, which tend to affect collaborative crisis management negatively. Empirically the study is based on 19 interviews with local crisis communicators in Sweden. Findings indicate that, in terms of internal collaboration, limited knowledge among organizational members about the role and skills of crisis communicators require communicators to spend time and resources on ‘promoting’ their competence within the organization. Regarding inter‐organizational collaboration, the study shows that the closer a communication officer works to the spatial place of the crisis and to the rescue service, the higher the status of the communication officer. Interestingly enough, relations seem to go both ways as emergency service personnel can also be empowered by becoming more skillful communicators.

Lately, scholars have been engaging in studies on the crossroads between collaborative public management and crisis management, but our knowledge on how organizations work together with interorganizational goals in times of crisis or in relation to the threat that crises pose, is still limited. This study aims to illuminate how interagency horizontal collaboration plays out in practice. An interview study with twenty‐three Swedish duty officers in three organizations with critical tasks in the institutional crisis management system is carried out to unearth impediments to interagency collaboration that emerge when organizations from different policy subsystems engage in crisis collaboration. Empirically, the study contributes with new knowledge on how a crucial function in crisis management carries out work and deals with challenges. Theoretically, it contributes to the literature on crisis management collaboration by shedding light on processes of horizontal collaboration in the area of crisis management.

Power displacement and recapture: A qualitative study of regional duty officers in government agency interaction

This study highlights and discusses challenges organizations face when collaborating in the field of crisis management. We study how Swedish County Council duty officers experience collaboration with external government agencies. Our interview study is based on thirteen interviews with duty officers from six County Councils. In the analysis we discuss our results from a gender perspective. Furthermore we lay the foundation for an analytical model that can be used to better understand problems with collaboration in the field of crisis preparedness and management.

This article suggests a diagnostic framework of public communication intended to capture new communication strategies used by Armed Forces across Europe to legitimize new tasks and recruit new personnel. Three distinct communicative models that impact differently on democratic values and public support are suggested: an Old Public Administration (OPA) model influenced by bureaucratic values, a New Public Management (NPM) model fuelled by market values and a deliberative model labelled ‘New Public Service’ (NPS) that is largely influenced by proponents of ‘e-democracy’. A case study of the communication of the Swedish Armed Forces identifies a lingering bureaucratic (OPA) ideal. The market ideal (NPM) however clearly dominates. The article concludes that communication along market purposes, principles and practices risks distancing Armed Forces further from society. Yet, an embryonic deliberative ideal (NPS)—much fuelled by the use of social media such as blogs—was also identified. This growing ideal holds the potential of infusing deliberative vigor into the organization and presumably facilitates the bridging of the gap to society.

Previous research shows that the Swedish Armed Forces’ communication is dominatedby market communication, and that this may impact on how the organizationis anchored in society. By adopting a neo-institutional perspective to the studyof agency communication, this article aims to deepen the analysis of the ArmedForces’ communication. Our analysis, based on interviews and official documents,demonstrates both risks and opportunities with marketization of the Armed Forces’communication. On the one hand, market communication may lead to the neglectof alternative values and images of the Armed Forces. Also, the rushed changes incommunication strategies identified risk providing an image of a complex organizationthat is difficult to comprehend, which may undermine the Armed Forces’legitimacy. On the other hand, the Armed Forces’ enhanced role as an employer andcomprehensive use of social media has led to more transparency and to the fosteringof values corresponding to values in society at large. How the Armed Forces, itsleadership, management, and communicators relate to these opportunities andrisks will be crucial for the organization’s future legitimacy.

Projection of strategic narratives to gain competitive advantages is a central feature in the global competition for status and power. This article presents a comparative narrative analysis of how the Russian state sponsored news platform Sputnik narrates Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden 2014–2019. The objectives are to uncover what negative work strategic narratives can perform and to decipher how adverse narratives are constructed. The findings suggest that Sputnik uses a mix of standard strategies and tailor-made narratives, working to destruct, direct and suppress the Nordics. The analysis exposed distinct differences as Sputnik narrated Sweden and Denmark more negatively than Norway and Finland. The narratives can serve to divide and weaken the Nordics and the EU, and undermine international reputations of each state. The strategy of division through narratives is particularly problematic as polarization challenges Western democracies and the EU. The article furthers narrative research by testing a recently crafted analytical framework and by presenting findings that indicate a need for a broadened research agenda. Whereas previous research has primarily centred on how malign information influence can harm democracy, our results indicate that narratives can cause a broader variety of harms.

Climate change, globalization, urbanization, social isolation, and increased interconnectednessbetween physical, human, and technological systems pose major challenges to disaster risk reduction(DRR). Subsequently, economic losses caused by natural hazards are increasing in many regions of theworld, despite scientific progress, persistent policy action, and international cooperation. We argue thatthese dramatic figures call for novel scientific approaches and new types of data collection to integratethe two main approaches that still dominate the science underpinning DRR: the hazard paradigm and thevulnerability paradigm. Building from these two approaches, here we propose a research framework thatspecifies the scope of enquiry, concepts, and general relations among phenomena. We then discuss theessential steps to advance systematic empirical research and evidence-based DRR policy action.

Using primary sources from four Nordic countries, (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden), this volume explores how small states have adjusted their military strategies in response to external shocks of the 21st century. The 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Russian interventions in Georgia and Ukraine, and the rise of the Islamic State have all forced the Nordic states to adopt new strategies. While the responses have not been uniform, their differing relations to the EU and NATO have not prevented these countries from behaving similarly in military affairs. Limitations in military capacity has led all four countries to pursue strategies that include cooperation with more resourceful partners. It is necessary for them to cooperate with others to protect and promote their national interests. Moreover, the Nordic cosmopolitan outlook expresses milieu-shaping ambitions that we generally would not expect small states to pursue against a potential great power aggressor.

This book will be of much interest to students of military strategy, defense studies, security studies, and international relations.

This article shows that all four Nordic countries, i.e., Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, have adjusted their alignment strategies when responding to the changes in their external environment during the twenty-first century. Furthermore, our findings indicate a great diversity among the four states in their responses. All too often, security policy analyses cluster small states into allies and non-allies, respectively. However, this article suggests that alliance affiliation in isolation is not sufficient for explaining small states’ behavior and adjustments of their strategies. Occasionally, previous experiences of armed conflicts as well as perceptions of strategic exposure provide stronger explanatory power.

This book explores the military strategies of the five system-determining great powers during the twenty-first century.

The book’s point of departure is that analyses of countries’ defence strategies should acknowledge that states come in various shapes and sizes and that their strategic choices are affected by their perceptions of their position in the international system and by power asymmetries between more and less resourceful states. This creates diversity in strategies that is often overlooked in theoretically oriented analyses. The book examines how five major powers – the United States, China, the United Kingdom, France and Russia – have adjusted their strategies to improve or maintain their relative position and to manage power asymmetries during the twenty-first century. It also develops and applies an analytical framework for exploring and categorising the strategies pursued by the five major powers which combine elements of structural realism with research on power transition theory and status competition. The concluding chapter addresses questions related to stability and change in the present international system.

Do middle powers develop similar defense strategies? Is middle powers a useful category for exploring the diversity of strategies among different categories of states? This article presents a great variation of strategies among the selected cases. Concurrently, similarities between middle powers belonging to similar regional security complexes (RSC) are revealed. The higher degree of great power penetration into a RSC, the lesser options for middle powers to develop individual strategies and vice versa. Furthermore, by comparing our findings with the strategies of more and less resourceful states, common elements among middle powers in terms of ends, means and ways, appear.

One key question for the European security community is whether today’s confrontation between the EU member states and Russia is the end of its spread to the Baltic Sea region, including Russian districts, and the beginning of a return of geopolitical rivalry in the region. This article investigates the possibilities of avoiding such a negative downward spiral by drawing on security community theory and discussing two different methods of security community building – “top-down” and “bottom-up”. It points to the need for the EU institutions to return to the Monnet method to find a way out of the geopolitical “zero-sum” game increasingly played by the governments in the region. This implies not putting restrictions on participants from the north-west regions of Russia in strategically chosen areas of cooperation, and a more pronounced bottom-up, long-term and macro-regional approach built on joint problem-solving projects and people-topeople contacts that generate “win-win” games.

European states may no longer expect inter‐state violence, but they do expect complex threats emanating from storms, epidemics, terror attacks and earthquakes. The EU has answered these threats through the rapid and far‐reaching institutionalization of European security cooperation. However, member states hesitate to use their common capacities. While both intergovernmental and constructivist approaches treat this pattern as evidence of weak integration and as unimportant to the European security community, we examine this cooperation through the lens of practice theory and reveal how the growth of EU capacities is fully compatible with a critical and cautious approach to activating these resources in the everyday work of national officials. Using unique empirical data retrieved through participant observation in the first multisectoral crisis management exercise held by the EU, the findings of this analysis sketch the contours of a new type of security community.